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FOREWORD
A research project entitled “Under pressure from abroad. Sectors of 
the Swedish economy 1939-1945” has been in progress for some 
time now at the Institute of Economic History at Gothenburg 
University. In spite of the fact that Sweden managed to keep out of 
the Second World War she was greatly affected by the events in 
neighbouring Europe. This applied not least to her economic life, 
the development of which will be described in the project. The 
connections to the west were cut off by the German armed forces’ 
occupation of Denmark and Norway in 1940 and by the Allies’ 
blockade. Sweden was therefore compelled to look to Germany for 
her foreign trade. These changes caused great difficulties for the 
Swedish export industry while at the same time Sweden became 
dependent on Germany for supplies of important raw materials. 
Up to 1944 Sweden was faced with the problem of living with her 
mighty neighbour to the south in a precarious state of balance between 
economic and political dependence and independence.
As a result of pressures from abroad the Government came to play 
a more extensive role in the economic life of Sweden. As in other 
countries individuals and companies became enmeshed in a network 
of laws and regulations designed to secure the supplies which were 
the most important from society’s point of view. The rearmament 
of Sweden’s outmoded armed forces formed part of this. Here the 
engineering industry came into its own. In the short term this meant 
that Sweden’s engineering works were occupied to a great extent in the 
productions of grenades and other simple equipment for the armed 
forces. Since there was no opportunity to import technologically 
advanced equipment such as tanks and aircraft, it also became 
necessary to build up an independent and specialised Swedish
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arms industry. In spite of great difficulties, by the time the war 
was over the Government and the major private industries had 
succeeded in doing this.
This book describes the conditions and consequences of the rearma­
ment from the end of the 1930s. It shows the extent and the effect of 
the engineering industry’s involvement in this rearmament. The final 
chapter demonstrates how the structure of Sweden’s arms industry 
has endured far into the 1970s.
IMILITARY EQUIPMENT AT ANY PRICE?
THE ACQUISITION 1939-1945
A. Requirements and shortages
From the year 1936 onwards Swedish rearmament for the Second 
World War passed through four main phases with borderlines in 1938, 
April 1940 and 1942. The lines of demarcation between the phases 
are not absolutely precise, nor do they coincide for all branches of 
the services and for all types of equipment, but they can nevertheless 
be distinguished. It is noteworthy - and perhaps not surprising - that 
political developments abroad are decisive.1
It was the aspect of the darkening political horizon in Europe which 
lay behind the proposal for a considerable extension of the defence 
organization which the Defence Commission of 1930 put forward, and 
which resulted in the Defence Act of 1936. The acquisition of equip­
ment for this organization was planned on a long-term basis of be­
tween five and ten years, and the cost of the equipment amounted 
to a sum of between 75 and 100 million kronor a year. During the years 
1936 and 1937 the plans which had been devised were in the main 
adhered to.
It was plainly with regard to the alarming development of Ger­
many's power in Central Europe, which was manifested in the Aus­
trian “Anschluss” and the Munich crisis of 1938 and the march 
into Czechoslovakia in 1939, that the defence was given money over 
and above the sums provided for in the plans. This related to the 
two “70 million kronor grants” in 1938 and 1939 respectively, and an 
extra grant of 20 million kronor in 1938. In each case the grant was
1 Ehrensvärd, C. A., Vett och vilja. Studie över svenska försvarsprinciper pp. 61-75. 
No complete account of the development of foreign policy is given in this work, but 
familiarity with its main features is assumed. References generally to Carlgren, W. M., 
Svensk utrikespolitik 1939-1945.
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to be used to buy equipment. At the same time the rate of acquisition 
provided for in the plans of 1936 was increased.
When the World War broke out there was a definitive abandonment 
of the plans of 1936. However, the character of the rearmament was 
not one of maximum acceleration, but rather of reinforcement in 
certain areas, with transitional and preparatory work. The Govern­
ment was still not prepared to devote all available resources to the 
production of military equipment. Certainly a so-called war industrial 
production was started during the first quarter of 1940, but the system 
worked badly. The size of the grants for equipment was still a lim­
iting factor and even in industries of military importance a substantial 
civil productions was still permitted. The rearmament of the Swedish 
armed forces was severely restricted by the extensive support given 
to Finland during the Winter War in the shape of military equipment.
The events of April 1940 in Denmark and Norway constitute a 
clearer watershed in the history of rearmament than the outbreak of 
the war in September 1939. All efforts were now concentrated on a 
reinforcement of Sweden’s armed forces. Ironically, at the same time 
the country’s supply situation deteriorated because of the western 
blockade. The most important characteristic of the phase of rearma­
ment which began in April 1940 was the fact that on the whole ques­
tions of grants ceased to be decisive as far as acquisitions were 
concerned. Costs increased more than tenfold in comparison with the 
pre-war period. It was instead the country’s production capacity and 
its ability to import which constituted the limiting factors. Nor did 
the organizational freamework any longer play a significant part in the 
acquisition policy; equipment which increased the war potential was 
acquired and used within the organization in the best possible way. 
By virtue of the very fact that the production capacity within the 
country governed the rate of rearmament to a great extent, the 
organizations set up during this period to manage the production 
resources were to be at the centre of events. For example the National 
Industry Commission (IK) was deeply involved in endeavours to 
remove the bottlenecks in production which occurred when resources 
were taxed to the utmost.
The charting of the country’s capacity to produce military equip­
ment was one of the most important of the basic factors for the 
Defence Commission which was at work in 1941. The new Defence
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Act which was passed in 1942 included a five-year plan for the build­
up of equipment for defence which was geared to the country’s 
production capacity. Through the very passing of this Act rearma­
ment became less hectic in character and orientated to a greater 
degree towards long-term goals. In addition, the fact that certain 
requirements had been met and production capacity extended through 
the accelerated rearmament in 1940-1941 also played a part. Major 
problems still remained, but they related to certain particular types of 
military equipment: heavy modern equipment the production capacity 
for which could not be created in a short time. At the same time the 
winter of 1942-43 saw a change in the political scene abroad. Ger­
many’s setbacks in the Mediterranean and the Soviet Union meant 
that the pressure on Sweden eased; together with the improvement 
in Sweden’s military preparedness, this meant that there was no 
longer such an immediate threat of a German invasion of Sweden.
One manifestation of the fact that rearmament entered a new phase 
at this point in time was the decline in the proportion of equipment in 
the defence costs between the budget years 1941/42 and 1942/43 
(table 1, p. 14). This final phase extends beyond the end of the war.
The extensive rearmament of the Swedish armed forces took 
place on the basis of changes in the political situation abroad. From 
a formal point of view the acquisition of equipment was justified 
partly by a long-term estimate of the country’s need for armed forces 
and partly by a short-term estimate of the extra acquisitions required 
for the increased military preparedness which came into operation on 
3 September 1939. This division into two categories was reflected in 
the terms of the budget in that what was called "peace expenditure’’ 
was financed out of the national budget, while the grants which were 
justified by the emergency situation were paid from so-called emer­
gency budgets.
The theory behind the long-term acquisitions was that an organiza­
tion would be set up in accordance with certain strategic and eco­
nomic considerations, and this would then constitute the framework 
for the contents which would include equipment in accordance with 
certain specific equipment regulations. In practice it did not happen 
in this way. The development of the army can be studied to illustrate 
this.
As regards the army the provisional war organization of 1937 was to
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lead to the organization of 1940, but this never came into force and 
was replaced by the transitional organization of 1940. This merged 
into the war organization of 1941 which was intended to be ready in 
December 1940. This objective soon had to be abandoned, and 
instead a plan was devised for a gradual transition from 1/7 1940 to 
1/4 1941. The war organization of 1941 was to be in force from 1/8
1941, but by that time the aim had long since been the introduction of 
a completely new organization on which the 1941 committee for 
national defence worked and which was approved at the start of
1942. It involved a considerable increase in equipment required and 
now the aim was to change to a new war organization on 1/7 1943. 
This was not to be the case, and it was not until the autumn of 1945 
onwards that there was a transfer to “the modified war organization 
of 1943”.
Thus throughout the whole of this period the aims were altered, 
while within the army administration ceaseless work was carried out 
on lists of “shortages”, i.e. the differences between the equipment 
required to fill the organizational framework and that which was in 
fact available. However, one result of the shifting objectives was the 
fact that the “shortage estimates” were not merely based on the 
organization which was formally current, but also incorporated the 
more long-term aims which were more or less certain to receive 
formal sanction in due course. Furthermore, it turned out that when 
purchases of equipment were made there was not always an existing 
organizational basis for them, but instead purchases were made of 
equipment which was deemed “desirable” and which could later 
be sent to the units. For example, sub-machine-guns were purchased 
and distributed according to availability. Thus the lists of equipment 
were dictated to a certain extent by the acquisition of equipment 
rather than vice versa. This was particularly the case during the first 
years of hectic rearmament.
In these circumstances it would hardly be worthwhile to try to 
reconstruct after the event the development of the “shortage 
situation” during the period 1939-1945, either for the branches of 
the services or for the armed forces as a whole, although there is no 
lack of records for such an undertaking. Nor has it been considered 
profitable to separate the acquisitions for the peace organization and 
those which resulted from the increased preparedness. Moreover this
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legal separation was very poorly observed by the military authorities 
themselves during the first period, and throughout the whole of the 
period under investigation was affected far too much by budget 
technicalities and by other factors which are irrelevant to the inquiry. 
Instead the demand is defined in a highly operational sense: it be­
comes apparent by virtue of the very fact that it is met. The orienta­
tion of the rearmament will therefore indicate where the most urgent 
demands lay. It is a condition of such an approch that the demands 
are actually met. It is possible to compare the situation in a civil 
economy: a market system is presumed in theory to meet the relevant 
needs because of the fact that market demand controls production. 
In reality this is not always the case because of the fact that markets 
do not function perfectly and many needs never find expression as 
demands there. On the other hand in a planned economy no needs are 
permitted to have an effect without the planning of the subordinate 
authorities. Sweden’s rearmament was to a high degree a planned 
economic operation but there was no conflict between the consumer 
and the planner: the Government authorities can be regarded as a 
single unit which itself gauged the military demand, and allocated and 
controlled acquisitions with a power which was on the whole 
unlimited. Thus it is possible to accept that the acquisitions reflect 
the true demand which in turn is equal to the shortages in the 
equipment with which the armed forces were equipped. Whether 
the many priorities which were selected on all levels - from the 
adjustments between the branches of the forces to the establishment 
of lists of equipment for the gun crew - were correct is a question 
which might possibly have been answered if the country had been 
drawn into the war.
However, there is a further important factor here, viz. the time. 
External political and military developments through decisions 
about the acquisition of equipment rapidly created a very great 
demand for many kinds of military equipment. The chronological 
order in which they were acquired was not dictated by the degree 
of urgency but to a large extent by the availability of the equipment. 
If all military equipment had been available for purchase at any given 
time it is probable that the equipment whose shortage made itself felt 
most acutely would have been purchased first and later it would 
have been possible to draw conclusions from this about the demand
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position. Now this was far from being the case, as will be shown 
later. On the other hand it is possible to assume that there was a 
balance at the end of the war so that the total of acquisitions by that 
time reflects a kind of total demand structure. During the six years of 
the war it was possible to build up a domestic production capacity in 
all the vital areas.2
Undoubtedly the argument outlined above involves a simplification 
of reality. To an extent the demands for equipment arose and were met 
continuously, at least as regards technologically advanced equipment, 
where domestic research and external stimuli gave rise to new types. 
Nevertheless the period of the Second World War appears to be so 
clearly demarcated, comparatively speaking, that the typical problems 
of divisions into periods which beset the study of an economic process 
seem to be surmountable.
In all the circumstances there is hardly any risk that in using the 
definition of operational demand any shortage will be overlooked on 
account of the fact that it could not be met. Every trouble has its own 
stamp, and this account will deal above all with the problem areas, 
the bottlenecks.
B. The size of the grants in 1939-1945
As mentioned above, expenditure on defence increased very sharply 
during the period 1938-1940. In the budget year 1940/41 there had 
been a tenfold increase to about two thousand million kronor a year. 
The costs would continue on this level in the years which followed. 
A considerable proportion of these grants was used to acquire 
equipment as shown in table 1.
It transpires that during the period as a whole 46 per cent of the 
funds had been spent on acquiring equipment and that this had 
occurred with an emphasis which was both absolute and relative 
during the first three budget years.3 The acquisition of equipment 
had been dominated by the type of equipment which is central to 
this investigation, viz. “mechanical military equipment”: ammuni-
2 Atleastfunds had been allocated. As regards aircraft, for example, the period between 
decision and delivery was very long.
3 See appendix 1.
Table 1. Defence expenditure and the proportion of it spent on grants for 
equipment during the budget years 1939140-1944/45.
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total defence 
budget in 
millions of
kronor
equipment mechanical military 
equipment
millions of
kronor
% millions of
kronor
%
1939/40 1,289 1,117 86 874 67
1940/41 2,010 1,197 59 822 40
1941/42 1,847 1,176 63 1.005 54
1942/43 2,065 478 23 395 19
1943/44 2.007 763 38 693 34
1944/45 1,722 434 24 410 23
Total 10,990 5,165 46 4,199 38
Source: Appendix 2, table 15.
tion, weapons, vehicles, ships, planes et cetera.4 Table 1 shows that 
the bulk of the materials acquired fall into this category: forty-two 
thousand out of fifty-two thousand million kronor, or 38 out of the 
46 per cent of the defence budgets which related to the acquisitions 
of equipment. During the first half of the period the costs of me­
chanical military equipment exceeded half of the total grants, while 
during the second half they amounted to somewhat less than one- 
third.5
In order to be able to study the composition of the equipment 
group in greater detail certain types of equipment have been gathered 
together in diagram 1 which is based on types of equipment rather 
than branches of the forces. The total sums for the period amount to 
the following:6
4 See appendix 1.
5 The grants for equipment show an apparent decline in the budget year 1942/43. This 
is probably connected with the changes in the organization. After large orders had 
been placed during the first years of the war there was less activity in connection with 
the drafting of the Defence Act of 1942. Once this had been passed - with its five-year 
plan for the expansion of the defence — it was possible, after a period of preparation, to 
place extensive new orders again (Cronenberg, A., Armén). However, it should be 
borne in mind that the figures in the table do not relate to the supply of equipment but 
the allocations of grants.
6 Appendix 1, table 18.
2 - The Creation ...
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ammuni- weapons 
tion
ship’s
equip­
ment
aircraft
equip­
ment
other
equip­
ment
total
millions of kronor 802 1,956 488 876 75 4,199
Diagram 1. Grants for the main types of mechanical military equipment.
millions of 
kronor
weapons
aircraft equipment
\. ammunition
ship's equipment 
.other equipment
1939/40 40/41 41 /42 42/43 43/44 44/1945
Source: Appendix 2, table 15.
The rough breakdown of mechanical military equipment into five 
categories already shows the main pattern of the rearmament. 
Weapons constitute the biggest item. As will be seen later, a large 
number of products, mainly for the use of the army and the navy, 
are included under this heading. The acquisition of aircraft equipment 
is the second biggest item with the highest figures towards the 
beginning of the period. The ship’s equipment shows a similar but 
even more pronounced fall on the graph. Finally, ammunition is a
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large item, the grants for which obviously co-vary with those for the 
purchase of weapons. As regards these two types of equipment it is 
possible to find a connection between the organization and the 
acquisition. The decline in the grants for the budget year 1942/43 is 
connected with the fact that at that time money had not yet been 
provided for the organization which the defence resolution of 1942 
involved. Instead the grants increased in the following budget year.
Mine and torpedo equipment have also been included in the 
ammunition group, which is incorrect according to military termi­
nology. The mines accounted for a total of about 78 million kronor 
and funds for these were mainly granted during the initial stages of 
the war with a total of 64 million kronor during the budget years 
1939/40 and 1940/41. Torpedoes constituted a smaller item of about 
22 million kronor, and this too was mainly granted at the beginning 
of the period.7
Of the remaining sum - about 703 million kronor - about 108 
million kronor was granted directly to central administrative author­
ities - and thus not to the branches of the forces - for the acquisition 
of tools and machinery for the production of ammunition.8
Thus about 595 million kronor remained for purchases of ammuni­
tion in the strictest sense of the word. This sum was distributed 
amongst the services as follows:9
1939/40 40/41 41/42 42/43 43/44 44/45 total
army 20 111 97 14 140 24 407
navy 11 12 33 8 7 - 70
air force 16 33 24 15 15 15 118
total 47 156 154 37 162 39 595
In terms of value about one-third of this acquisition of ammunition 
related to ammunition for small arms, and the remainder to artillery 
ammunition.10
7 See appendix 1, table 18.
8 Förteckningar och sammanställningar ... p. 3. Ber.v. Huvudredogörelse: bihang 8. 
MHA.
9 See appendix 1, table 18.
10 See chapter III.
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Two traditional groups of materiel have been included under the 
heading weapons: the army's ordnance equipment (with certain 
exceptions which are included under other headings) and the navy’s 
gunnery equipment. As is shown below, it is the first group which is 
dominant:11
1939/40 40/41 41/42 42/43 43/44 44/45 total
army 345 242 536 140 296 162 1,720
navy 78 89 18 17 13 21 236
total 422 331 554 157 309 183 1,956
Many products from tanks to bayonets are included in the army’s 
share of the sum. It is not possible to make a further reliable 
breakdown of types of equipment. Where it has been possible to do 
so other equipment has been accounted for as such, but the account­
ing principles have varied and grants for items which cannot be 
regarded as weapons in the strict sense still lie concealed in these 
large sums. It is possible to obtain an impression of the pattern and 
the quantities of pure weapons amongst the equipment from the list 
below which shows the increase in certain types of equipment in the 
army’s basic organization between February 1940 and 1/7 1945.12
Stock in 
Februaiy 1940
Stock on 
1/7 1945
In­
crease
rifles and carbines 500,000 547.400 74,400
light machine-guns 8,000 30,620 22,620
sub-machine-guns 800 58,830 58,030
machine-guns 1.700 9,830 8,130
8 cm mortars 900 1,410 510
3.7 cm anti-tank guns 140 902 762
light field artillery, no. of guns 380 1,028 648
heavy field artillery, no. of guns 120 237 117
40 mm anti-aircraft guns 160 924 764
7 cm anti-aircraft guns 85 376 291
tanks 65 766 701
11 See appendix 1, table 18.
12 Cronenberg passim.
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Thus the growth of the organization meant an increase in traditional 
equipment as well as reinforcement with new types of equipment.
Tanks and motor vehicles of various kinds constituted an important 
feature of the acquisition programme. Apart from tanks just over 100 
self-propelled guns and 53 armoured cars were acquired. Of the 
other motor vehicles about 1,000 passenger cars were purchased, 
half of which were fully mobile across country, more than 8,000 
lorries, of which 1,500 were four-wheelers, about 1,000 towing 
vehicles and 1,200 other special vehicles, 842 tractors and 5,400 
motor-cycles. Together these vehicles meant that the Swedish army 
was motorized to an unprecedented extent.13
The tanks which were acquired - just over 700 - cost about 200 
million kronor. If the cost of all the other vehicles is added to this, 
the sum increases to about one-third of the army’s total expenditure 
on mechanical military equipment apart from ammunition.14
After this artillery, including anti-aircraft guns, the artillery of the 
infantry, especially for anti-tank purposes, and small arms were the 
most important items, in that order.15
The equipment intended for ships as well as coast artillery is 
included in the naval artillery equipment. The coast-artillery account­
ed for about a quarter of the total sum. Small firearms and fire control 
equipment are also included here. Thus out of the navy's total grants 
for ‘ ‘m echanical military equipment’ ’ of about 900 million kronor, just 
over a quarter was used for “artillery equipment’’ while twice as 
much was used to acquire ships.
The most important naval gunnery acquisitions for anti-aircraft 
defence during the period of the war were 308 20 mm automatic 
guns, 172 40 mm automatic guns and 49 10.5 cm guns. Of the heavier
13 Lorries worth 75 million kronor were bought up from civilian owners over and 
above those shown here.
The plan for the army’s acquisition of equipment during the five-year period from the 
budget year 1942/43 provides a good illustration of the motor vechicle equipment 
policy. Of the estimated total cost of ordnance equipment of 483 million kronor, 53 per 
cent, or 257 million kronor, was to be used for motor vehicles. Ber.v. CF I p. 114. 
MHA.
14The approximation is based on KKVs collocations of defence equipment for the 
organization of 1940 and 1943 (KKV HF:I Div. oreg. handl. tab. och tabs. KrA) and 
on IK’s records of tank orders (IK KA E 1:9, 10; IK Kr H 1942. RA).
15 See notes 13 and 14 above.
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guns 24 12 cm guns for destroyers and 24 15 cm guns - 14 of which 
were for cruisers - and 9 21 cm coastal artillery guns were acquired.16
The navy's acquisition of ships was one of the big items in the 
rearmament of the services. Ofthe navy's total grants for mechanical 
military equipment almost half was spent on ships. In comparative 
terms this concentration was especially predominant towards the end 
of the period. Deliveries of new ships during the period of the Second 
World War are shown in table 2.
The armoured vessel "Wasa" was taken out of commission in 
March 1940. Of the three destroyers which were wrecked in the Bay 
of Hårs in September 1941 two were repaired and were brought into 
service again in 1943 and 1944 respectively (“Klas Horn” and 
“Göteborg”). Two older destroyers were taken out of commission 
in 1940. The submarine force was fairly well equipped at the outbreak 
of war but underwent a thorough modernization by virtue of the fact 
that eight vessels were taken out of commission. However, two of 
the vessels (“Illern” and “Ulven”) were taken out of service because 
they were damaged. In comparative terms the supply of smaller 
vessels increased even more sharply than the supply of larger ships. 
Motor torpedo-boats were completely new to the organization.
Apart from the ships included in table 2, a large number of smaller 
vessels, picket-boats, tankers et cetera were acquired, as well as 
special ships such as the mine-cruiser “Älvsnabben” and others. 
Furthermore a number of civil ships were purchased and rebuilt for 
military purposes. Armoured vessels and older destroyers were 
refurbished.
At the end of the war two destroyers were under construction, 
and in addition work was in progress on two cruisers, the biggest 
warships ever built in Sweden. After preparations dating back to 
1940 and a series of delays the keels of the cruisers were laid in 
September 1943. The ships were delivered after the end of the war. 
The total cost of the cruisers was about 150 million kronor, and so 
they swallowed up almost one-third of the grants for the acquisition 
of ships. An equally large proportion was spent on the destroyers,
16 Important orders for artillery equipment and ammunition for the navy during the 
period 1/7 1939-30/6 1941, ditto 1/7 1941-30/6 1943, ditto 1/7 1943-30/6 1945. Ber. v. 
CF III. IV. MHA.
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Table 2. Number of large ships in September 1939 and May 1945 and deliveries of new ships 
to the navy during the intermediate period.
Type of ship In New acquisitions (year of delivery) Taken In
1/9 -39 1939 -40 -41 -42 -43 -44 -45 total commis­
sion
May
-45
Armoured vessels 8 _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 i 7
displacement in tons 
Destroyers
39,000
15 5 2 3 4 1 15 3
35,600
27
displacement in tons 
U-boats
10,600
15 1 1 4 2 5 6 19 8
23,700
26
displacement in tons 
Motor torpedo-boats
7,600
6 4 5 6 21 1
13,300
20
Minesweepers
large 4 4 8 _ _ _ 12 _ 16
small 2 6 16 2 - - 24 - 26
Source: Ber. v. CF IV. MHA.
while the balance was distributed amongst the smaller vessels and 
other expenditure.
At least 80 per cent of the air force’s equipment grants was used to 
acquire aircraft equipment, including armaments. Ammunition was 
the only large item over and above this (see above). The grants for the 
purchase of aircraft were rapidly increased during the period around 
the outbreak of the Second World War. The first budget years of the 
war also saw the largest figures, while the trend thereafter declined 
right up to 1944/45.
When war broke out the air force had a total of 195 aircraft, 134 of 
which were operational - 47 bombers and 33 fighter planes.18 Most
17 The information about the acquisition of ships is taken from: Centrala Förvaltnings­
myndigheter (Marinförvaltningen). As to the warships' level of armaments and their 
strategic positioning in readiness for war et cetera Ber. v. CF IV. MHA. Översikt över 
fartygsbyggnad 1/8 1942. IK KA EI: 17 dnr h 492 RA.
18 The expansion of the Swedish air force during the Second World War has been the 
subject of two accounts, which have been used here: Norberg. E., Flyg i beredskap, pp. 
83, 195, 200-204, 220, Söderberg, N., Med spaken i näven, pp. 315, 327.
The figures for the number of operational aircraft are uncertain. Cf. Böhme’s review 
of Norberg, pp. 306 f.
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of these were fairly old and as regards performance they were not 
comparable with the aircraft of the great powers.
In fact the accelerated rearmament meant that at the beginning 
of 1942 it was already possible to muster a total of about 450 planes. 
In all during the war period about 1,000 aircraft were acquired.19 In 
the pattern of acquisition the emphasis had shifted from bombers to a 
more even distribution between bombers and fighters. This was due 
amongst other things to the impression which the great successes of 
the English fighters had made on the military experts. There were 
sufficient aircraft at the outbreak of war to make up 2 bomber wings 
and 1 fighter wing; in 1945 there were 12 wings comprising 5 fighter 
wings, 5 bomber wings, 1 long-range reconnaissance wing and 1 
torpedo wing.
The grants for many items which have not been included in the 
groups dealt with above have been gathered together under the 
heading “other equipment”. Thus this applies to a balancing item 
of fire protection devices, salvage materials, diving equipment, 
vehicles, beacons, generators for reserve power, barbed wire and 
fences, telephone and other signalling equipment and coding equip­
ment. The group also constitutes a balancing item in another sense: 
in many cases there are funds for the same type of equipment within 
one or more of the groups previously mentioned as well as within the 
“other equipment” group, and it is not possible to draw a clear line of 
demarcation between them. This applies, for example, to vehicles 
which constitute the biggest item - 31.5 million kronor - within the 
group “other equipment”, with 23.8 million kronor for the budget year 
1943/44. However, the great majority of the vehicles of the armed 
forces were paid for out of grants to the army for the acquisition of 
ordnance equipment. The next biggest item after vehicles is the grants 
for telephone and other signalling equipment totalling 19.3 million 
kronor.
C. A war economy?
The expenditure on mechanical military equipment during the first 
three years of the period amounted to more than half of the total ex-
19 The wing of American Mustang planes which was purchased at the end of the war is 
included here. These aircraft are not included in Norberg's collocation, p. 220, but are 
mentioned in Söderberg, p. 327.
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penditure on defence, and thereafter the proportion fell to not quite 
onethird. Over the period as a whole it amounted to 38 per cent of the 
defence expenditure. This must be regarded as a high figure. The 
remarkably large proportion of equipment costs was a natural result 
of the fact that the armed forces were rearmed rapidly. During 
periods of more even development or of a decline in the strength of 
the armed forces the grants have not been used to the same extent to 
acquire equipment. Furthermore, the period of the Second World War 
was characterized by breakthroughs for new, technically advanced 
and expensive weapons. This applied above all to the air force which 
had the highest proportion of material costs, but the army too, tradi­
tionally a branch of the services with low equipment costs, became 
‘heavy on equipment’, primarily on account of the development of air 
defence and the tank force. For the sake of comparison it may be 
observed that pay in the armed forces, in spite of the conscription 
which was heavy at times, only accounted for between 20 and 30 per 
cent of the total expenditure, and that training costs were just over 10 
per cent.20
Thus while the defence budget increased tenfold in connection 
with the outbreak of the Second World War, an unusually large 
proportion was used for the acquisition of equipment. It is possible 
to get an impression of the magnitude of the sums if one takes into 
consideration the fact that the Department of Defence's share of the 
working budget expenditure in the budget years 1939/40-1943/44 
varied between 54 and 63 per cent.21 Thus from the summer of 1939 
and during the five years which followed almost a quarter of the 
Government’s total expenditure went on purchases of “mechanical 
military equipment”.
Another method of estimating the size of the expenditure on 
defence is to compare it with the Gross National Product (GNP). In 
table 3 this comparison is made on the basis both of the total defence 
costs and the cost of mechanical military equipment.
20 An outline of the distribution amongst wages, training, equipment and other items of 
defence costs is to be found in: Furtenbach, B., Materielanslagens andel av försvars- 
kostnadema åren 1901-1955 (Aktuellt och historiskt. Meddelanden från försvars­
stabens krigshistoriska avdelning 1955, pp. 125-135). Here equipment also includes 
quartermaster's equipment et cetera.
21 Statistik årsbok 1939-1946.
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Table 3. Defence costs and the cost of mechanical military equipment 
in relation to the GNP in 1935-1945.
GNP in
milliards
of kronor
Defence Costs Mechanical Military 
Equipment
in milliards
of kronor
as %
ofGNP
in milliards
of kronor
as %
ofGNP
1935 9.8 0.12 1.2
1936 10.6 0.15 1.4
1937 11.6 0.17 1.5
1938 12.2 0.22 1.8
1939 13.3 0.76 5.7
1940 14.8 1.65 11.1 0.85 5.7
1941 16.5 1.93 11.7 0.91 5.5
1942 17.8 1.96 11.0 0.70 3.9
1943 19.3 2.04 10.6 0.55 2.8
1944 20.2 1.89 9.4 0.55 2.7
1945 21.9 1.30 5.9
Source: Johansson, Ö., The Gross Domestic Product of Sweden and its Composition 
1861-1955 (Stockholm 1967) p. 151.
Note: The figures for the calendar years have been arrived at by halving the figures 
for the budget years and distributing them between the calendar years.
On average during the seven years 1939-1945 military expenditure 
swallowed up 9.3 per cent of the GNP. Throughout the whole of the 
five years during which the war was in progress in Europe 4.1 per 
cent on average was spent on the acquisition of military equipment. 
What this means as regards the call on industrial capacity will be 
discussed in a later chapter.
Was the Swedish economy during those years a war economy? 
One way of answering this question is by making comparisons with 
the countries at war.
The increase in military expenditure during the period before 
the outbreak of war began first in Germany where there was a gradual 
increase in the proportion of the GNP devoted to military expenditure 
from 1933 until 1944. In England and the U.S.A. the increase 
occurred later and more dramatically when the two countries were
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Table 4. Military expenditure in relation to the GNP in Germany, the U.S.A. and
England 1935-1945.
Germany U.S.A. England
GNP in
milliards
OfRM
Milit. expendit. GNP in
milliards 
of $
Milit. expendit. GNP in
Milliards
of £
Milit. expendit.
milliards
ofRM
%of
GNP
milliards 
of $
%of
GNP
milliards
of £
% of
GNP
1935 74 6.0 8 73 0.9 1 4.1 0.1 2
1936 83 10.8 13 83 0.9 1 4.4 0.2 5
1937 93 11.7 13 91 1.0 1 4.6 0.3 7
1938 105 17.2 17 85 1.0 1 4.8 0.4 8
1939 130 30 23 91 1.3 1 5.0 1.1 22
1940 141 53 38 101 2.2 2 6.0 3.2 53
1941 152 71 47 126 13.8 11 6.8 4.1 60
1942 165 91 55 159 49.6 31 7.5 4.8 64
1943 184 112 61 193 80.4 42 8.0 5.0 63
1944 211 88.6 42 8.2 5.1 62
1945 214 75.9 36 8.3 4.4 53
Source: Carroll, B. A., Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich. (The 
Hague 1968) p. 184.
brought into the war in 1939 and 1941 respectively.22 Sweden’s 
highest proportion of 10-11 per cent is roughly equivalent to that of 
Germany in the years 1935-36, of the U.S.A. in 1941 and of England 
in the years 1938-1939. Thus one can see that the Swedish economy 
in 1940-1944 was geared to rearmament to the same extent as the 
economies of England and the U.S.A. immediately before those two 
countries entered the war. The military share of the GNP in Germany 
was increased from 13 to 18 per cent in 1938 when she took action in
22A somewhat slower increase is shown for the U.S.A. in Purcell, C. W. Jr. (ed.), 
The Military Industrial Complex, p. 326:
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
as a % of the GNP 1 2 6 17 36 38 37
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Europe with military support. In the countries at war the military 
element in the economy was increased during the years which fol­
lowed, to over 60 per cent in England and Germany and to 42 per 
cent in the U.S.A. Such high figures are closely allied to a pure 
military replacement production and the heavy cost of troops which 
is the result of active warfaring, and therefore Swedish conditions 
are not comparable.
II
CRUMBS FROM THE RICH MEN’S TABLES 
THE IMPORTATION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
In order to achieve a rapid rearmament of Sweden’s forces from the 
end of the 1930s it was necessary to import equipment. Therefore 
the defence authorities looked round the world in order to purchase 
the equipment which it was impossible to produce in the short term in 
Sweden. In 1938 military equipment, including aircraft, worth just 
over 20 million kronor was imported, and in 1939 equipment worth 
just over 30 million kronor (see diagram 2). Gradually, as the world 
political temperature rose, efforts to import increased. In this connec­
tion the events which occurred in the east in the late autumn and 
winter of 1939-40 were naturally of particular importance. During the 
Winter War the Finnish armed forces received support inter alia 
through substantial Swedish deliveries of military equipment.1 In turn 
Sweden’s imports from the west and the south were stepped up. 
From a political point of view neither the western allied powers, 
nor the U.S.A. or Germany had anything against the indirect help 
which was given to Finland in this way.2 However, the net result 
was negative as far as Sweden’s military equipment was concerned 
and her requests to purchase from abroad increased further - the 
figure of 500 million kronor has been mentioned in this connection.3
1 The value of the equipment supplied by the military administrations has been estimat­
ed at 47 million kronor (Carlquist, p. 283). In addition equipment worth at least an equal 
amount was exported directly by industry under Government licence (Wahlbäck, K., 
Finlandsfrâgan i svensk politik 1937-1940, p. 244). SOS records exports of military 
equipment worth a total of 42.4 million kronor for the years 1939 and 1940.
2 Kellgren, H., Sex krigsår i Skölds skugga, p. 100. In the first week in February when 
the Finnish front was wavering and both the Western powers and Sweden tended to 
wish to become more deeply involved the Germans adopted a more restrictive attitude 
towards Sweden. Kellgren, pp. 100, 148.
3 Hägglöf, G., Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget (1958), p. 99.
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Diagram 2. Imports of military equipment from various countries. 
W.A. =weapons and ammunition; AP = aeroplanes; S = ships.
I The German Reich 
Bohemia-Moravia 
L2 Belgium and
millions of the Netherlands 
kronor 
(00.
E Switzerland S The U.S.A.
E Italy 
E Finland
LliLlJ Great Britain 
LU Other countries
W.A. AP WA-AP 5 W.A. AP 
1938 1939 1940
Source: SOS Handel.
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In spite of the fact that these large import requirements could not be 
met immediately, which was quite natural in the light of the way in 
which the war had developed, nevertheless there were very extensive 
imports of military equipment in 1940, amounting in value to about 
160 million kronor, which was in a class by itself as the highest 
figure for any year of the war. The development from 1940 and 
during the subsequent years of the war will be studied in the text 
which follows, with the emphasis on the U.S.A. and Germany. 
Having regard to the way in which matters developed it was those 
two countries above all which might conceivably supply a wider range 
of high quality equipment and Sweden’s main efforts were also 
concentrated there.
A. Imports from the U.S.A.
After England and France had been brought into the war the U.S.A. 
stood out as the most important alternative source to the Axis powers 
from which to purchase military equipment. The Royal Air Force 
Matériel Administration (KFF) had already signed large contracts at 
the turn of the year 1939-1940 through the so-called Swedish Air 
Commission (Swedaircom) headed by Squadron Feader B. Jacobs­
son. Amongst other items the contracts related to 120 J9s (Severskys), 
52 B6 Severskys (a bomber version of the J9), 144 JlOs (Vultees) 
and also a large number of engines.4 On 8 January 1940 KFF’s orders 
in the U.S.A. amounted in value to about 57 million kronor.5 How­
ever, it was already quite clear at this point in time that the de­
liveries would be seriously delayed in spite of strenuous efforts to 
speed them up.
An outward sign of the importance of the U.S.A. in the situation 
which had arisen was the fact that on 22 December it was decided 
to send an official delegation to the U.S.A. to “organize and effect 
purchases of certain goods of special importance for Sweden’s 
national supply”.6The delegation consisted of Prince Bertil, G. Hägg-
4 On the question of the air force's acquisition there are two detailed and to a great 
extent parallel accounts in Norberg and Söderberg.
5PM beträffande materielanskaffningen för flygvapnet från USA. Fst H Mtrlavd. 
B 1:2 KrA.
6 Kungl. Maj:ts beslut 22/12 1939. UD HP 24 V/Am I. UDA.
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löf from the Foreign Office, A. Gabrielsson from Volvo and, as 
experts, Admiral N. Wijmark, Captain F. A. B. Hård af Segerstad 
and the marine engineer C. Falkendal. Although attempts had been 
made to give the delegation a civil appearance outwardly, its main 
task was to buy military equipment on behalf of the army and navy. 
Soundings carried out with valuable help from the Finnish military 
attaché had indicated that there were good possibilities of purchasing 
a large number of items of military equipment. Furthermore, the 
National Industry Commission had asked for machinery worth about 
11 million kronor for the production of ammunition.7
The military request lists for the army included hand-grenades, 
sub-machine-guns, 3.7 cm anti-tank guns, artillery ammunition of 
various kinds, anti-aircraft batteries, range-finders, binoculars, 
searchlights, tractors, jeeps, radio stations, telephone cables, 
electrical equipment and tanks (100 of them). The navy's most 
important requests were for automatic anti-aircraft guns (20-25 mm), 
three batteries (of three guns each), 10.5 cm anti-aircraft guns, two 
15 cm mobile shore batteries of three guns each, all equipped with 
fire control apparatus and ammunition. There was also a large number 
of additional items: range-finders, cables, towing vehicles, sub- 
machine-guns, et cetera. The air force asked for fighter planes and 
parachutes above all.8 Soundings would also be made about motor 
torpedo-boats and armoured cruisers.
For various reasons it proved impossible to purchase many of the 
items which had been requested. During the winter and the spring the 
world situation became more tense and there were many claims, not 
least by the U.S.A.’s own armed forces, on the military equipment 
which was immediately available. Placing orders for production with
7 Hägglöf, G., Samtida vittne (1972), pp. 8 f., Hägglöf (1958), p. 100.
Boström till Günther 16/1 1940 angående anskaffningsmöjligheter för viss krigs­
materiel i Förenta staterna. Bilaga beträffande anskaffningsmöjligheter för krigs­
materiel i U.S.A. upprättad av ftnske militärattachén Överste Zilliacus 10/1 1940. 
Tillägg till Överste Zilliacus's PM den 10/1 1940 av den 13/1 1940. Avskrifter Fst H 
Mtrlavd. F 11:3 KrA. Varor och material som böra importeras från Förenta staterna. IK 
12/12 1939 FstH Mtrlavd. B 1:2 KrA.
8 Förteckning över material, som torde kunna beställas i USA för tygdepartementets, 
marinförvaltningens och flygförvaltningens räkning (Dec. 1939) Fst H Mtrlavd. B 
1:2 KrA.
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industries which were not already engaged in producing military 
equipment meant unacceptably long delivery periods. In many 
instances the Swedish military administration became sceptical and 
abandoned the purchases, probably because it was thought that there 
were better alternatives nearer to hand (i.e. usually Germany). Inter 
alia this applied to 100 light (8 ton) tanks about which there were 
advanced negotiations in progress in March 1940. Without armaments 
these would cost a total of 12.6 million kronor.
The most important exception to the general negative picture was 
aircraft equipment, in respect of which substantial orders had already 
been placed through the air force administration's own bodies. In 
addition, contracts were made for 4,800 submachine-guns (most of 
them of Smith & Wesson manufacture) with ammunition. Large 
quantities of gas masks and telephone cable were also ordered for 
defence purposes.9
When communications to the west were broken off through the 
German occupation of Denmark and Norway about 30 Seversky 
fighters of the J9 type had arrived in Sweden. The main part of the 
equipment ordered in the U.S.A. had not yet been delivered. The 
question now was how the transport to Sweden could be organized. 
Several alternative ways were discussed: through a German mine 
barrage to the Norwegian coast and from there to Gothenburg; via 
Italy and Germany and as far as the aircraft equipment was con­
cerned by boat to Iceland or England and thence by air.10 The 
alternative which was finally chosen was to buy cargo space on board 
the traffic to Finnish Petsamo, the equipment then being taken by 
lorry into Sweden. This transport route was in operation from the 
month of May 1940. Another thirty or so Seversky J9s were able to
9 VPM angående inköp och undersökningar rörande anskaffningsmöjligheterna för viss 
materiel verkställda i Amerikas Förenta Stater av Swedish Government Trade Delega­
tion under tiden 24 januari-25 juli 1940. 9/9 1940 F. Hård af Segerstad-C. J. O. Falken­
dal. Fst. H Mtrlavd. F 11:3. KrA. At the turn of the year 1939/40 the orders from KFF in 
the U.S.A were worth 56,664,005 kronor (including 120 J9 Republics and 52 B6 
Republics) and on 29/2 the figure was 53,947,932 kronor. In July 1940 there were orders 
for 60 J9 aircraft, the 52 B6 planes and 144 Vultee fighters, KFF 30/12 1939; KFF till UD 
8/3 1940; KFF till UD 12/7 1940. HP 24 WAm IV. UDA.
10 PM från KFF 9/4 and also 30/4, HP 24 VVAm IV. UDA.
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be brought in together with some further equipment.11 The biggest 
items apart from these were the large consignments of telephone 
cable and gas masks.
On 2 July 1940 the President of the United States ordered an 
embargo on the export of military equipment. In spite of efforts by 
Swedaircom and the members of the delegation who remained (Prince 
Bertil. G. Hägglöf, A. Gabrielson and N. Wijkmark had gone home 
on 13/3) as well as the Swedish Embassy, no export licences were 
obtained for the equipment contracted for. For the time being it was 
stored in the U.S.A.12 Sweden's reluctance to abandon the military 
equipment was due to her worsening position generally vis-a-vis the 
Western Powers after the transit agreements with Germany. In a 
conversation with Günther on 7 July Mallet, the British Ambassador, 
suggested that to counterbalance her concessions to the Germans 
Sweden should forego her American aircraft contracts, which would 
then be taken over by the English. In any event the British Govern­
ment could no longer allow planes to be transported from America to 
Sweden through the sea blockade of the British navy.13 It was as­
sumed in Swedish quarters that the English exerted influence over 
the U.S.A. to prevent military equipment from being allowed into 
Sweden. Nor did a personal visit to President Roosevelt by the 
Swedish Ambassador. W. Boström, have the desired effect. The 
export embargo also applied to licences for the production of the 
American Twin-Wasp aeroplane engine. Uikewise - already in May,
11 On 23 November, when the Petsmo traffic had largely ceased, the following items 
inter alia had been imported via Petsamo since June 1940:
2.300.000 11.5 mm cartridges weighing 53.7 tons bought by KATD
6.500.000 9 mm cartridges weighing 102.25 tons bought by KATD 
101,177 gas masks weighing about 236 tons bought by KATD
telephone wire, telegraph and mine cable weighing 355.4 tons bought by KATD, KMF 
4,300 9 mm Smith & Wesson machinge-guns weighing 20 tons bought by KATD 
Source: Rapport över leveranserna från USA till Sveriges över Petsamo. Ställningen 
den 23 no v. 1940 (Hedin Ktrk) HP 24 VVAm. UDA.
12 Norberg, pp. 110-113.
13 Uppteckning av samtal mellan utrikesministern och brittiske ministern 7/7 1940. 
HP 24 V/AM V. UDA.
Telegram från sändebudet i London till UD 26 juni 1940. Transiteringsfrågan juni­
december 1940. (Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget. Official 
documents published by Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet Stockholm 1947) akt 24, p. 22.
35
incidentally - exports of the important machine tools for military 
equipment production had been stopped.
In September in Sweden consideration began to be given to a sale 
of the equipment, since it was realized that it would probably prove 
impossible to get it released for export. A sale to the American 
Government was first considered. In the Air Force Matériel Admin­
istration hope was not completely abandoned until the American 
Government introduced a law on 10 October providing for the 
requisitioning of military equipment. After fruitless attempts to 
exchange production licences for aircraft engines for licences for the 
production of Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, the activity in the 
U.S.A. changed to long-drawn-out negotiations about economic 
compensation for the equipment which had not been delivered and the 
advance payments which had been made.14
The extensively planned attempt to import military equipment from 
the U.S.A. was a mountain which gave birth to a mouse. Certainly 
sixty or so modern fighter planes were no mean acquisition in 1940, 
but bearing in mind the hundreds of planes which had been ordered, it 
was plainly disappointing. Practically nothing else was received.15 
This outcome of the negotiations was serious. After the Western 
Allies had dropped out by virtue of the fact that they had been drawn 
into the war or occupied (England, France, Holland, Belgium) the 
only country outside Germany's sphere of influence which could 
produce high quality military equipment was the U.S.A. When the 
U.S.A. also had to be left out of calculations in the middle of 1940, 
only the Axis powers remained.
B. Imports from Germany and Bohemia-Moravia
Towards the end of 1939 Sweden stepped up her efforts to be allowed 
to buy German military equipment. In December the King in Council 
appointed A. Wettermark, a bank director, to be Government 
negotiator for German military equipment.16 Wettermark was to be in
14 PM 26/7. 5/8. 20/8, 29/8, 3/9, 25/9 1940. HP 24 WAm VI. UDA.
15 The value of the 4,800 machine-guns (Smith & Wesson+ Thomson) with ammunition 
9 mm and 11.5 mm) amounted to about 4.2 million kronor.
16 Kungl. Maj:ts tillstånd 22/12 1939. HP 24 V1Ty. UDA. Since 1933 Wettermark had 
held the post of managing director of the Deutsche Unionbank in Berlin.
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charge of current operations during the war years which followed, 
while the large main agreements for trade between the two countries 
were concluded by the Swedish and German Government commis­
sions. Sweden’s main representatives wereG. Hägglöf and J. Wallen­
berg, and Germany’s were A. Walter and K. Ludwig. The decisions 
as to what military equipment could be released by Germany and 
exported were specially reserved to the Wehrwirtschaftsamt and its 
head, General G. Thomas, while the direct negotiations were usually 
conducted by Colonel Becker and Captain Koch (later a certain part 
was to be played by Speer's Ministry). As a rule the Swedish 
military attaché in Berlin, Colonel C. A. Juhlin-Dannfelt represented 
the Swedish forces. Group Captain N. Söderberg often negotiated 
on behalf of the Swedish air force administration. In certain instances 
the air force administration went its own way without coordinating 
its negotiations with those of Wettermark.17
At the turn of the year 1939-40 Sweden had asked for equipment 
worth nearly 170 million kronor.18 The biggest items on Sweden’s 
request list were:
Equipment Value
Artillery equipment
(10.5 cm howitzers, 3.7 cm anti-tank guns, 20 mm anti-
aircraft guns, 3.7 cm anti-aircraft guns, all with
ammunition) 100.0 million kronor
9 mm sub-machine-gun s with ammunition 4.3
Hand-grenades 0.6 "
60 Me 109 aircraft 20.0 "
36 Ju 87 14.0 "
27 He 114 11.0 "
17The operations of the Government commission are described in Hägglöf (1958), 
passim. See also Norberg, passim and Söderberg, passim.
18 Hägglöf (1958) states (p. 99) that when he was on a short visit to Berlin in the middle 
of December 1939 he had with him a list of requests from the defence staff for equip­
ment worth "not less than 500 million kronor". The next part of Hägglöf's account 
(pp. 100-103) is somewhat misleading since he gives the impression that there were no 
further negotiations in Germany about military equipment. Instead interest is focused 
on the U.S.A. where Hägglöf went in January 1940.
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In addition the army administration also wanted to buy 80-100 tanks 
made in Czechoslovakia.19
The Germans appeared cooperative,2" and after negotiations in the 
new year of 1940, in the course of which the aircraft deliveries were 
postponed, on 4/1 the German authorities gave their preliminary 
consent to purchases to the value of 74 million kronor.21 In the 
majority of cases the negotiations direct with the manufacturers were 
far advanced and contracts could be signed. Amongst others, 
negotiations were held with the firm of Ceskomoravska-Kolben- 
Danék (CKO) in Prague for the purchase of 90 tanks worth about
23 million kronor.22
However, no deliveries could be made until agreement had been 
reached about terms of payment. The Wehrwirtschaftsamt greatly 
preferred that metals should be handed over in exchange for the 
military equipment. The Swedish negotiators were only authorised to 
go as far as offering compensation for the metal which was included 
in the equipment delivered. The question of the payment for the 
deliveries of military equipment was linked with the large war trade 
agreement which was concluded between Sweden and Germany. 
Under this agreement the payments were made via a clearing ac­
count, through which the Swedes now wanted the military equipment 
to be paid for as well. Tudwig and Walter in the German Government 
commission maintained that this was not possible since they were not
19 PM beträffande inköp av krigsmateriel. Synpunkter av ekonomisk art framförda vid 
sammanträden 3 januari 1940 med General Thomas i Wehrwirtschaftsamt och med 
Ministerialdirektor Walter i Reichsernährungsministerium.
Wettermark 3/1 1940. HP 24 V'/Ty. UDA.
Juhlin-Dannfelt till Richert 2/1 1940. Fst H Mtrlavd F III:3/Ty. KrA.
Uppteckning av Juhlin-Dannfelt från sammanträffande med Thomas 11/12 1939. HP
24 V1/Ty-UDA.
Cf. also Aufzeichnung des Leiters der Wirtschaftspolitischen Abteilung 12/12 1939. 
Akten zur . .. Ser. D Bd VIII Dok. 446.
20 Juhlin-Dannfelt till generalfälttygmästare H. Gustafsson med uppteckning av samtal 
med Thomas 15/12 1939. Fst H Mtrlavd. F II: 3/Ty. KrA.
PM överläget i leveransfrågan 16/12 1939 (Juhlin-Dannfelt). FstH Mtrlavd. F II:3/Ty. 
KrA.
Uppteckning av samtal med Göring 28/12 1939 (Juhlin-Dannfelt). HP 24 V/Ty. UDA.
21 PM över läget i vapenleveransfrågan den 4/1 1940 (Juhlin-Dannfelt). Fst H Mtrlavd. 
F II:3/Ty. KrA.
22 VPM 6/2 1940H. Gustafsson, generalfälttygmästare. Fst H Mtrlavd. F II:3/Ty. KrA.
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interested in having such large credits in the account. They indicated 
that they would be unable to use them. They would prefer to be 
paid in gold or in free currencies.23 After several rounds of negotia­
tions an agreement was reached at the end of January, and it was 
signed in Berlin on 27/1 1940. Under this agreement half of the pay­
ment for the military equipment was to be made in gold or free 
currencies, and half through the clearing account. Metals were to be 
delivered to Germany in the same quantities as those which were 
estimated to be included in the equipment. Over and above this 500 
tons of semi-manufactured copper and brass products, 250 tons of 
stainless steel and 50 tons of high-speed steel were to be delivered 
to Germany. The payment for these raw materials was to be made 
through the clearing account. They amounted in value to between 
2 and 4 million kronor.24
After this framework agreement had been concluded negotiations 
continued with firms in Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia- 
Moravia, with the result that by the beginning of April contracts 
totalling 92 million kronor in value had been made. In addition there 
were in progress negotiations about products worth 26 million kronor, 
including Czechoslovakian machine-guns and ammunition (9.2 million 
kronor) and 6 21 cm guns from the Skodawerken for the navy (13.1 
million kronor).25 In April, of this equipment the following items had 
been delivered to Sweden:
1,800 sub-machine-guns 645.000 kronor
500,000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition 36,667 kronor
Sundry artillery material 12,505,000 kronor
74 guns 4,336,667 kronor
Total 17,523,334 kronor
23 Brevkoncept Hägglöf till Richert 28/12 1939. HP 24 V1 /Ty. UDA.
See above, note 19.
PM 11/1 1940. Hägglöf. HP 24 V1ZTy. UDA.
Hägglöf (1958), p. 96.
24 Avtal 27/1 1940. HP V1Ty. UDA.
PM beträffande leveranser av krigsmateriel frän Protektoratet Böhmen-Mähren 1/3 
1940 (Wettermark). Fst H Mtrlavd. F II:3Ty. KrA.
Richert till Günther 27/1 1940. HP 24 V1Ty. UDA.
25 Wettermark tUl Ihre 3/4 1940. HP 24 V1Ty. UDA.
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Thus when the German armed forces advanced into Denmark and 
Norway only a fraction of the equipment which had been requested 
had been delivered. The protracted negotiations about terms of pay­
ment and the transport difficulties had held up the imports.26 The 
Swedish armed forces had counted on receiving the bulk of the 
deliveries during the first quarter of 1940 but in fact this had not been 
the case. No aircraft or tanks had been delivered in spite of the fact 
that there were in existence contracts for 37 Heinkel planes. 18 
Dornier planes and 90 Czechoslovakian tanks with machine-guns and 
ammunition.27
Deliveries of military equipment to Sweden were stopped on 
account of the occupation of Denmark and Norway. In a telegram of 
21/4 and a letter of 22/4 Juhlin-Dannfelt announced that on 20/4 the 
German Ministry of Aviation had seized 40 anti-aircraft guns 
(Oerlikon), part of an order of 120 guns which were to be delivered 
during the month of May (the guns had originally belonged to the 
Czechoslovakian army). The Swedish military attaché thought that 
the seizure was connected with the German armed forces’ increased 
need for air defence in their battles in Norway, but he did not rule 
out the possibility that the action was politically motivated.28 Because 
of the events in Norway after 9 April, the attitude towards the 
Swedish representatives had hardened in Berlin. In spite of repeated 
representations the Swedish Government had in fact refused to 
forward in transit military equipment to the German forces at Narvik 
who were cornered and hard pressed by the English. Soon, too, the 
suspicions of political motives were confirmed: a de facto embargo 
was placed on deliveries of German military equipment and the 
forwarding in transit of such equipment across Germany.29 The
26 PM beträffande leveranser av krigsmateriel från Rheinmetall Borsig AG 22/2 1940 
(Wettermark). Fst H Mtrlavd. F IIAfTy. KrA.
PM beträffande användandet av svenska järnvägsvagnar för transport av krigsmate­
riel till Sverige 27/2 1940. Wettermark. FstH Mtrlavd. F II:3/Ty. KrA.
27 Wettermark till Ihre 3/4 1940. HP V1Ty. UDA.
28 Juhlin-Dannfelt till Sköld 22/4 1940. Juhlin-Dannfelt till Stendhal 22/4 1940. Fst 
H Mtrlavd. F II:3Ty. KrA.
29Juhlin-Dannfelt till Sköld 24/4 1940. Transiteringsfrågor och därmed samman­
hängande spörsmål april-juni 1940 akt 72 pp. 83 f.
The Germans had first tried to see if it would be possible to obtain the desirable right 
of transit through an approach to the King of Sweden. When this failed they began to
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reason for this was the uncertainty about the situation in the Nordic 
countries. It appeared quite clear that the duration of the embargo 
would depend on Sweden’s actions. At one meeting Field Marshal 
Goering was quite explicit: if Sweden did not support Germany by 
allowing the forwarding in transit of weapons to Narvik, "not a single 
cartridge more" would be delivered to Sweden. On the same occasion 
Goering took the opportunity to criticize the Swedish armed forces, 
and pointed out the weaknesses of the air force above all.30 The 
political high command in Germany had tightened the thumbscrews. 
On 7 May Juhlin-Dannfelt and Wettermark visited the Wirtschafts­
stab and discussed the list of the postponed deliveries with Captain 
Koch. Koch’s manner was cordial but he could do nothing until a 
political decision about the lifting of the embargo had been made.31 
Ludwig was able to achieve equally little. FIe explained that the 
uncertainty about Sweden’s position with regard to the events in 
Denmark and Norway and the disagreement which had then ensued 
about the transit traffic to Narvik had brought about the embargo.
link together the Narvik question and the German deliveries of military equipment. The 
German embassy took the view that by being helpful in this connection it would be 
possible to influence the Swedish Government through Sköld, the Defence Minister. 
(Der Leiter der Wirtschaftspolitischen Abteilung an die Gesandtschaft in Stockholm 
22 April 1940. Die Gesandtschaft in Stockholm an das Auswärtiges Amt 24 April 1940 
and 27 April 1940. Akten zur . . . Ser. D Bd IX Dok. 150, 159. 171). On 30 April the 
Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop, gave detailed directions as to how far it was thought 
possible to go and listed considerable quantities of weapons and ammunition (e.g. 
2,850 machine-guns with 38 million rounds, 30 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and 20 37 mm 
anti-tank guns with 1 million rounds). The representatives of the SwedishGovernment 
did not succumb to this temptation and the German envoy Wied did not think that 
they were prepared to modify the Swedish policy of neutrality even if the prospect 
of further supplies of weapons was held out (Der Reichsaussenminister an die Ge- 
sandtscahft in Stockholm 30 April 1940. Der Gesandte in Stockholm an das Aus­
wärtige Amt 7 Mai 1940. Akten zur . . . Ser. D Bd IX Dok. 183, 202). In this situation 
a message came from Ribbentrop saying that the deliveries of military equipment were 
to be stopped (Das Auswärtige Amt an den Reichsaussenminister 25 Juni 1940. Akten 
zur... Ser. D Bd X Dok. 15).
Cf. Carlgren, pp. 150-190.
30Rapport av ingenjör Dahlerus 13/5 1940. Angående besök i Berlin lördagen 11 maj 
1940. Transiteringsfrågor och därmed sammanhängande spörsmål april-juni 1940 
akt 176, pp. 184-189.
31 Uppteckning av samtal med Kapitän Koch i Wehrwirtschaftsstab 7/5 1940 (Juhlin- 
Dannfelt). Fst H Mtrlavd. F II:3/Ty. KrA.
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Ludwig maintained that from the point of view of her trade policy it 
was in Germany’s interest to sell military equipment since, with the 
start of the shipping season, large Swedish deliveries of iron ore, 
wood and cellulose would change Germany’s clearing position, which 
was positive so far.3- The embargo was still in force in June. At that 
time preliminary contacts had been made between the Government 
commissions about the exchange of trade between the two countries. 
In this respect the question of the military equipment was to play a 
comparatively important role, usually linked with Germany’s 
emphasis on the iron ore deliveries.33 After reminders from Sweden, 
Walter, the German negotiator, stated on 6 June that “the dossier on 
the Swedish orders for weapons has been sent to Herr von Ribben- 
trop and has now been placed with the documents on the Narvik 
question.”34
However, the picture of the war in Europe changed at the be­
ginning of June. The German blitzkrieg attacks to the west had been 
extremely successful and resulted in the military conquest of France. 
The English troops were driven towards the Channel coast and were 
evacuated from Dunkirk. In this situation the English thought it
32 PM beträffande leveranser av krigsmateriel från Tyskland. 15/5 1940 (Wettermark). 
HP 24 V1Ty-UDA.
33 Richert till Günther 16/5 1940; Richert till Günther 18/5 1940; Richert till Boheman 
30/5 1940. Transiteringsfrågor och därmed sammanhängande spörsmål april-juni 
1940 akter 192, 210, 253, pp. 212-215, 231 f., 268-270.
It is possible to discern a certain conflict between the top political leaders in 
Germany who wanted to act high-handedly and the people responsible for the trade 
negotiations who wanted to give greater consideration to the negotiating situation as 
a whole. Sweden’s negotiating position was strong inasmuch as good will was re­
quired for deliveries to be made via Luleå of as much iron ore as would compensate for 
the loss of Narvik. The Swedes were keen to make their protection against English air 
raids on the ore transports dependent on German deliveries of anti-aircraft artillery. 
It was also an embarrassing fact for the German negotiators that the deliveries of 
military equipment which had been agreed in January had not been completed while 
the Swedish undertakings had been fulfilled. Immediately before the start of the 
negotiations in the last days of May a proposal was made to Ribbentrop that the deli­
very embargo should be lifted, but because of the situation of the German troops in 
Narvik this did not take place. Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs 21 Mai 1940. Akten 
zur... Ser. D Bd IX Dok. 290.
34 PM angående svenska vapenbeställningar i Tyskland 14/6 1940 (Hägglöf). HP 24 
V1Ty. UDA.
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impossible to continue the fight in northern Norway, but left in the 
first week in June, together with the Norwegian Government.35 
Thereafter the German armed forces were in undisputed possession 
of the whole of Norway, and the transit question which had inflamed 
relations between Sweden and Germany appeared in a different light. 
The negotiations about the transit traffic between Germany and Nor­
way across Swedish territory soon led to an agreement, as did the 
trade negotiations. On 27 June the embargo on the export of weapons 
to Sweden was lifted.36
On 9 and 10 July 1940 negotiations took place in Stockholm between 
the Government commissions about the completion of the German 
deliveries and the possibilities of further purchases. A list of the 
equipment contracted for but not delivered was considered; the goods 
on the list amounted in value to 75 million kronor. Captain Koch 
made it clear that certain items on the list could not be delivered. 
This applied for example to 138 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, 90 tanks, 
18 Dornier aircraft with spare engines, 1 torpedo plane and many 
other items. Koch expressed great doubt on many other points. The 
75 million kronor was severely reduced.37 A preliminary offer was 
made of 200 3.7 cm anti-tank guns with ammunition, 3,000 light 
machine-guns (Czechoslovakian but from German supplies) with 
ammunition and certain other ammunition including 10 million 9 mm 
parabellum pistol cartridges as new items which might be purchased. 
The total value of the equipment offered amounted to just over 
20 million kronor. Towards the end of July the signing of contracts 
with the German companies was completed, and the trains with 
military equipment aboard began to land in Trelleborg again.38
35 Starck. M., Allmän sjökrigshistoria 1930-1945. Del 1 1930-1941, p. 149.
36 On 25/6 1940 Ribbentrop received a reminder from Auswärtiges Amt about the lifting 
of the embargo on the export of weapons. An endorsement on this letter shows that on 
27/6 at the latest the Feuhrer released the supplies which had been contracted for, 
inasmuch as only German's own military requirements might consitute an obstacle to 
the deliveries. Das Auswärtige Amt an den Reichsaussenminister 25 Juni 1940. Akten 
zur ... Ser. D Bd X Dok. 15.
37 PM 12/7 1940 (Hägglöf). Redogörelse för förhandlingar beträffande inköp av krigs­
materiel frän Tyskland i samband med Kapitän Kochs besök i Stockholm den 9 och 
10 juli 1940. 11/7 1940 (Wettermark). HP 24 V'/Ty. UDA.
38 PM över uttalanden av Kapitän Koch den 17/7 1940 angående vapenleveranser 
till Sverige (Juhlin-Dannfelt). 17/7 1940 Fst H Mt.rlavd. F II:3/Ty. KrA.
Wettermark till KATD, KFF, KMF 22/7-17/8 1940. FstH Mtrlavd. F II:3/Ty. KrA.
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During the July negotiations the German attitude towards sales to 
Sweden proved to be much less generous than it had been before 
the April embargo. It is true that the total value of the military 
equipment imported during 1940 was to amount to about 76 million 
kronor, but it had not been possible to comply with Sweden’s 
requests on important points. Artillery equipment had been received 
in large quantities.39 The shortages remained, above all as far as
39 Wettermark till Hägglöf 22/11 1940. HP 24V’/Ty.UDA.
The situation in the middle of November 1940 can be summarised in the following 
table (in millions of kronor):
Delivered up Contracted for
to 15/11 1940 delivery up to
31/12 1941
Total 70.9 40.8
Including: Artillery equipment (15 cm howitz., 10.5cmhowitz. ,4cmanti-air-
cm anti-tank guns, all with ammunition andaccessories),Lightmachine-guns
Including: Artillery equipment (15 cm
howitz.. 10.5 cm howitz., 4 cm anti­
aircraft guns. 2 cm anti-aircraft guns, 3.7 
cm anti-tank guns, all with ammunition 
and accessories). Light machine-gun 
ammunition 49.7 5.5
Optical equipment 0.4 6.4
Aircraft (39 Hes) - 10.5
Other aircraft equipment 7.9 4.4
Source: Sammanställning 22/11 1940 (Wettermark). Missiv till Hägglöf 22/11 HP 24 V/Ty. UDA.
It has proved difficult to calculate the exact value of the imports during the year 
1940. Here the sum contracted for on 15/11 1940 has been regarded as a maximum 
figure for the deliveries up to and including 31/12 1941. From this there has been 
subtracted the value of 27 He planes which were never delivered (7.3 million kronor) 
and the value of the equipment delivered during 1941 (28 million kronor). The figure for 
1940 will then be 76.4 million kronor. The reasonableness of this figures can be mea­
sured against a tabulation from Fst Mtrlavd. of the situation as at 31/12 1940, although 
in the latter the values are not specified. Fst kvmavd. Övriga handlingar efter ämne. 
F XI: 1. FCA.
The Fuehrer had said that in the negotations with Sweden about military equipment 
there would be “keine besonders wohlwollende, sondern eher eine zurückhaltende 
Tendenz." Akten zur .. . Ser. D Bd XIII Dok. 92 not 3.
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anti-aircraft artillery was concerned. Altogether during the year 60 
40 mm anti-aircraft guns and 106 20 mm anti-aircraft guns were 
purchased. This was far fewer than had been requested and the 
attempts to purchase heavier guns failed. As regards artillery equip­
ment, mention should be made of the long-drawn-out negotiations 
for permission to purchase 21 cm guns for the coast artillery. Up to the 
summer of 1940 there were good prospects of being allowed to buy 
six of these from Skodaverken, but the matter then lapsed. Not 
until the year 1944 were nine of these guns delivered.
One of the most serious matters was the tank question. Contracts 
had been concluded for the delivery of 90 20 ton Czechoslovakian 
tanks, but in the summer it became clear that they would not be 
delivered. Instead, on 15 July the Defence Staff asked the Foreign 
Office to investigate the possibilities of obtaining a licence to produce 
such tanks in Sweden.40
The aircraft deliveries were a further source of disappointment. The 
order for 18 Dornier planes had had to be cancelled in July 1940, 
and as regards the modern Ju 87-88 bomber and the Me 109-110 
fighter, matters did not even progress as far as concrete negotiations 
in spite of vigorous lobbying. Of the 39 Heinkel planes contracted 
for, none were to be delivered during 1940.41
Thus the results were modest, looked at against the background 
of the extensive requests which had been made at the end of 1939. 
Nor was there a decline in the need for imports. During the spring of 
1940 work was carried out on a reorganization of the defence which 
meant a considerable increase in the demand for military equipment. 
For this reason a new import request list - “list no. 3”, drawn up by 
the Defence Staff - was produced in May 1940.42 The list was very 
extensive and included 360 aircraft. There was a request to purchase 
200 Ju 88s and 100 Me 110s, apart from the aircraft already contracted 
for. In addition they wanted to import a total of more than 700 anti­
aircraft guns, especially 20 mm guns.
During the remaining years of the war Sweden’s purchases of
40 Rappe (Stf C Fst) till UD 15/7 1940. Fst Mtrlavd. B 1:2 KrA.
41 The aircraft deliveries are tabulated in Norberg, p. 220.
42 Cronenberg, p. 31.
Stendhal till Hägglöf 10/5 1940 med förteckning 10/5 1940. HP 24 V/Ty. UDA.
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military equipment in Germany were on a smaller scale and less 
striking in character. During the year 1941 the contracts signed in 1940 
were implemented and goods worth 28 million kronor were imported, 
mainly artillery equipment. On 8 December 1941 a new military 
equipment agreement was concluded between the two countries, 
initially involving about 80 million kronor. In 1942 and 1943 supple­
mentary agreements connected with it were concluded. The total 
values of the deliveries under these agreements were as follows:
in 1942: 18.0 million kronor
in 1943: 46.5 million kronor
in 1944/45: about 39.5 million kronor
The item which completely dominated these deliveries was 10.5 cm 
howitzers with ammunition.43 Other large items were jeeps, light
43The deliveries from Germany to Sweden under the agreements of 8/2 1941, 5/3, 
9/5. 7/9 1942, 4/5 1943 amounted in value to the following sums (in millions of kronor):
31/12-42 31/12-43 31/3-44 Balance Total ordered,
Total 18.0 64.5 92.7 11.3 104.0
Including
10.5 cm howitzers
with ammunition 4.2 30.5 48.1 2.4 110 howitzers
275,000 explosive 
shells
Hand-grenades - 2.3 2.8 - 450,000
Light machine-guns 6.8 8.3 8.3 - 2,000 light machine-
with ammunition guns 25 million 
cartridges
Jeeps 3.9 12.0 12.0 — 600 (582) after 
cancellations
21 cm howitzers 
with ammunition 8.2(5) 8.1(4) 9 howitzers 1,800
round
Binoculars and 
range-finders 0.8 6.4 6.4 - 27,750 pairs of 
binoculars, 600 
range-finders
Radio equipment 1.1 1.4 1.4 0.03
Aircraft equipment 0.5 2.7 2.7 0.4
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machine-guns, 21 cm guns, field-glasses and range-finders. Apart from 
these deliveries, during 1943 226 aircraft engines were purchased, 
including 115 AmericanTwin-Wasp engines which had been seized as 
spoils of war in France, and 21 Daimler-Benz 605 engines to a total 
value of about 10 million kronor.44
During the years 1940-1945 Sweden imported military equipment 
worth about 218 million kronor from Germany. Thus Germany was 
clearly the predominant source of imports (see diagram 2).
Germany's motives in supplying Sweden with military equipment 
were perhaps partly political - for example, it emerged at times 
that there was a wish to give Finland indirect support against the 
Soviet Union by exporting to Sweden - but they were mainly eco­
nomic.45 The German imports, above all of iron ore but also, for 
example, of wood products, cellulose and engineering products, 
presupposed services in return. Sweden also had a vital need for the 
imports from Germany, but it soon turned out that Germany found it 
more difficult than Sweden to fulfil her contractual delivery obliga­
tions, and from 1941 onwards there was a deficit in the clearing 
balance which was very trobulesome for the German negotiators. 
For example, the strained German economy had difficulties in mining 
and transporting the coal and coke which constituted the biggest item 
in the German export quota. It seemed tempting to the German 
Government commission's negotiators to improve the balance of 
payments by exporting valuable and not very bulky goods as military 
equipment, without having to apply for increased credits, which was a
Source: Sammanställningar av Wettermark 14/1 1943, 8/1 1944, 4/4 1944, HP 24 V'/Ty. 
UDA.
Deutsch-schwedisches geheimes Protokoll über die Lieferung von Kriegsgerät 
8/12 1941. Akten zur ... Ser. D Bd XIII Dok. 565.
44 Sammanställning 13/10 1943 (Wettermark). Missiv 15/10 tili Hägglöf (Wettermark). 
HP 24 V'/Ty. UDA.
45 Kellgren, pp. 100, 148.
PM över läget i leveransfrägan den 16 december 1939 pâ e.m. (Juhlin-Dannfelt).
The representatives of Rheinmetall were of the opinion “on the basis of informa­
tion received in the course of conversations with various military authorities that 
aid to Finland is implied in the German concessions (to deliver military equipment).“ 
FstMtrlavd, F II:3Ty. KrA.
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constantly recurring theme, expecially during 1942,46 The agreement 
concluded in January 1940 provided that half of the payment was to be 
made in gold and free currencies (see p. 32), but all the subsequent 
agreements for the supply of military equipment stipulated that pay­
ment was to be made through the clearing.47
One of the factors which hampered Germany in exporting military 
equipment was her own armed forces’ need for equipment. This factor 
made itself felt more and more after the period of the German 
“Blitzkrieg” had come to an end and the long-drawn-out Russian 
campaign began to eat up large resources. In the light of this it was 
natural that the exports were to consist of equipment which for 
various reasons was not in such demand by the German armed 
forces or which was of a standard character and was produced in 
very large series. Thus on several occasions spoils of war which had 
been seized by the Germans were exported; these could not be fitted 
so easily into the German organization. The big items of artillery 
equipment, small arms and ammunition were goods which were mass- 
produced and for which there was apparently a significant production 
capacity in Germany.48 On the other hand, as regards heavy anti­
aircraft artillery, tanks or aircraft for example, the position was 
different. These were products in respect of which the German armed
46Hagglof (1958). pp. 197-209.
PM angående svensk-tyska överläggningar i handelsfrågor. Handelskommissionens 
arkiv vol. 352. RA.
In the autumn of 1941 Walter maintains that it is necessary to have "eine Auflocke­
rung der Kriegsgerätausfuhr nach Schweden”. Aufzeichnung des Legationsrat von 
Scherpenberg (Handelspol. Akt.). Vermark über die Besprechung bei Herrn. Min. dir. 
Wiehl betreffend Wirtschaftverhandlungen mit Schweden am 28 Aug. 1941. Akten 
zur .. . Ser. D Bd XIILl Dok 254.
Cf. Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 316.
47 In actual fact about 80 per cent of the deliveries of 1940 were also to be paid for via 
the clearing. Wettermark till Hägglöf 22/11 1940. HP 24 V1Ty- UDA.
The agreement of 8/12 1941 provided that 10 per cent of the purchase price was 
to be used freely in Sweden and to be outside the clearing system. 80 per cent of the 
purchase was to be paid in advance which was also designed to ease the clearing situa­
tion for the Germans. PM angående svensk-tyska överläggningar i handelsfrågor. 
Handelskommissionens arkiv vol. 352. RA. Deutsch-schwedisches geheimes Proto­
koll über die Lieferung von Kriegsgerat 8/12 1941. Akten zur ... Ser. D Bd XIII Dok. 
565.
48 Hägglöf till Prytz 19/12 1941. HP 64 Ct. UDA.
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forces claimed precedence. From the point of view of foreign policy 
the exports of such equipment were probably a more sensitive matter; 
there was always a risk that the German forces would be compelled 
to face Swedish troops. It was not agreeable to think that the latter 
would then be equipped with the most modern and effective weapons 
from the German war industry.49
As far as the Swedes were concerned, at the beginning of the war 
they were very interested in buying virtually all kinds of military 
equipment from Germany. Up to the summer of 1940 they entertained 
high hopes of being allowed to buy the equipment which was partic­
ularly desirable - tanks, aircraft et cetera, for some of which contracts 
had in fact already been signed. However, motives of foreign policy 
and, later, consideration for Germany’s needs, resulted in a subse­
quent moderation of hopes and demands.
However, a collaboration in the field of military technology - and 
extensive purchases of weapons more or less presuppose this - always 
involves a relationship of dependence with political consequences. 
It is possible to discover a natural endeavour on the part of the 
Swedes to avoid finding themselves placed in such a position of 
dependence, and one cannot assume that the limitations on the 
imports of military equipment resulted only from German restrictions. 
The three month embargo on deliveries during the early summer of 
1940 had demonstrated as clearly as could be wished what it meant 
to be dependent on imports of military equipment. This was a weak 
point in Sweden’s relationship with Germany. On other occasions 
too Germany’s political leaders showed their readiness to use the 
cancellation of deliveries of weapons as a means of exerting pressure 
in critical situations. It was one of the “Daumenschrauben” which 
could be applied.50
49 JuMin-Dannfelt till Günther 24/4 1940. HP 24 V1Ty. UDA.
50 On 31/8 1940 Becker of Wi Rü Amt informed Juhlin-Dannfelt that “difficulties over 
the weapon deliveries would arise” if the Swedes did not surrender six Norwegian 
tankers which were lying in Swedish harbours. Juhlin-Dannfelt continues: “The whole 
method, typically German, of getting their own way by what is in fact blackmail and 
by threatening to cancel the weapon deliveries is most unattractive, but I assume 
that in the present situation it is wisest to arrange for the surrender of the ships in 
question as soon as possible.” JuMin-Dannfelt till fälttygmästaren B. Hedqvist, 
KATD. FstH Mtrlavd. F II:3/Ty. KrA.
Cf. also: Die Gesandtschaft in Stockholm an das Auswärtige Amt 2 Juli 1941;
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In German industrial and military quarters great interest was taken 
in placing the Swedish war material industry under the “Gross- 
raumwirtschaft”, which it was designed to build up in Europe 
under German leadership.51 It was to be the main task of the Swedish 
engineering industry to act as components sub-contractor to the 
German rearmament industry.52 In return the Germans offered 
licences and drawings. One instance of an offer of collaboration of 
this kind is the proposal in the autumn of 1941 that the Swedish army 
be allowed to buy forty or so German tanks, the Swedish companies 
delivering in return spare parts for tanks in an equivalent sum.53 
This proposal was not accepted, and instead the production of tanks 
was to take place on Swedish soil under licence. Another instance 
occurred at the end of 1940 when there were discussions about the 
production in Sweden of an aircraft engine of the Daimler-Benz type. 
First of all private German firms, above all Junkers, sounded out 
Swedish companies about the possibilities of manufacturing engines 
under direct German supervision. There was interest in such an 
arrangement, but it was rejected by the Swedish authorities. Instead 
a proposal was worked out according to which the Germans were to 
build up an aircraft industry in Sweden with a monthly capacity of 
150 engines, 100 of which would be at the disposal of the German 
Luftwaffe, while 50 would be allocated to the Swedish aircraft 
manufacturers. The attitude of the Air Force headquarters was
Aufzeichnung des Legationsrat von Scherpenberg (handelspol. Akt) 10 Juli 1941; 
Die Gesandtschaft in Stockholm an das Auswärtige Amt 12 Juli 1941; Die Gesandt­
schaft in Stockholm an das Auswärtige Amt 19 Sept. 1941. Akten zur ... Ser. Bd 
XIII Dok. 59, 92 (not 3), 98, 336.
The German rearmament situation can be traced in the following works inter alia:
Milward, A. S., The German Economy at War (1967);
Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg:
Janssen, G., Das Ministerium Speer. Deutschlands Rüstung im Krieg;
Carroll, B. A., Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich.
51 Cf. Hägglöf (1958), pp. 131-132.
52Milward (1967), pp. 110-111.
Aufzeichnung des Legationsrat von Scherpenberg. Akten zur ... Ser D Bd XIII 
Dok. 254.
53 PM 16/8 1941 (Wettermark); PM angående samtal med major Rodhe i Wi Rü Amt i 
Berlin 24/10 1941 beträffande upphandling av krigsmateriel i Tyskland (Wettermark); 
PM angående möjligheterna för fortsatt upphandling av krigsmateriel i Tyskland 6/12 
1941 (Wettermark). HP 24’/Ty. UDA.
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positive, the interest of the Minister of Defence was enlisted, but the 
Government turned down the proposal in January 1941. In fact in 
February a German commission toured nine leading Swedish war 
industries in order to study the prospects of the production under 
licence of the DB engine, which the Swedes were interested in in­
stead. After long and hard negotiations licences were granted in 
August 1941. The Swedes were dependent on German know-how, 
but they defended themselves against the presence of the Germans 
as far as they could.54
Bearing in mind the risk of acts of extortion in critical situations 
and with them increased long-term pressure to fit into the Greater 
German economy, it is easy to understand the basic endeavour of the 
Swedish Government to avoid placing itself in a relationship of 
dependence on Germany. One of the ways of doing this was to try 
and base Swedish rearmament on domestic industrial resources as 
far as possible.
C. Imports from other countries
In terms of value the imports of military equipment from Italy were 
the next largest after those from Germany, and in 1940-1941 Italy was 
the dominant supplier (see table 5). However, the purchases from 
this country were of a different character to the others. Recourse was 
had to Italy when all other sources dried up. Equipment was bought 
there in order to make good very acute shortages, while at the same 
time there was scepticism about models and quality. This applied to a 
great extent to the purchases of ships which were made in 1940. 
Around the turn of the year 1939/40 there was discussion of purchases 
from abroad, above all of cruisers and destroyers. The Naval Matériel 
Administration was in contact with Italy in relation to certain other 
purchases - inter alia, of torpedoes - and at the beginning of 1940 an 
offer to buy four destroyers was made. Two were of the so-called 
“Stella” type and were fairly old, two were somewhat more modern
54Norberg, pp. 116-119.
Licensavtal 22/8, 25/8 1941. HP 24 Y1ITy. UDA.
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and were of the “Spica” type. They were comparatively sceptical 
about the transaction at the navy administration, but the situation 
was such that they could not afford to be too particular. On 26 April 
the ships were purchased for a total price of 27 million kronor. During 
the voyage home from Italy the destroyers were captured by British 
naval forces near the Faroe Islands, which caused a diplomatic 
crisis between Sweden and Great Britain. In July 1940 the destroyers 
put in to Gothenburg. They then underwent an extensive reconstruc­
tion of the crews’ quarters, the armaments and many other things. 
The purchase costs were considered high and if these extra costs are 
added the whole transaction must be considered unfavourable from a 
purely economic point of view. During the same year four motor 
torpedo-boats were also purchased in Italy. Apart from the purchase 
of two English motor torpedo-boats which had taken place earlier, 
the Italian ships were the only ones purchased abroad during the 
period of rearmament.55
In the difficult situation of the late spring of 1940 contacts were 
also made with Italian aircraft manufacturers. By then the Air Force 
Matériel Administration had met with rebuffs from France (Brequet), 
Germany (Dornier), Holland (Fokker), the U.S.A. (Seversky, Vultee) 
and even the Soviet Union. The types of plane which were offered 
in Italy were not the most suitable from the Swedish point of view. 
Experiences during the following years were also to confirm mis­
givings that the quality was not of the best. However, there was no 
choice in 1940. After complex negotiations - to which the Swedish 
war-time commissions, the Foreign Office and the Swedish ironworks 
had to be summoned, since the Italians wanted payment inter alia in 
the form of quality steel, alloy metals, mica and many other things - 
contracts were signed. During the years 1940-1942 a total of 216 
planes were imported, viz. 84 Caproni planes (Ca 313) for bombing 
and reconnaissance, 72 fighters manufactured by Fiat and 60 Reggiane 
Falco fighters.56 As a result Italy was to become completely dominant 
as a supplier of foreign aircraft to the Swedish air force. After 1942
55 H-son Ericson, S., Knopar på logglinan, pp. 138 f.
56 Thus the total imports of aircraft during the period of the war can be summarised 
as follows (according to Norberg, p. 220):
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no more Italian planes were imported and the country’s impor­
tance as a supplier of military equipment ceased.37
One explanation for the fact that it was still possible to buy equip­
ment in Italy was that she had not yet been drawn into the war in 
earnest in 1940, and was therefore comparatively speaking well- 
armed. Indeed, war was declared against England and France when 
the latter was being conquered by the Germans in the summer of 
1940, but this did not give rise to any immediate demand for military 
equipment. However, Italy soon became involved in the war in 
earnest. Then it became impossible to count on finding any spare 
aircraft or other military equipment in Italy.
Up to and including 1942 equipment worth 48 million kronor was 
purchased from Switzerland. This consisted mainly of 20 mm anti­
aircraft guns and ammunition. In addition the other items acquired 
from Switzerland included range-finders and clockwork devices for 
fusing grenades.
Before the outbreak of war Sweden had already had a system of 
weapon bartering with Finland. In certain fields the Finnish military 
equipment industry had a considerable capacity, and in spite of the 
fact that domestic demands were, naturally, great, Finland was able to 
supply Sweden with certain equipment. The most important items 
were the heavy trench-mortars (12 cm) which were imported in the
type exporting country delivery period number
T 2 (Heinkel) Germany Jan 1939-Oct 1939 12
S 12 (Heinkel) Germany July 1941-April 1942 12
S 14 (Fieseier Storch) Germany June 1938-Sept 1943 20
J 9 (Seversky) U.S.A. Dec 1939-Aug 1940 60
J 11 (Fiat) Italy June 1940-Oct 1941 72
S 12 (Caproni) Italy Oct 1940-Nov 1941 84
J 20 (Reggiane) Italy May 1941-Feb 1943 60
In addition of these there were 90-100 American fighters, imported just before the 
end of the war in 1945 (Söderberg, p. 327).
57The aircraft negotiations are described in Norberg, pp. 113-115, Söderberg, pp. 
286-293 and Bjuggren, B., Attack, pp. 157-161.
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Table 5. Imports of military equipment (weapons and ammunition, warships and 
aircraft) from various countries 1940-1945. In millions of kronor.
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Germany
(inc. Bohemia-Moravia) 58 26 19 33 47 3 186
The U.S.A. 17 - - - - 15 32
Italy 61 43 19 - - - 123
Switzerland 14 18 16 6 3 3 60
Finland 2 7 6 2 2 1 20
Belgium & Netherlands 2 4 - - - - 6
Others 6 5 3 1 - - 15
Total 160 103 63 42 52 22 442
Source: SOS Handel 1940-1945.
years 1942-1944, but in addition considerable quantities of ammuni­
tion were included in the purchases.
The result of developments in Europe in 1940 was that Sweden 
became more and more dependent on Germany for her imports of 
military equipment. Not only was Sweden cut off from all countries 
which were hostile to the Axis powers, but Germany gained control 
over the rest: the imports from both Italy and Switzerland were very 
much subject to German approval. The German influence in Finland 
also increased.
D. The importance of the imports
There is no clear-cut way of establishing the importance of the 
imported military equipment for the country’s defence forces. The 
imports can be assessed purely in terms of quantity on the basis of 
their value in relation to the total of the equipment acquired by the 
armed forces. Table 5 shows that, according to official statistics, 
military equipment worth 442 million kronor was imported during the 
years 1940-1945.
On various grounds there is reason to suppose that the official 
statistics underestimate the value of the imports of mechanical
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military equipment by about 20 per cent.58 If in addition one takes 
into consideration the fact that the imports for the year 1939, which 
were worth a total of 35 million kronor (according to SOS), fell within 
the war period to a great extent, this will produce a total figure of 
about 550 million kronor for the whole of the war period. Since the 
defence's total acquisition of military equipment cost about 4,200 
million kronor, this means that about 13 per cent of the new acquisi­
tions took the form of imports. Comparatively speaking the part 
played by the imports was greatest during the initial stages of the 
period; in 1940 a quarter of the acquisitions were imported. There­
after the significance of the imports declined and from 1942 onwards 
they accounted for around 10 per cent of the value of the year’s 
acquisitions59 (see diagram 3).
58 The table is based on the official trade statistics, group XIX (weapons and ammuni­
tion) and group XVII: 1,922 and 1,940 (means of transport: aircraft and warships). As 
regards certain kinds of equipment it is not possible to tell from SOS what had been 
imported for civil purposes and what was intended for military use. This applies to 
motor vehicles, for example. For the most important import country, Germany 
(including Bohemia-Moravia), the figures for the orders from the defence administra­
tions have been used. They amount to about 218 million kronor for the whole period 
1940-1945. This should be compared with the figure of about 186 million kronor in the 
official statistics. Thus table 5 underestimates the value of the imports of military 
equipment quite considerably. In addition there is the fact that equipment which was 
of importance for the war was to some extent imported by private Swedish citizens 
and companies and was then sold to the Swedish defence force. This applied above 
all to parts for tanks, aircraft et cetera. A rough estimate produces a figure of about 
3 million kronor per year in value in 1940-1944, i.e. 15 million kronor (Wettermark till 
Hägglöf 15/10 1943. HP 24 V1Ty- UDA.). As far as the German imports are con­
cerned it is then necessary to adjust the calculation of the total value by about 25 
per cent from about 186 to about 233 million kronor. As regards other countries there 
is no reason to assume that SOS underestimated the imports of military equipment so 
greatly. Thus the total value of the imports from all countries in the years 1940-1945 
is somewhere between 489 and 553 million kronor.
39 A rough estimate of the relative importance of the imports can be obtained from 
the following table (the import from SOS have been increased by 20 per cent):
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
39/40 40/41 41/42 42/43 43/44 44/45,
Total grants, budget year 874 822 1005 395 693 410
Imports, calendar year 42 192 124 76 50 62 26
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Diagram 3. Total grants for military equipment and imports of military equipment
millions of Kronor
600_
-grants
200-
mports
1939 40 43 44 1945
39/40 40/41 41/42 42/43 43/44 44/45
Source: Appendix 1 table 17, SOS Handel.
Note: As to the calculation of the totals, see notes 58 and 59.
In spite of the magnitude of the imports at the beginning of the war 
period, it is clear that the Swedes did not get the equipment which 
they had requested. During the winter of 1939/40 the basis on which 
the rearmament was planned was one of rapid imports which would 
make good shortages so that the time could be gained in which to build 
up the industrial capacity and accumulate the know-how which would 
constitute the foundations for long-term rearmament. It was necessary 
to make the country self-supporting in the long term as regards 
military equipment so that there would be a capacity for sustaining a 
replacement production throughout a longer period of warfaring. 
Also, at the beginning of the year 1940 negotiations took place, with 
some success, in both Germany and the U.S.A., and although the 
equipment was not delivered as swiftly as was desired, there were 
nevertheless contracts to hand or advanced negotiations in respect of 
equipment worth a total of 250 million kronor. As a result of develop­
ments on the battlefields and in the war at sea in the spring Sweden's
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western import routes were cut off. For a time an alternative way 
round the obstacle via Petsamo made it possible for military 
equipment to continue to flow in. but political developments in the 
U.S.A. stopped the flow at source. Parallel with this development 
political relations with Germany became complicated and the supply 
from the south was also stopped. In the summer of 1940 it became 
clear that no reliance could be placed on obtaining the military equip­
ment - which was of a high standard as regards quality and was 
particularly desirable - from Germany. In any event the price of such 
equipment would be high: with her monopoly Germany was able to 
impose political conditions. Thus during the summer the situation for 
Swedish rearmament was critical. The first stage - of rapid rein­
forcement through imports - could never be achieved, and the 
prospects for the second stage, a long-term rearmament based on 
the country’s own resources, had not yet been created.60
s" There will be further discussion of the role of the imports in the course of the account 
of certain types of equipment in chapter III.
Ill
REARMAMENT FROM DOMESTIC RESOURCES
The value of the mechanical military equipment acquired during 
the period of the war amounted to a total of 4,199 million kronor 
(current money values throughout). As shown in the previous chapter 
about 13 per cent of this, to a value of about 550 million kronor, was 
imported. The remainder, i.e. equipment worth about 3,649 million 
kronor, was produced by the Swedish engineering industry. Evenly 
distributed amongst the six years of the war this would mean an 
annual order for a sum in excess of 600 million kronor. In purely 
quantitative terms these figures do not seem absurd. At the outbreak 
of war the Swedish engineering industry had an annual production 
capacity of about 2,000 million kronor. Towards the end of the period 
under investigation the production had risen to more than 3,000 
million kronor a year. However, this did not mean that the rearma­
ment took place without fundamentally interfering with the industry’s 
“normal” way of functioning or without considerable problems. 
Some of these will be illustrated in this chapter.
In a situation in which there was political pressure from outside, 
a blockade and a demand for the rapid reinforcement of the armed 
forces, the authorities intervened to exert control over all the fields 
of economic life. For industry the National Industry Commission 
(IK) was set up, and its tasks included the supervision of resources 
so that military equipment could be produced in the quantity and at 
the rate which were desired. A rearmament of this magnitude also 
made completely new demands on the organization which was 
responsible for the acquisition of the equipment. Coordination and 
a comprehensive view were required and experience of industrial 
production on a large scale was necessary. The present chapter
58
begins with a description of the organizational changes as regards 
the acquisition of equipment. This is followed by a survey of the 
general requirements for rearmament from domestic resources, i.e. 
supplies of raw materials, labour, fuel and power. In addition the 
supply of machine tools is discussed. The aim is not to deal exhaus­
tively with these large fields but rather to try and make it clear 
whether shortage situations occurred which were able to affect the 
progress of the rearmament.
In spite of the fact that the Swedish engineering industry was well 
developed in 1939 it was not able to adjust in a trice to military 
equipment production, especially since Sweden had been cut off 
from normal foreign contacts. The third section of this chapter is 
devoted to the bottlenecks which occurred within the engineering 
industry itself when the orders for military equipment increased. 
The problems are illustrated by giving a description of some of the 
important sectors of military equipment production which is supple­
mentary to the account given in the first chapter, so that the diffi­
culties become apparent in concrete terms. The prospects of produc­
ing arms, ammunition, ships or aircraft, for example, varied very 
considerably.
A. The acquisition organization is changed
Under the Defence Act of 1936 it was the duty of the army adminis­
tration’s ordnance department to arrange for the acquisition of 
ordnance equipment for the army and to plan military industrial 
production. Within the naval administration the various departments 
and the office for industry’s war organization performed correspond­
ing tasks. The air force administration had its own equipment depart­
ment with similar functions. The planning of acquisitions in a state 
of war took place mainly through the making of war supply contracts 
which provided that certain companies undertook, in the event of 
war or the threat of war, to make certain deliveries to the armed 
forces. The planning was supplemented by the National Board of 
Economic Defence (RKE), inter alia through the establishment of a 
so-called war industry register which began by listing companies 
with war supply contracts. Factory plans for such companies were
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worked out, specifying the staff, raw materials, means of transport 
and many other items which were required.1
When the war broke out machinery which was on the whole new 
was introduced for the planning of the country’s national supply. 
As regards industry, on 4 September 1939 the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry set up a committee of industrial experts to whom was 
given the task of planning and possibly of bringing into operation a 
control of the more important raw materials and other requirements 
of industry, and the additional tasks of following developments and 
suggesting appropriate measures. This committee drew up plans for a 
more permanent wartime body, the National Industry Committee 
(IK) which received its instructions from the King in Council on 
27 October 1939 and began to function on 1 November of the same 
year. Certain parts of the mandate were altered by a decision of the 
King in Council of 14 June 1940. IK ceased to operate on 31 December 
1949 and was replaced by the National Commission for Trade and 
Industry.2
Within IK the work was so organized that, besides certain central 
bodies, several departments or bureaus were set up with the responsi­
bility for different groups of goods.3 For example, there was an 
engineering department to deal with questions of works capacity and 
machine tools. A war industry department was formed on 15 Decem­
ber 1939 and this was responsible for planning the production of 
military equipment.4 The department came into existence by virtue 
of the fact that the industrial department within RKE was transferred 
to IK. This was one of the stages in the development which resulted 
in the newly established body taking over all RKE s planning duties. 
When military equipment was acquired IK was to participate by 
organizing the supply of raw materials and the operation of the 
country’s industries. This was made legally possible by the passing
1 Betänkande med förslag rörande den ekonomiska försvarsberedskapens framtida 
organisation (SOU 1946:19), p. 41.
2 Statsmakterna och folkhushållningen ... (SOU 1941:18), pp. 48-51. Betänkande med 
förslag ... (SOU 1946:19), pp. 13-19.
SFS 787/39, 582/40. IK Arkivförteckning. RA.
3 Statsmakterna och folkhushållningen ... (SOU 1941:18), pp. 216-220. Huss, E., 
Statens industrikommission, pp. 400-411.
4 SFS 860/39.
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of the National Requisitioning Act. It was invoked against Bofors 
and under its provisions it could be enforced against all the companies 
which were listed in the war industry register.3
A price bureau was also set up within IK on 17 January 1940. Its 
function was to deal with questions of price, especially in relation to 
supplies to the armed forces but also in relation to other matters 
within IK’s sphere of operations.8
The exceptional demands for supplies of military equipment meant 
that the civil industry was drawn into the defence plan to an unprece­
dented extent. As a result certain conflicts which had previously 
been latent were brought to a head. It became apparent on many 
occasions in the 1930s that the private sector of the economy was 
dissatisfied with the way in which the military organization worked 
in acquiring military equipment. The problems were due in part to 
the traditional division of the armed forces into different branches 
of the services which were greatly attached to their independence 
and which were unwilling to subordinate themselves to central bodies. 
The establishment towards the end of the 1930s of a defence staff and 
a supreme commander marked a retreat - albeit with reluctance on 
the part of the navy and the air force - from the conventional separa­
tism. However, private industry took the view that the military 
administration as a whole did not act rationally enough and was not 
sufficiently abreast of the times as far as orders, production and the 
maintenance of its equipment were concerned.5 6 7
As a result of the establishment of a war administration in the 
years 1939-1940, leading spokesmen for the private sector of the 
economy - in their major roles within the war agencies - were to 
acquire a greater influence over the whole field of military equipment 
supplies (see pp. 173 et seqq.). For example IK, through its hold over 
raw materials and industrial capacity, acquired the real power of 
decision as far as production was concerned. It had the task of 
achieving a rational acquisition system without being hampered by 
considerations of military tradition.
The acquisition of ammunition was the sphere in which the need
5IK KR B: 1 dnr h 367, 2532. RA.
6 Statsmakterna och folkhushållningen ... (SOU 1941:18), pp. 268-269. SFS 293/39.
7 Månsson, O., Ekonomisk försvarsberedskap inför 2. världskriget.
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for a single common body was regarded as most acute. There was 
often direct competition between branches of the services over 
ammunition orders. On 1 March 1940 a proposal about the acquisi­
tion of ammunition was put forward jointly by IK and the Emergency 
Expenditure Audit Board. Thereafter the King in Council set up the 
National Ammunition Board (SAN) which came into operation on 22 
April 1940. SAN’s task was “to acquire goods which are suited to 
production in series or mass production, above all ammunition.”8 
In consequence the board took over most of the work of IK’s war 
industry department. In addition the board was to assist the adminis­
trations in making their purchases, a function which was in the 
main taken over by IK’s price bureau after 1940. By virtue of the fact 
that SAN was directly responsible to the King in Council it was an 
ancillary administration for the branches of the services.
The establishment of SAN constituted the first important transfer 
of the functions of decision-making and purchasing to a body domi­
nated by civilians. Another important step was taken on 24 May 1940 
when the engineering committee of the armed forces was set up. 
The prelude to this was a joint letter of 2 April 1940 from the Emer­
gency Expenditure Audit Board of 1940 and IK to the Ministry of 
Defence, in which unfavourable comment was made on the great 
deficiencies in the defence’s own production of military equipment. 
The Secretary of State at once appointed a committee to plan a 
reorganization. The chairman of the committee was R. Blomqvist, 
the chairman of the audit board. After a swift inquiry which was 
very critical of the way in which the defence’s own factories and 
other industrial establishments were run, the board for maintainance 
of defence equipment was set up as soon as 24 May 1940. Its task 
was “to take charge, under the King in Council, of the operation, as 
regards technology and finance,” of the following factories and 
establishments:
armouries belonging to the ordnance depots
land defence ammunition factories
gunpowder factories belonging to the defence organization
8 Kungl. Maj;ts prop. 247/1940 samt statsutskottets utlåtande över densamma den 
28 maj 1940. See also note 5 above.
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land defence and air force laboratory and adaptation centres 
the Torpedo Works of the National Defence Factories 
Carl Gustafs stads munitions factory 
the defence organization's chemical establishment
Between 1 January 1941 and 30 June 1942 the Signalverkstäderna 
(signal works) in Sundbyberg also came under the control of the 
board. On 1 January 1942 the ordnance depots were handed back 
to the army administration’s ordnance department.9
On 29 November 1940 a group of experts within the Ministry of 
Defence was given the task of drawing up guidelines for a reorganiza­
tion of military administration. Two of the “more weighty” represent­
atives of the civil war administration. R. Blomqvist and P. E. Gum- 
meson, were included.10 The Governor-General, T. Nothin, became 
chairman and there were also four representatives of the military 
council. Barely three months later, on 24 February 1941, there was 
produced “a report with proposals about the principles relating to 
a reorganization of the military administration submitted by the mili­
tary administration inquiry”. In the report much of the criticism of the 
military administration’s handling of equipment matters was repeated. 
It was a known fact that the small grants of the pre-war period had 
not permitted the building up of a good stock of equipment and that 
the enormous increase at the outbreak of war would inevitably cause 
problems. However, the military administration was accused of decli­
ning efficiency, duplication of work, negligence over standardization 
and a lack of competence on the part of the management and staff 
within the administration. Centralization, coordination and increased 
influence for industry were required. The committee of inquiry pro­
posed that a defence administration department of equipment should 
be set up, to take charge of the production of military equipment 
apart from ships, aircraft and tanks, and the acquisition, control and 
storage of all military equipment. The advantages of such a change 
would include the creation of entirely new possibilities of standardiza­
tion, and thanks to a better overall view it would be possible to choose
9 Kungl. Maj:ts prop. 180/1943, pp. 26-28.
. 10 Skrivelse från försvarets fabriksstyrelse till gen. Thörnell 13/7 1949. Ber.v. CF I. 
MHA.
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the right priorities over the whole field, it was proposed that “a 
person who is fully conversant with the problems of industry” should 
be appointed head of the department. On his recommendation the 
King in Council would appoint groups of experts recruited from the 
manufacturing companies. These groups would act as advisors to 
the head of the department and would participate in the creation 
and planning of military equipment production. The department would 
be directly responsible to the King in Council and in the event of 
disagreement between the department and the defence command, 
which had to initiate manufacturing or investigation, the question 
was to be referred for decision to the King in Council.11
The proposals of the military administration inquiry of 1940 became 
the basis for a debate which continued throughout the ensuing 
period. The main question was whether a central administration 
should be responsible for ordering military equipment, or whether 
this responsibility should remain with the military authorities.12 The 
civilian representatives had dominated the inquiry and in spite of 
harsh criticism from military quarters developments during the period 
which followed meant that SAN was transformed into a central 
administration for the acquistion of military equipment with an ever 
expanding sphere of authority. Important steps in this direction 
were taken from the end of April 1942 when SAN was given new 
tasks in supplementary instructions and in consequence was re­
named the National Military Equipment Board at the turn of the 
budget year on 1 July 1940. Amongst other things the responsibility 
for the acquisition of gas protection equipment and quartermaster’s 
equipment manufactured by the engineering industry was transferred 
to the new board.13
11 Militära förvaltningsutredningen (1940 ârs), passim.
Ex. nr 59 Fst H Marinoperationsavdelningen F 11:2:4. KrA.
12PM angående militära förvaltningsutredningen. Fst H Kvartermästaravdelningen 
F XI:3 FCA
PM angående professor Woxéns förslag till “Försvarsväsendets krigsmaterielverk” 
i anslutning till diskusioner under slutet av 1941-februari 1942. IK KR H 8/42. RA.
Betänkande med förslag rörande den centrala förvaltningsverksamheten inom 
försvarsväsendet avgivet av 1941 års militära förvaltningsutredning den 28 mars 
1942 (SOU 1942:16), pp. 23-63.
13 Kungl. Maj:ts prop. 180/1943, pp. 26, 114-116.
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The developments were in line with the new organization proposals 
which had been put forward on 28 March 1942 by the military adminis­
tration inquiry of 1941, a one-man inquiry by the Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of Defence, T. Warn, set up in the autumn 
of 1941 (SOU 1942:16). The proposals of the man who conducted 
the inquiry were in the main based on the inquiry of 1940 and were 
to form the basis for the fundamental reorganization of the military 
administration which took place in the years 1943-1944. As regards the 
acquisition of equipment, a Government department, the Swedish 
Board of War Supplies (KKV), was set up on 1 July 1943. A Director- 
General was put in charge of the board, with a deputy Director-Gene­
ral, a chief engineer and three assistant directors who were directly re­
sponsible for the five divisions of the Board (see below). Alongside 
this there was an advisory body, the KKV Council, whose members 
were appointed by the King in Council and consisted of three members 
proposed by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the services, 
one by the chief of the defence staff, one representative of civil 
defence, one representative of the Swedish Employers Association 
(SAF), one for the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) 
and at least six representatives of civil industry. The Supreme Com­
mander had the right to issue directives connected with preparedness 
for war and military operations. In the event of a disagreement 
between the Board and the Supreme Commander the question was 
to be referred by the latter for decision to the King in Council. The 
main task of the Board was described in the first paragraph of its 
terms of reference as being “to prepare and implement the measures 
required for the defence’s needs for equipment necessary for its 
preparedness for war and other requirements to be met in the best 
way possible in accordance with plans laid down or directions from 
the authority in question.”14 KKV’s work was distributed amongst 
five divisions: an industrial division, a technological division, a 
control division, a supply division and an administrative division. 
The industrial division dealt with questions of war industry planning 
and the acquisition of military equipment. The planning was designed 
to create prospects of a viable war industry production, even in war.
14Kungl. Maj:ts prop. 180/1943, pp. 111-170. Provision regulations for KKV were 
issued on 30/7 1943 and confirmed 15/6 1944 (SFS 339/44).
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The equipment to be acquired was equipment which a) was of a 
mass-produced or standard character, or b) could be regarded as 
definitive as far as technology was concerned, or c) which it was 
thought should be acquired centrally if there was to be completely 
efficient war industry planning. However, the planning for and 
acquisition of such items as aircraft, warships and tanks remained the 
task of the respective administrations, as was the case with certain 
weapons, vehicles, bridge and fortification equipment, et cetera. In 
fact there had to be collaboration with KKV.15
In comparison with SAN, KKV got a more extensive sphere of 
authority but it did not go as far as the military administration inquiry 
of 1940 had recommended. After the inquiry had presented its pro­
posals the new shape of the whole defence organization had in fact 
been made clear by the committee on national defence of 1941 which 
took the view that less of the responsibility for the military efficiency 
of the branches of the services should be transferred to the Supreme 
Commander than had been recommended by the military adminis­
tration inquiry of 1940. The general centralization of the armed 
forces constituted a major argument in favour of a central acquisition 
of equipment. Thus some of the force of this argument abated.16
So on 1 July 1943. simultaneously with the establishment of KKV, 
the National Defence Factories (FFV) with the National Defence 
Factories, Head Office as the administrative unit, were set up to 
replace the board for maintainance of defence equipment. The admi­
nistration was organized in a similar way to that of KKV, i.e. with a 
Director-General in charge and an advisory body dominated by 
representatives of “industrial and technological expertise”. The 
position of the Supreme Commander in relation to the administration 
was the same as in relation to KKV.17 At that stage the following
15 Stencilerat föredrag vid krigsindustriombudskonferens 23-28/10 1944, pp. 15-17. IK 
El:32 dnr h 711/44. RA.
16 Betänkande med förslag rörande den centrala förvaltningsverksamheten inom för- 
svarsväsendet. (SOU 1942:16), pp. 36-39.
17 SFS 559/43, 341/44. For a long time there was discussion as to whether the defence 
organization's factories should be run by companies or public corporations. When the 
head office of the National Defence Factories was set up the latter alternative was 
chosen.
Palme, R., Försvarsväsendets verkstadsnämnd (in:Stv. T. 1942. pp. 286-289)
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establishments were included: the ammunition factories in Marieberg, 
Karlsborg and Zackrisdal, Carl Gustafs stads munitions factory, 
Åkers powder factory and the gas mask factory associated with it, 
and the torpedo works of the national defence factory in Motala.18
Because of the reorganization enacted by the Swedish parliament 
in 1943 the system for the supply of equipment for the armed forces 
took on a different aspect. First of all a centralization took place 
which was designed to facilitate a broader view, coordination and a 
rational production. In this connection there was a departure from 
the traditional distribution of responsibility amongst the different 
branches of the services. This development was connected with a 
general tendency within the defence organization which was ulti­
mately brought about by a change in the actual conduct of the war, 
by virtue of which the branches of the forces had been forced to 
collaborate in their operations to an ever increasing extent.
The other major change was the increase of the civilian element 
in the military administration. KKV and FFV were to be dominated 
by what was often referred to as “technological and commercial 
expertise”. One principle which was enunciated was that “efficient 
industrialists” were to be appointed to leading posts in the depart­
ments to facilitate collaboration with civil industry and to achieve a 
rational production in accordance with the principles which had been 
developed there.19 The increased influence of commercial and indus­
trial life was a reflection of its increased importance for defence. 
By virtue of the fact that military operations became more and more 
mechanised and made ever increasing demands on a country’s pro­
duction capacity, industry’s potential became directly decisive for the 
effectiveness of the armed forces. It was natural that the new key 
figures would acquire greater administrative influence. The blockade 
of Sweden and her dramatic rearmament placed the country in a 
situation which was similar to that of the warring countries. The 
development in the latter countries exhibited similar characteristics 
and possibly also acted as model for the Swedish organization.20
18 Skrivelse från försvarets fabriksstyrelse till gen. Thörnell 13/7 1949. Ber.v. CF I. 
MHA.
19 Kungl. Maj:ts prop. 180/1943, pp. 27-30.
20 ‘ ‘As a result the development ... was channelled along a course the practicality 
of which appears to me to be confirmed by the experience not only of our own country
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Germany's development was of particular interest, and to a certain 
extent it ran parallel to the development in Sweden.21
After the reorganization on 1943 the development became stabi­
lized, but this did not mean that the traditional conflicts disap­
peared.22
B. General conditions for rearmament 
1. Raw materials23
During the pre-war period Sweden’s supplies of iron and steel were 
based to a great extent on collaboration with countries abroad. 
Imported coal and coke were used in the steel works, as were con­
siderable quantities of foreign pig-iron. Quality steel and ore were 
exported from Sweden. The most important partner in this collabora­
tion was Germany, and since trade with this country continued com­
paratively undisturbed, the outbreak of war did not affect the supply 
of iron and steel. In order to compensate for the disappearance of 
imported fuel it became necessary to change over to charcoal and
but also of the countries at war. Thus in certain foreign countries, as far as the acquisti- 
tion of military equipment is concerned, an ever increasing influence has had to be 
accorded to the technologists.” Kungl. Maj:ts prop 180/1943: Departementschefen 
angående förstärkningen av centrala anskaffningsmyndigheter, p. 28.
21 The German development was also noted in military quarters but there it was mani- 
tained that it meant no significant reduction in the military authorities. En orientering av 
arméns tekniska upprustning, föredrag av Fälttygmästaren, Översten m.m. B. 
Hedqvist nov. 1942. Arméförv. Tygdep. F II KrA.
22 The criticism of KKV which came from military quarters was often very harsh. 
Protokoll vid sammanträde 13/10 (1944) inför ÖB med representanter för försvarsgrens- 
förvaltningama angående utvidgning av KKV:s befogenheter.
Douglas. A., Jag blev officer, p. 389.
23 Except where otherwise stated this section is based on the following accounts: 
Björnberg A., (red.). Hur Sverige ordnade folkförsörjningen under andra världs­
kriget, pp. 110-111.
Schwartz. S., Den svenska industrien och kriget. Föredrag hållet i Utrikespolitiska 
Institutet 15/12 1943.
Råvaruförsöijningen PM 28/2 1945. Fst kvmavd.: Övriga handlingar efter ämne F 
XI:2. FCA; Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning i Sverige under och efter andra 
världskriget I (SOU 1952:49), pp. 464-523.
See also Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning I (SOU 1952:49), pp. 457-459.
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wood to a great extent - a change which was costly but not impossible ; 
by 1945 large parts of industry had made this change. Exporting steel­
works had to adjust their production so as to compensate on the 
whole for the disappearance of the imports. Through these measures 
the Swedish market was able to be supplied with about a million 
tons of iron and steel a year, which was the normal consumption. 
Through IK’s allocation of the deliveries from the steelworks accord­
ing to priorities the most urgent needs were met, e.g. for military 
equipment, and no shortage of iron or steel occurred. There was in 
fact an exception to this in the case of ship plate, but this was due 
to a shortage of rolling-mill capacity.
The position was more problematic as far as steel's alloy metals 
were concerned. Before the five-year construction period 1942-1946 
the demand for alloy metals was estimated as follows (figures in 
tons):
Table 6. Estimated metal requirements for military acquisition of equipment 1942-1946.
Army admin. Naval
admin.
Air
Force
admin.
SAN-
KKV
Total
Ordnance
dept.
Quarter­
master
dept.
Antimony 3.9 3 9 4 255 279
Cadmium 6.9 - - 4.8 _ 12
Magnesium 22 - 1.5 222 - 246
Chromium 196 630 187 112 40 1 165
Manganese 201 5 154 83 365 808
Molybdenum 30 2.5 24 5.6 - 62
Nickel 333 225 131.5 65 - 755
Titanium - - 5 6 - 11
Vanadium 9 - 0.7 1.8 _ 12
Tungsten - - 3.9 16 - 20
Note: The metal required for the manufacture of 6,500 3-ton Volvo lorries has been 
included for KATD ; it was not expected that they would be purchased by 
KATD. but it was thought necessary to manufacture them to provide a basis 
for recruitment.
Source: Metal requirements for the military acquisition of equipment during the five- 
year period 1942-1946. IK KR H 73/42 Fst Marinop. avd. F 11:2:2 KRA.
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As is shown, there was no question of large quantities, but because 
they were necessary for the manufacture of certain qualities of steel, 
e.g. armour-plate, the metals were in fact of great importance. In 
normal circumstances they were imported into Sweden. Before the 
war broke out small quantities of manganese and tungsten were mined 
domestically, and during the war new mining of nickel, vanadium, 
cobalt and tungsten was started. Up to the time when this mining 
produced results reliance was placed on the fairly large stocks ac­
cumulated by the National Reserve Supply Board. Thanks to strict 
rationing and mutual exhanges of alloy metals, the most vital needs 
could be met. The most important example of the fact that problems 
still existed was the discussions about the molybdenum which was 
required in connection with the plans for building cruisers.
Before the cruisers (Tre Kronor and Göta Lejon) were built, dis­
cussions had been going on ever since 1940 between the naval adminis­
tration and IK about raw material requirements. On 23 September 
1941 the naval administration made a request to the Reserve Supply 
Board that certain quantities of alloy metals, including molybdenum, 
should be placed at the disposal of Bofors for building cruisers. The 
matter was remitted to IK who turned down the application for the 
time being. Even the Minister of Defence was of the view that the 
decision ought to be postponed until the middle of 1942 (when the 
new resolution on defence would be to hand and inquiries into the 
matter would have been concluded).-5
Sweden's supply of molybdenum was based on imports from 
Norway, where Swedish-owned mines produced about 55 tons a 
year. Bombing and threats of seizure (which were implemented in 
1943) made the supply uncertain. The results of attempts to step up 
the Norwegian mining and to introduce domestic mining were dis­
couraging.26 In the autumn of 1941 it was estimated that about 50
2» pm för sammanträde samt protokoll 8/12 1941 frän sammanträde pâ IK den 25 
november 1941 angående större marina byggen. IK KRPM 15/41. RA.
26 The naval administration participated in the search for workable deposits. The 
reference to one of these in December 1941 was prompted by a desire to justify the 
granting of permission for the war reserve of molybdenum to be used. PM angående 
molybdenfrågan. 14/12 1941. Y. Schoerner (head of the naval administration's engi­
neering department) Fst H Marinop. avd. F 11:2:2. KrA.
According to SOS Industri no molybdenum was mined until 1945 when 7 tons of 
ore concentrate are recorded.
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tons of molybdenum could be made available for military require­
ments. It was estimated that 21 tons would be used in building the 
cruisers. In this situation it was necessary, said the planning authori­
ties, that allocations according to priorities should be made to the 
various defence requirements. The other large field in which armour- 
plate was needed was tank production and the question was whether 
a greater - and in any event more rapid - growth of the defence 
potential might not be achieved by giving priority to this. But even 
within the framework of the naval production programme equal 
advantages might be gained by concentrating efforts on building 
modern destroyers instead of cruisers. IK took the view that the 
choice between these priorities must be made in the first instance 
by the Supreme Commander, but did not conceal its opinion that the 
building of the cruisers ought to be postponed. In naval quarters 
this argument found no favour. They offered to exchange the molyb­
denum in the armour for nickel which was a metallurgically inferior 
solution.27 However, IK was still sceptical; the cruisers would require 
9 per cent of the estimated total supply of nickel during the five-year 
period 1942-1946.28
It is difficult to determine whether the shortage of molybdenum 
was in fact the decisive reason for the postponement of the 
cruiser programme; there were also other misgivings about this big 
project. However, it is quite clear that the shortage of alloy metals 
was an important contributory factor, and this question was to a 
great extent at the centre of the debate from the autumn of 1941.29
Of the other metals it is copper which is primarily of interest, since 
it is a strategically important metal, especially for the manufacture 
of ammunition. Before the outbreak of war Sweden produced about 
11,000 tons a year, which constituted about a quarter of the country's 
consumption. During the war years it proved possible to increase 
production so that the following figures were achieved:
27 C. G. de Mare till HenningQuistgaard 23/12 1941. Fst H Marinop. avd. F 11:2:2. KrA. 
28ThornelI till konungen angående fartygsbyggnader för flottan 3/4 1942. Fst H 
Marinop. avd. F 11:2:2. KrA.
IK till konungen 9/6 1942 +bil. 1. Metallbehov för militär materielanskaffning 
under femårsperioden 1942-1946. 11/5 1942 (Ericson). FstMarinop. avd. F 11:2:2. KrA. 
29 Cf. Ericson, pp. 154-159.
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1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
tons 12 887 13 507 16 666 16 667 16 357 20 649
This increase was achieved by increasing the mining at Government 
as well as privately-owned deposits in the mining district of Väster­
botten. Large costs were incurred in expanding the mining. Amongst 
other things a cableway 100 kilometers long was built for transport 
between Kristineberg in Lycksele and Boliden. Since the imports 
of copper were so insignificant, stringent controls had in fact to be 
imposed on the consumption of copper. The civil sector was of course 
primarily affected. Attempts to replace copper were made in 
several ways, e.g. by using scrap metal in the manufacture of 
brass, using other metals for electric wire, and manufacturing casings 
of steel instead of brass.30 Thanks to measures of this kind, in the 
years 1943 and 1944 the annual consumption fell to about 20,000 tons. 
At that time 9,000 tons were kept in reserve, 5,000 of which were 
intended as a war reserve.31 Against this direct military requirements 
amounted to about 3,500 tons a year - up to 70 per cent of it for the 
production of ammunition (it was estimated that for the rearmament 
over the five-year period 1942-1946 about 14,000 tons were required).
There is little reason to suppose that the shortage of copper con­
stituted a serious threat to Swedish rearmament. In fact the electri­
fication of Sweden’s rural areas continued during the war, to a great 
extent in accordance with the long-term plans, which proves that 
margins still existed.
During the years before the war and during the war itself the supply 
of aluminium was of importance for all countries with their own 
aircraft industries, which require supplies of this metal.32 Sweden’s 
initial position was not ideal, since there was no aluminium production 
based on domestic raw materials before the outbreak of the war.
30 KKV: Utkast till redogörelse 1944. Ber.v. CF I. MHA.
31 Råvaruförsörjningen. PM 28/2 1945. Fst kvmavd.: Övriga handlingar efter ämne F 
XI:2. FCA.
Thörnell till konungen angående fartygsbyggnader för flottan 3/4 1942. Fst H 
Marinop. avd. F 11:2:2. KrA.
32 Cf. Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway (1972), pp. 171-208.
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The domestic production, which then catered for about one-third 
of the consumption, was based on a semi-manufactured product, 
aluminium oxide, which was brought in from Norway. Apart from 
this the demand was met through imports. Because of the needs of 
the aircraft industry, great activity took place after the outbreak of 
war so that the country would achieve a secured domestic produc­
tion of aluminium. After negotiations IK made an agreement with 
Svenska Aluminiumkompaniet in 1941, and in June 1943 a new estab­
lishment was opened in Kubikenborg. There aluminium oxide was 
produced from andalusit, a mineral which was mined in Boliden. 
Aluminium was produced in the same place in a new factory which, 
together with the old one in Avesta, had an annual capacity approach­
ing 4,000 tons.33 As a result it was possible to reverse the downward 
trend in production:34
Annual production of aluminium
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
tons 2 788 2 276 2 589 1572 3 857 3 914 3 540
It is estimated that the aluminium required for military purposes 
during the period 1942-1946 amounted to a total of 3,532 tons. Thus 
the domestic production capacity was sufficient, with a good margin 
for military requirements.
It also turned out that the international supply of aluminium was not 
as short as had been feared. Thus large quantities could be imported 
into Sweden, and no direct shortage situation ever arose.35 It was 
already possible to abolish rationing in 1944.
The initial position as far as lead was concerned was somewhat 
like the initial position as regards copper and aluminium. There was 
no domestic production of lead before the war, but there were raw 
materials available for production. The comparatively large stock of
33As regards cryolite and electrodes, which were necessary for the production of 
aluminium, the country became self-sufficient somewhat later in the war.
34 SOS Industri.
35 In 1943 about 3 million tons were imported and in 1944 about 1 million tons, prac­
tically all from Norway.
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lead, about 30,000 tons, dwindled during the first two years of the 
war to about 12,500 tons. On 1 November 1941 the country’s lead 
was requisitioned and strict rationing was introduced. In the mean­
time extensive work was carried out to achieve a domestic produc­
tion, IK and private companies collaborated in this work. A deposit 
in Norrbotten in Lapland was prepared, industrial buildings and 
houses were erected, a power station with cable was built, and a 
smelting plant in Rönnskär was able to function at the end of 1943. 
With this the critical period was over. During the final years of the 
war the following quantities of lead were produced:36
1943 1944 1945
tons 4,615 13,975 17.167
In spite of the fact that the strictest economy in the use of lead had 
been ordered during 1942 and 1943, it was possible to allocate to 
defence the quantity of about 10,000 tons which had been requested 
for the five-year programme.
The supply of tin was more problematical, in that there were no 
domestic deposits of ore to build on. Thus the economic administra­
tion of tin was a question of how rapidly one dared to reduce the 
stocks. When the possibilities of imports ceased at the beginning 
of 1940 the country’s stocks of tin amounted to about 3,500 tons. 
Two years later this had been halved to about 1,800 tons. When 
estimates were prepared in 1942 IK reduced the military allocation 
to 265 tons from the 450 tons which had been requested. In fact a 
further 65 tons were added in 1944 for the cruisers. In spite of the 
shortage the armed forces considered it possible to meet the most 
urgent needs. Tin could often be replaced by other metals. This 
applied to a great extent to bearing metals for slide bearings, the most 
important field of application for tin. Instead it was possible to 
transfer to ball and roller bearings to a large extent.
As far as zinc was concerned, the supply was never seriously 
threatened. Thanks to imports from Germany the comparatively 
large stocks which were available at the outbreak of war could be
36 SOS Industri.
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kept intact. A cloud appeared in the sky when trade with Germany 
ceased towards the end of 1944, but the situation did not have time 
to become serious before the advent of peace.
Summarising the situation, it can be established that the supply 
of raw materials for the production of military equipment during 
the first years of the war was hardly threatened. Thanks to imports 
which were stepped up until the blockade of 1940, large reserves were 
available both at the National Reserve Supply Board and in private 
companies. In 1941 the position became more serious. The civil 
consumption of metals was cut down and the list of goods requisi­
tioned was increased by the addition inter alia of copper, tin, lead, 
zinc and (in the spring) chromium. In connection with the discussions 
of the Committee on National Defence in 1941 several lists were 
made of the armed forces' requirements of raw materials, and IK 
examined these lists and expressed its views on them. It then came 
to light that the greatest problems existed in relation to alloy metals 
for armour, and in relation to copper, tin and lead. In addition, the 
rubber situation presented difficulties. During 1942 and 1943 IK 
made plans for the supply of raw materials. At the same time the 
commission took action by working from the beginning of the war 
for the utilization of domestic resources of raw materials, and to this 
end entered into a large number of production agreements with 
private companies. The agreements contained guarantees of work 
and prices and, in certain cases, subsidies. Guarantees were also 
given for the allocation of energy and release from the war-profits 
tax (appendix 2 contains a list of such agreements).
Because there was rationing and increased domestic production 
the situation in relation to steel and metals never became so grave 
that urgent military production would have to be cancelled on that 
account. Rearmament requirements were naturally given the highest 
priority.
Certain other requirements of raw materials which were important 
for rearmament have been omitted from this account because they 
only concerned the engineering industry indirectly. For example, this 
applies to the production of explosives, in relation to which the 
domestic production had to be increased; but here there were no 
bottlenecks in ammunition production. Nor has there been a more 
thorough treatment of the rubber supply. The supply was very short
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and was to a great extent dependent on uncertain imports from 
Germany. This resulted in restrictions on the transport of the armed 
forces, tyres of lower quality and a depleted war reserve. However, 
the rubber shortage also did not in itself restrict the rearmament of 
the services.37
2. The labour force
The development of the Swedish labour market during the war years 
is a large and very interesting field of study, which well deserves 
an account of its own. In this context the subject will only be touched 
on, and only in relation to those parts of it which concern the engi­
neering industry, particularly the question of the supply of military 
equipment.
The war years as a whole were characterized by a big demand for 
labour. From an economic point of view 1939 was a good year, with 
the lowest unemployment for two decades. The first months of the 
war constituted a period in which there was an almost hectic upward 
economic trend. Because of the blockade in 1940 problems arose 
for the export industries and other sectors of the economy which 
were in one way or another dependent on free contacts with the 
West. The result of this was a slowing down of the demand for labour. 
However, fairly soon new demands manifested themselves: the 
replacement industries began to function, military equipment was to 
be produced, the adjustment from imported fuel to wood made heavy 
demands on labour in the forests and for transport.38 In addition there 
was extensive conscription for emergency service duty; even during 
periods when the tension was comparatively relaxed around 200,000 
men were taken away from the civil labour market.39
37 Råvaruförsörjningen. PM 28/2 1945. Fst Kvmavd. Övriga handlingar efter ämne F 
XI :2. FCA.
38 The labour market during the war years is discussed inter alia in:
Utredningar angående ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering: I (SOU 1944:7). 1. Industriens 
arbetskraftsförhållanden 1/9 1939-1/9 1943:
Schwartz, passim:
Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning I (SOU 1952:49), pp. 1135-1158.
39The highest call-up figures, of over 300,000 men, were recorded in the summer of 
1940 and in February-March 1942. A figure of somewhat under 200,000 men was 
normal for the war years. Björkman, L.. Operation Barbarossa, p. 473; Uhlin. A., 
Februarikrisen 1942, p. 196.
77
Thus the level of employment rose further after the “adjustment 
unemployment” of 1940 and 1941, and the unemployment figures fell 
to a level which was entirely comparable with that recorded in the 
post-war boom period.40 During 1942 one could speak with justi­
fication of a real shortage of labour - towards the end of the war there 
was again something of a decline in demand. Throughout the whole 
period there was remarkable mobility on the labour market.
For reasons which will be dealt with more thoroughly in a later 
chapter, the engineering industry was one of the few branches of 
industry which asked for an increasing number of workers through­
out the whole period of the war. In consequence the level of unem­
ployment recorded within the engineering trade union was low.41 
Chapter IV will show how that branch expanded sharply during the 
first year of the war while the number of workers in the country as a 
whole declined.
Thus there was an influx of labour into the engineering industry 
from other branches of industry. In December 1939 the Swedish 
Metal Trades Employers Association already asked its member 
companies to train reserve staff in order to meet the growing demand. 
The labour market commission’s adult training programmes for 
“the rehabilitation and training of semi-skilled workers for the engi­
neering industry” was of great importance in increasing the engi­
neering labour force. From April 1940 onwards such training courses 
were organized in Stockholm, Gothenburg and about fifteen other 
places. Those taking part were unemployed people aged sixteen and 
over. One condition was that the men were exempt from military 
service. In addition certain men over the age of forty who were liable 
for military service did in fact take part, as did women and - after 
1942 - foreigners (above all Norwegians). The programme reached 
its peak in 1941 when 2,771 people were discharged on completing 
the course.42 A total of about 10,000 people completed such courses.43
40 Holmberg, P., Arbete och löner i Sverige, p. 32.
41 In 1940-1941 the unemployment figure was about 5 per cent which was somewhat 
higher than the figures for 1936-1939. Thereafter the level of unemployment fell and 
in the years 1942-1945 the figure fluctuated around 2-3 per cent. Olsson, U., Löne­
politik och lönestruktur, p. 20.
42 Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning I (SOU 1952:49), pp. 1149-1150.
43 Öhman, B., Svensk arbetsmarknadspolitik p. 119.
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Thus the engineering industry was apparently able to attract a 
large number of new workers during the war years. Nor did the 
greatest shortage of labour occur in this sector of the labour market, 
but rather in forest felling and to a certain extent in the steel works.44
However, there was an additional factor, viz. conscription. Al­
though generally speaking there would have been labour available, 
conscription, which occurred periodically and unforeseeably, must 
have disrupted industry severely. However, with regard to the part 
of the engineering industry which was engaged in the production of 
military equipment, there were possibilities of avoiding these pro­
blems. Before the war there had already been provisions for the 
exemption of certain people from military service if it was in the in­
terest of society that they continued their civilian duties instead.45 
From June 1940 the procedure in such matters was centralized in the 
National Board of Economic Defence, and in September of the same 
year they were taken over by the newly established national labour 
market commission, statens arbetsmarknadskommission (SAK). 
The transfer of this task from military to civilian authorities illustrates 
the increased importance which was attached to the nation’s total 
economic activity for the defence forces.
The basis in constitutional terms of SAK’s deferment activity was 
the so-called deferment proclamation of 1940 (no. 717 in SFS). 
The second paragraph provided that “the deferment of conscription 
for military service may only be granted to conscripts whose employ­
ment in civilian occupations is unavoidably necessary in order to 
secure the smooth running of the national economy or to avoid 
changes which would be more keenly felt in society generally or to 
maintain operations at plants listed in the register of war industries 
or which are otherwise of extreme importance for the country’s mili­
tary or economic preparedness.’’46
44 The female element in the industrial labour force increased within the ore-mining 
and metal industry group from 10,275 on 1/9 1939 to 15.796 on 1/9 1943. Above all it was 
the engineering and electrical works which employed women. On the other hand the 
total number of female workers in industry did not increase during the same period, 
which was due mainly to falling employment in the textile and clothing industry. 
Utredningar angående ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering: I (SOU 1944:7), pp. 12-25.
45 On the exemption system see Betänkande med förslag till det militära uppskovs- 
väsendets ordnande (SOU 1944:63), pp. 9-14. 35-47. 82-85, 123-128 et passim.
46 SFS 1940 nr 717.
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The register of war industries mentioned in the constitution in­
cluded about 400 engineering works when the war broke out, and 
later further additions were made to it.47
Apart from the question of deferment SAK was to deal with matters 
involving terms of respite and the granting of home leave. These 
exemptions from military service were of a more temporary nature 
and were for a maximum period of six months. A further form of 
short-term exemption from service was the collective granting of home 
leave. In reaching its decisions SAK collaborated with the recruiting 
and replacement office of the armed forces, and when assessing the 
degree of urgency, collaborated above all with KKV and the mobiliza­
tion division of IK.
It is not easy to gauge the extent of the exemptions which were 
granted or the way in which the practice developed as far as they 
were concerned. It has become apparent in various ways that it 
was the normal practice for companies which were involved in the 
production of military equipment to apply for exemption from con­
scription for sections of their personnel. There is nothing to indicate 
that their requests were not met to a great extent. There are good 
reasons for assuming that these engineering works were given high 
priority in SAK's decisions.48
What is apparent from the foregoing is that the production of 
military equipment in general terms does not appear to have been 
hampered by a shortage of labour. However, this does not exclude 
the possibility that difficulties may have arisen in special cases 
which could not be solved by retraining courses or exemptions. For 
example, when it was a question of stepping up the construction 
and production of complex and new military equipment, a shortage of 
personnel with experience and knowledge in these fields naturally 
occurred on numerous occasions. As regards the production of 
aircraft the problems were accentuated by the fact that a large number 
of American tecnicians returned to the U.S.A. at the outbreak of 
war.49 Likewise, it is apparent that the supply of design engineers and
47IK KA El:6. Akt 69 dnr h 418. RA.
48 Sammanfattande historik ... Ber.v. CF I, p. 17. MHA.
SAK's report governed the department’s attitude in cases in which an application 
for exemption was made on the ground of work. See Kellgren, pp. 22-24.
49 Söderberg, p. 253.
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draughtsmen constituted a bottleneck in the building of new de­
stroyers and cruisers.50 Thus in certain cases a shortage of labour did 
occur, involving qualified personnel who were necessary for the 
bigger projects.51
3. Fuel and power52
During the period between the wars the Swedish economy became 
more and more dependent on imported fuel. Imports of coal, coke 
and liquid fuel played an ever increasing role, not least for industry. 
The balance between imported and domestic fuels can be summarised 
as follows for 1938, the last pre-war year:
Imports
6 million tons of coal 
2 million tons of coke
740.000 cu.m, petrol
720.000 cu.m, heavy oils
Domestic production
17 million cu.m, firewood
430.000 tons of coal
25.000 tons of fuel peat
22.000 cu.m, motor spirit
Expressed in comparable fuel values these figures mean that out of a 
total consumption equivalent to about 13 million tons of coal, about 
4 million tons were provided by domestic production. Thus the basic 
features of Sweden's fuel supply problems were clear: to make it 
possible to secure fuel for heating and fuel for transport and industry 
it would be necessary on the one hand to maintain the imports as 
far as possible and on the other hand to replace imported fuels with 
domestic fuels.
50 PM 11/5 1942 (IK) Fst H Marinop. avd. F 11:2:2. KrA.
51 Steckzén, B., Bofors, en kanonindustris historia, pp. 721-724.
52 Except where otherwise stated this section is based on the following works:
Kaijser, F., Bränsle- och kraftförsörjningen (in: Hur Sverige ordnade folkförsörj­
ningen under andra världskriget), pp. 117-132;
Schwartz, passim;
Statsmakterna och folkhushållning ... (SOU 1950:50). pp. 117-132.
Kristidspolitik och kristidshushâllning I (SOU 1952:49), pp. 800-802, II (SOU 1952: 
50), p. 883.
Research into the fuel supply during the war years has been carried out at the Institute 
of Economic History at Gothenburg University. The coal imports inter alia have 
been investigated by Sven-Olof Olsson.
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In the years 1936-1938 the coal fuel which was imported amounted 
to 8,1 million tons a year, about 75 per cent of which was mineral coal 
and the remainder coke. Transport difficulties and keen competition 
for the product prevented a stockpiling during the period of grace up 
to April 1940 such as had occurred with metals; thus the development 
of the war on the Continent and the western blockade rapidly brought 
about a threatening supply situation. Before the war Poland and 
Great Britain had accounted for 90 per cent of the imports of coal. 
In the war trade negotiations with Germany coal from Germany and 
Poland was to become one of the most important items; considerable 
quantities were also imported during the following years (see dia­
gram 4).
As diagram 4 shows, the annual import figures fell to about half of 
the pre-war level. Stringent economizing and a change-over to other 
fuel still made it possible to build up stocks which were to prove 
extremely valuable at the end of the war. From September 1944 until 
after the end of the war in May 1945 the imports of coal fuel had in 
fact ceased completely.
Diagram 4. Imports of coal fuel.
millions of tons
□ Briquettes
Coke
Mineral coal
Source: Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning II, p. 704.
6 - The Creation ...
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The bulk of the imported solid fuels was consumed by industry. 
Before the war about two-thirds of the imported fuels went to 
industry. At the same time coal fuel constituted three quarters of 
industry's total fuel consumption. Through substitution the depen­
dence on imports was forced down to about 40 per cent in the years 
1942-1944 (see table 7). By then the total fuel requirements had 
declined somewhat because of the fact that certain sectors whose 
demands for fuel were very heavy, such as the cellulose and paper 
industry, worked at a reduced capacity. Technologically and econom­
ically the substitution demanded great efforts but it was quite possi­
ble to implement it as long as it was not a question of producing 
very high temperatures, as was sometimes the case in the steel in­
dustry for example.
Thus wood felling in Sweden during the war years became one of 
the principle fields of operations in the national fuel supply. It re­
quired an extensive organizational apparatus and a large work effort. 
In order to get the felling done it was necessary during the most
Table 7. Industry’s consumption offuel 1938-1945.
mineral
coal and
coke in
thousands
of tons
peat in 
thousands
of
tons
charcoal
in millions
of hecto­
litres
wood and
other fuel
in thousands
of stacked
cubic meters
liquid 
fuel in 
thousands
of tons
gas in 
millions
of cu.m.
Total with
conversions
into miner­
al coal: in
thousands
of tons
1938 5.138 16.3 21.6 8,421 118 40.4 6,694
1939 5,341 16.4 20.0 9,280 142 36.3 7,021
1940 4,383 57.5 23.2 10,053 74 27.0 6,192
1941 2,539 99.1 23.1 15,223 6 26.0 5,084
1942 2,353 275.0 24.3 19,479 5 25.0 5,629
1943 2,052 538.5 26.9 17,792 5 26.8 5,252
1944 2,057 565.2 25.7 17,282 10 28.6 5,210
1945 1,747 552.6 24.2 19,940 23 25.1 5,178
Note: The following conversion figures have been used: coke 1.05; charcoal: 0.017; 
wood: 0.17; other wood fuel: 0.1; petrol: 1.15; motor and fuel oil and paraffin- 
oil: 1.5; coal gas: 0.72.
Source: SOSIndustri 1938-1945.
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Table 8. Wood felling in 1937 and 1939/40-1944/45. In millions of cu.m, of piled wood.
1937 1939/40 1940/41 1941/42 1942/43 1943/44 1944/45
Pulpwood 25.4 12.3 9.6 9.4 15.1 12.6 10.4
Coal and
fuel wood 7.9 20.0 35.2 35.2 37.3 29.1 24.6
Note: Wood for domestic use is not included.
Source: Kaijser, F., Bränsle- och kraftförsörjningen pp. 117-132.
critical period 1942/43 to conscript compulsorily for work in the forest 
a whole year’s age group of men liable for military service. The total 
felling for the period is shown in the following table, in which the 
division from 1939 onwards has been made in terms of fuel years, 
i.e. from July in one year up to and including the month of June in 
the following year.
During the 1930s imports of liquid fuel had increased rapidly, and 
in the last years before the war they had amounted to more than a 
million tons a year, of which about 70 per cent was used for the 
civilian vehicle traffic. The blockade in this fuel sector had more 
serious consequences than the blockade in the solid fuel sector. 
This was due to the fact that the areas controlled by Germany could 
not replace the suppliers of the pre-war period so easily. Oils were 
bought from Rumania and the Soviet Union (1941) and from the West 
through the so-called safe-conduct traffic. The volume of imports 
during the war can be gauged from diagram 5.
The barely adaquate rations of imported liquid fuel were shared 
out amongst the armed forces; the navy received the black oils, and 
the air force and army the petrol. The same applied to a great extent 
to the extraction of oil and petrol from alum shale, which was started 
in Kvarntorp and Kinnekulle.
The civilian consumers of liquid fuel had to rely on substitutes. 
Installations of producer-gas generators were needed in industry to 
a great extent in order to replace oil with wood fuel. This also applied 
to vehicle traffic which was completely dominated by producer-gas 
powered vehicles from December 1940 onwards. Swedish industry 
rapidly produced the necessary units. Already in the spring of 1941
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it was not the fuel factor which limited the motor vehicle traffic but 
the uncertain supply of rubber and lubricants.
For the controlling authorities industry's need for transport was 
the main consideration. Thus transport by lorry, expecially over 
short distances, e.g. to the nearest railway station, was allowed even 
during the period of most severe restriction. On the whole it was 
almost exclusively private cars which were brought to a complete 
standstill.
That part of industry’s energy which was produced from hydraulic 
power - to some extent directly but mainly through electricity - was 
not dependent on the country’s foreign trade. Thus here was a girdle
Diagram 5. Imports of liquid fuels.
thousands of tons
I I Crude oil 
LuldJ Motorandfuslo
Poraffin-oil etc. 
Petroi
Source: Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning II. pp. 800-802.
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of strength which, with its impressive extensions of power stations 
and electricity supply mains, became of ever increasing importance. 
The total supply of hydraulic power rose from about 8,700 milliard 
kWh a year at the end of 1939 to about 12,600 milliard kWh at the 
end of the war. The rapid expansion during the war years meant 
an invaluable supply for industry which accounted for two-thirds 
of the total consumption of electric power. In 1939 industry consumed 
6.2 milliard kWh and in 1945 8.1 milliard. The big consumers were 
the paper industry and the metal industry, where the steel works 
played the major role. The ore mining and metal industry group 
consumed about 40 per cent of the whole of industry's electric power 
which was a greater proportion than during the pre-war period.
Restrictions on the consumption of electric power - for the heating 
of buildings, the lighting of shop windows, advertising and the like 
- were in force at certain periods during the war years. In the autumn 
of 1942 the mains voltage was reduced by 5 per cent in certain areas. 
The autumn of 1942 was the most critical period when the supply 
was threatened because the water supply had run exceptionally low. 
Power rationing, for which preparations had been made long in 
advance, came into force on 28 October. For practical reasons the 
rationing was imposed on the big consumers, which included industry. 
However, in the days which followed there was a heavy rainfall in 
Sweden and the rationing was already lifted on 3 November, so 
that it had not had time to become of any practical importance.
4. Lubricants
Finally, the question of lubricants will also be touched on.53 The 
yearly pre-war consumption of around 60,000 tons was met entirely 
through imports, and therefore when the country found itself blockad­
ed the situation looked grave. However, an inventory carried out in 
June 1940 showed that there were in the country stocks totalling 
78,000 tons, which in spite of everything provided a fairly favour­
able basis, having regard to the fact that the annual consumption could 
be reduced to around 25,000 tons. As is shown in diagram 6, during
33 Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning II (SOU 1952:50), pp. 861-884.
86
Diagram 6. Imports of lubricants.
thousands of tons
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Source: Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning II, p. 863.
the war years the imports amounted to about one-third of those of the 
pre-war period.
The domestic consumption was reduced in various ways. In this 
respect the most important factor was the sharp restriction of motor 
vehicle traffic. By collecting and purifying waste oil a considerable 
quantity of oil was recovered.
Large research resources and much work were invested in the 
production of lubricating oil from domestic raw materials. There 
was little success when shale was used as the basic material. After 
protracted attempts it became possible to extract tar fat oil from 
stumps of resinous pine trees; after refining it also proved useful 
in the more demanding of the many varied lubrication functions 
required in modern economic life. The tar fat oil was first blended 
with the lubricants in the spring of 1943, but it did not acquire any 
appreciable importance until the following year. In all about 12,000 
tons of tar fat oil were used. Bearing in mind the extensive work 
which had been carried out, the results were not very impressive, and 
the oil also became very expensive to produce.
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In fact, on the whole the lubricant problem was solved during the 
war years. At times the transformer oil situation was grave, with 
demand increasing as electrification spread, and so was the situation 
as regards oil for the journal boxes for the railway wagons, but in 
neither case did developments lead to a crisis. Allocations were made 
amongst industries which used mineral oils in their manufacturing, 
priority being given to use for food and defence. On the other hand 
no machine in the country had to stand idle for lack of lubricants.
5. Machine tools
A central preoccupation of the engineering industry was the supply 
of machine tools for cutting in metalwork. This applied above all to 
machines for drilling, grinding, turning, planing and milling. The 
supply of these machines to the Swedish market is shown in table 9.54
The pre-war period was characterized by extensive imports of 
machine tools, while the bulk of the Swedish production was export­
ed. In a blockade it was not possible to channel the Swedish export 
production onto the domestic market since the exports and imports 
consisted of different types of machines which were not interchange-
Table 9. Production, exports and imports of machine tools 1938-1945. 
In thousands of kronor.
production imports exports supplied to the 
Swedish market
1938 13,463 10,494 7,088 16,869
1939 12.561 12.946 8.539 16.968
1940 20,276 11,764 8,415 23.625
1941 21,664 11,669 12,450 20.883
1942 30,887 11,522 17.206 25,203
1943 36,245 13,967 14,560 35,652
1944 33,238 10,730 8,843 35.125
1945 27.351 4,094 7,251 24,194
Source: SOS Industri, SOS Handel.
54 The prices of machinery increased by about 50 per cent in 1939-1943 and were fairly 
stable after that. SOS Statistik årsbok.
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able. The manufacturing of machine tools is a complex process; the 
manufacturing companies are highly specialised, and are not able to 
alter their production from one year to the next. Thus the outbreak 
of the Second World War constituted a threat to the very important 
supply of machine tools. What did this mean for the Swedish engi­
neering industry and its prospects of fulfilling the military orders?
During the period before the war the imports came mainly from 
three countries: Germany, the U.S.A. and Great Britain.
Table 10. The value of the imports of machine tools distributed amongst the countries
of origin. In percentages.
The German Reich The U.S.A. Great Britain Others
1938 46 30 14 10
1939 51 28 9 12
1940 50 31 - 19
1941 62 3 - 35
1942 65 - - 35
1943 69 - - 31
1944 68 - - 32
1945 21 26 3 50
Source: SOS Handel.
As soon as war broke out difficulties arose as regards the imports 
from the West. The English at once stopped delivering machine 
tools, irrespective of whether they had been ordered before or after 
September 1939. The Swedes made vigorous but unsuccessful 
attempts to get the machines released. Amongst other things threats 
of cancelling Swedish exports of machine tools to Great Britain were 
made. It was also contended that Finland’s need for military equip­
ment ought to be taken into consideration, and that accordingly 
Swedish industry should be assured of mechanical equipment.55
The blockade in April 1940 made the situation worse. A compara­
tively large quantity of machines manufactured in the U.S.A. were 
received via Petsamo, but the trading/political attitude towards 
Sweden hardened in Washington in 1940 and during the second
55 PM 14/2 1940 (Leire) IK VE BI:4 UT H. RA.
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half of the year in practical terms only Germany and the areas which 
she controlled remained as alternative sources for imports. During 
the years 1941-1944 only Switzerland, which accounted for 10-15 
per cent in value of the imports, was a source of imports which was 
comparatively independent of German dominance. Therefore, in the 
war trade negotiations with Germany machine tools were to become 
one of the most important objectives, just as they were to become 
a weighty item in the exchange of goods. In terms of value the ap­
proximate figures for the machine imports from Germany herself were 
as follows: 1940: 6 million kronor, 1941: 7 million kronor, 1942: 7 
million kronor, 1943: 10 million kronor, 1944: 7 million kronor.56 
Although these imports were to decline in importance in comparison 
with the total addition to the Swedish market the picture of a Sweden 
dependent on German machine tool production remains. This became 
clearly apparent when the more long-term rearmament of the Swedish 
forces gathered momentum from 1942 onwards. This was the case, 
for example, just before the new production of engines for the air 
force. In February 1942 it was estimated at IK that the cost of expan­
sion of the machine park in this connection would amount to about 
7 million kronor in a single year.57 At Svenska Flygmotor AB the 
prospects of acquiring machines for the Daimler-Benz 605 production 
were assessed as follows:
a) Machines which are necessary and which are not being produced 
domestically at present: 43.
b) Machines which have been ordered from abroad and which are 
not being produced domestically: 25
c) Machines which are desirable but which can be replaced by 
machines of domestic manufacture: 8.58
The Hesselman Motor Corporation which was to deliver injection 
pumps for theDB-605 engines mentioned above needed some seventy 
machine tools, of which 14 were ordered in Germany, for this engine. 
Grinding and milling machines above all, but also planing and drilling
56 SOS Handel.
57 PM (Mattsson) 10/2 1942. IK KR B:I 13/1942. RA.
58 Svenska Flygmotor AB till IK 29/1 1942; Svenska Flygmotor AB till IK 23/2 1942. 
IK KA EI:12 dnr h 71, 105. RA.
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machines, with specific dimensions and performance, had to be 
imported.59 The imports did in fact materialize, mainly in the course 
of 1942.
As is shown in table 9, the domestic production capacity increased 
rapidly and sharply during the war years. Conscious of the fact that 
the supply of machine tools created a bottleneck, the authorities 
supported an extension of this capacity. Through a grant of 5 million 
kronor which was allocated in the budget year 1938/39, ‘‘a debenture 
credit for the acquisition of certain machinery and other items for 
industry” was created, which was allowed to be used by companies 
in relation to investments which were of importance for the produc­
tion of military equipment. An equally large sum was allocated in 
the following year, but loans could now be granted to industries other 
than engineering works. In accordance with the recommendations 
of the Board of Trade and the proposals of the King in Council, the 
Parliament of 1940 increased the loan fund by 2 million kronor.60
Interest in obtaining loans from the fund had declined by this time.61 
The heavy demand for machinery e.g. for the production of ammuni­
tion, was met through the Government authorities buying machines 
outright and hiring them out to industry (see section Cl). Nor did 
private industry’s problems relate primarily to economic resources, 
but rather to an insufficient production capacity and interrupted im­
port routes. The public fund for the acquisition of machinery does not 
stand out as having borne a particularly heavy burden if it is com­
pared with the total investment within the engineering industry (see 
chapter IV). Because of the fact that the authorities responsible for 
the planning of the war industry had great influence over the distri­
bution of the funds, it can still be assumed that they were of im­
portance during the period before and surrounding the actual outbreak 
of war.
IK was also involved in the machine tool question by virtue of the
5S Agreements between KFF and Hesselman Motor Corp- 3/5 and 4/5 1943; Hesselman 
Motor Corp. till IK 10/3 1943. IK KA EI:26 dnr h 136. RA.
60 Statsmakterna och folkhushållningen ... (SOU 1941:18). p. 283.
Handelsdep. till fullmäktige i riksgäldskontoret 30/10 1942 m.fl. IK KA EI:13 
dnr h 142. RA.
61 KATD, industribyrän. Protokoll 3/10 1940. KKV H F: 1. Oreg. handl., prot. och 
rapp. utan dnr. KrA.
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fact that the commission acted as a sort of clearing centre for machi­
nes in order to ensure that the maximum use was made of them. 
Before the war the National Board of Economic Defence had set up 
a register of engineering works machinery. This was taken over and 
kept up to date by IK, and it was later also to be used by KKV.62
From 1943, because of the increased production capacity and the 
fact that tools and machines had been acquired for the heavy new 
items of military equipment, a comparatively secure situation had 
been achieved as far as machine tools were concerned. In estimating 
what would happen if there was a total blockade of the country, IK 
wrote in July 1943 that, in spite of the fact that a certain quantity of 
imports were still desirable, it would be possible to cope with the 
situation through a rational use of the available machinery. It was 
then a known fact that the peak load limit for the engineering industry 
had passed and a certain general decline in the employment situation 
was expected.63
The figures in table 9 indicate that after the year 1943 there would 
be a surplus capacity in the domestic production of machine tools. 
The production capacity amounted to between 30 and 40 million 
kronor, while the demand fell after the peak of 1943. One estimate of 
Sweden's potential export capacity for 1944 came out at about 25 
million kronor, while the actual figure was to be about 9 million 
kronor, a much lower figure than the corresponding figure for the 
period 1941-1943. The decline is a reflection of the problems on 
Sweden's most important export market, Germany, where the set­
backs in the war left their mark.64
One great problem which affected the supply of military equipment 
during the first years of the war was the country's lack of capacity 
for heavy drop forging. When the war broke out the only really large 
drop hammers were to be found at Bofors, viz. one of 12 tons and 
one of 8 tons. The load on these was very great and for certain manu­
facturers of military equipment the drop forging constituted a real 
bottleneck. Thus vital parts of engines for tanks, torpedo boats and 
aircraft had to be drop forged at Bofors. In June 1940 the 12 ton drop
62 Betänkande med förslag rörande den ekonomiska försvarsberedskapens framtida 
organisation (SOU 1946:19). p. 82.
63IK KA EI:21 dnr h 900. RA.
64IK KA EI:29 dnr h 759. RA.
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During the first years of the war the lack of capacity for heavier forging proved trouble­
some, The situation was greatly improved after the installation of a 20 ton duplex 
hammer at Svartå, Here a crankshaft for a diese engine is being drop forged (Bofors).
hammer had to be repaired and this caused serious disruptions. Just 
before the more intensive rearmament programme began to be 
stepped up after the turn of the year 1941/42, representatives of 
the Defence Staff, the military administrations and the leading sup­
pliers of military equipment met at Bofors and, with IK, drew up plans 
for Bofors’ deliveries. Twelve days later the 12 ton drop hammer 
had one of its breakdowns, and was out of action for repairs for the 
following six weeks. In relation to the plans which had been drawn up 
the delays were estimated as follows: for aircraft about nine weeks, 
aircraft engines (STW C3) eight weeks, propellers about eight weeks, 
tanks between four and sixteen weeks, marine engines twelve weeks. 
Thus the situation had been brought to a head. Attempts were made 
in various ways to mitigate the effect of what had happened and to
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avoid a recurrence of the same situation. An inventory of the coun­
try’s other drop forging capacity yielded disappointing results, 
although it was possible to transfer certain forgings to the 5 ton drop 
hammer at Kohlswa and to Atlas Diesel. In the renewed priority 
agreement the needs of the air force were on the whole to be given 
precedence over other manufacturing objectives.65
A new drop hammer of 12 tons was made ready during the summer 
and autumn of 1942, and with active support from IK the construction 
of a 20 ton drop hammer was stepped up, and this was completed in 
the autumn of 1943. Both belonged to Bofors but for strategic reasons 
the latter was installed at Svartå. In this way the bottleneck was 
widened during the year 1943, and thereafter the drop forging capacity 
was perfectly adequate for the country’s needs.66
6. Conclusions
The development of the war outside the borders of Sweden tried 
the country’s production apparatus severely in many ways. Sales 
markets disappeared and supplies of raw materials, labour, energy 
and machinery were interrupted. This was due to the fact that the 
country’s economy was linked to a high degree to the outside world 
by virtue of the size of its foreign trade. However, the present survey 
shows that industry was far from stagnating in a lack of production 
resources as had been feared at the start of the war.67 Instead one 
finds great activity, with solutions to, or ways round, all the problems 
which threatened to halt operations. There are several reasons for 
this development.
85Prot. från IK:s sammanträde 11/2 1942. IK KR B:2 dnr h 25/42. RA; KFF till 
ÖB 19/2 1942, KFF till AB Bofors 19/2 1942. IK KA El: 16 dnr h 64. RA;
PM (Faerden) 17/3 1942. IK KR B:2 dnr h 26/42. RA.
Cf. also Norberg, p. 104.
66 PM (Faerden) 23/4 1942. IK KR B: 1 dnr h 38/42. RA;
IK KR till IK:s byggnadsavd. 1/2 1943. IK KR B:1 dnr h 4/43. RA:
Steckzén, p. 718.
67 One question has hardly been touched on. viz. the supply of capital. This produc­
tion factor was hardly affected by the events of the war. There was a good supply 
of capital in Sweden during the war and interest rates were low. In addition, as will 
be seen below (pp. 000 f.) the companies financed their investments without needing 
to resort to external sources to any significant extent.
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First of all, Sweden was not cut off to the extent which is sometimes 
supposed. The period up to the establishment of the western blockade 
was used to build up stocks which provided a foundation for the war­
time economic administration and a breathing space to try and find 
new solutions. But Sweden was not cut off after April 1940 either. 
The foreign trade continued to a great extent although the trade 
routes went largely southwards. Thanks to the fact that both of the 
warring parties - for partly different reasons - were interested in the 
continued functioning of the Swedish economy, and thanks to her iron 
ore, Sweden was able in no small measure to import the products 
which were required to keep up her production: metals, oil, chemi­
cals, machine tools, et cetera.
Furthermore, Swedish industry acquired a significant “surplus 
capacity” when the blockade was set up, due to the fact that to a 
high degree export markets disappeared. This capacity could be 
passed on to areas in which new needs were now making themselves 
felt. An example of this is the transfer of both labour and electric 
power to other sectors, e.g. the engineering industry, from the paper 
and cellulose industry which had been concentrating largely on éx- 
porting to the west. One form of “surplus capacity” was also utilized 
when less essential consumption was restrained by rationing, e.g. 
lighting for advertising, or journeys in private cars, in favour of more 
urgent requirements, or when mechanical resources were transferred 
to the manufacturing sectors which were given the highest priority.
To a great extent domestic resources, which it had not been econo­
mically profitable to make use of during the pre-war period, were 
also now being utilized. It was a condition of such developments that 
there should be - as well as the actual resources of the raw materials - 
the necessary skills, displayed for instance in metallurgical, engineer­
ing and chemical research and industry.
The readjustment of industrial production did not take place over­
night. In many cases it took a very long time, for example as regards 
increasing the level of self-sufficiency where raw materials and energy 
were concerned. This time aspect is important in assessing the situa­
tion of economic preparedness. Nor could the readjustment take place 
without a large measure of control by the authorities. During a 
period of a few months from the outbreak of the war to the spring 
of 1940 an apparatus which was unique in modern Swedish history
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was built up, for the central Governmental control of commercial 
and industrial life. The cost of the readjustment was also very high, 
and it strained the economy, both as regards the national budget 
and private companies.
This was the price which had to be paid. In return, employment 
in the country could be maintained on a high level and the national 
economy made secure in all essentials. Finally, the question of the 
purely military rearmament will be dealt with in greater depth in the 
text which follows. So far the most serious difficulties have mani­
fested themselves in relation to machine tools, where supply prob­
lems meant delays with regard to certain types of equipment. On 
the other hand the lack of raw materials, labour or energy should 
not seriously have hampered the work of the rearmament industry.
C. Some important types of equipment
The types of equipment to be discussed in this section have previously 
been touched on in chapter I. These rank as major items in the rearma­
ment, but the list is by no means complete. However, the intention 
is merely to give a concrete picture of the conditions of rearmament; 
an increase in the number of examples would not alter this picture 
significantly.
1. Ammunition
Perhaps the most urgent need as regards rearmament in Sweden 
after the outbreak of war was for ammunition.68 Here Sweden was 
not completely unprepared. Out of the first special grants for strength­
ening preparedness for defence, which were approved in July 1938, 
4.1 million kronor was reserved for industrial preparations for war. 
The drafting of so-called war supply contracts relating to ammuni­
tion formed part of this. The contracts were detailed agreements 
between industry and military customers for deliveries in the event of 
war, and they were drawn up in collaboration with the National 
Board of Economic Defence (cf. p. 58). The orders, which related 
to machines, work tools, measuring tools and surveying instruments, 
and which were necessary in order to be able to increase the ammuni­
tion production, proved to be of great importance. Through KATD,
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which was responsible for the orders of equipment which was com­
mon to all the armed forces, a total of about 14 million kronor was 
invested in preparations for manufacturing ammunition during a 
period of two years from the middle of 1938. This sum included 
about 6 million kronor which was the cost of two new gunpowder 
factories.®
Thus certain preparations had been made, but they were far from 
adequate having regard to the enormous new requirements which 
arose during the autumn and winter of 1939-1940. The requirements 
were of course connected with the increasingly tense political situa­
tion abroad and the greater degree of preparedness which followed 
from it, but they were also connected with the new and greatly 
expanded organization of the armed forces, with the transition from 
the organization of 1936 to that of 1941. In addition there was a further 
factor, viz. the deliveries of ammunition to Finland during the Winter 
War from 30 November 1939 to 13 March 1940. Such deliveries had 
been discussed for several years, and preparations had already been 
made in that the Finnish armed forces had adjusted the calibre of 
their arms to conform with the Swedish calibration and the Swedish 
arms industry had established itself in Finland.70
Without precise figures it is only possible to form a rough estimate 
of the extent to which the deliveries of ammunition to Finland deplet­
ed Swedish stocks and constituted a burden on Sweden’s production 
capacity. It is reasonably certain that the total value amounted to 
at least 25 million kronor. About half of this ammunition was deli­
vered through Swedish military bodies. This figure can be compared 
with the figures given below for the orders from the Swedish armed 
forces.
On 26 January 1940 the military administrations received the 
consent of the King in Council to the placing of orders, in consul­
tation with IK, in accordance with the plans for industrial produc­
tion for war which had been drawn up.71 It was the so-called supple-
68 See for example Burman, F. F:son, Född till soldat, p. 94.
69 Hedqvist, B., En orientering om arméns tekniska upprustning. Manuskript till före­
drag, (nov. 1942). KKV H Fälttygmästarens handl. F II. KrA.
70 Wahlbäck, pp. 11-36.
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mentary budget 4 which now had to be brought into operation, and 
this meant that - eventually at any rate - economic resources no 
longer constituted a limiting factor. Now the planning was to prove of 
value in certain cases. Thus, for example, it was possible in a short 
time to set up a factory in Stockholm for the assembly of fuses.71 
However, the magnitude of the requirements was such that RKE's 
plans, in many cases very detailed, did not prove of great assistance. 
A rational planning of the ammunition production was made difficult 
on account of the fact that different branches of the forces often 
competed for industrial capacity, not infrequently in conflict with 
Finnish orders too. The rapid establishment of SAN after a request 
by IK and the National Audit Board of Emergency Expenditure 
on 1 March reflects the strongly felt need for supervision and coordi­
nation. SAN went into operation on 22 April 1940. Its primary task 
was to acquire ammunition on behalf of all the armed forces. Ammuni­
tion meant firearms ammunition, mine ammunition, bomb ammuni­
tion, torpedo ammunition, special ammunition and packaging for this 
ammunition.72 Later SAN was transformed into the National Military 
Equipment Board and the Swedish Board of War Supplies (KKV) 
and was given more extensive duties (see section III A). SAN took 
over from the administrations of the branches of the forces all the 
contracts under which the final deliveries were to take place after 
1 July 1940.
The total cost of the ammunition acquired for the armed forces 
during the whole period of the war amounted to 802 million kronor 
(see p. 18). The value of the imports of ammunition over the same 
period can be estimated at about 185 million kronor, of which more 
than half related to the years 1940-1941, and so the Swedish produc­
tion capacity bore a load of deliveries worth about 617 million kro-
71 Hedqvist, B., En orientering om armens tekniska upprustning, p. 17. KKV H Fält- 
ty gmästaren handl. F II. KrA.
72 Kungl. brev inrättande av statens ammunitionsnämnd den 21 mars 1940. IK KA EI:6 
dnr h 367. RA;
VPM angående am-kommittens utredning rörande am-anskaffhing. 17/10 1940.
KKV H F:I Oreg. handl. PM 1940-1943. KrA;
Appelqvist, oral information.
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nor.73 If those parts of the production which fell on the chemical 
industry and other sectors of industry are disregarded, just over 80 per 
cent of the value - or a total of about 500 million kronor - is left for the 
engineering industry.74 In terms of time the production of ammunition 
was stepped up during 1940 and reached its peak in 1941 with 
deliveries worth about 170 million kronor from the engineering 
industry. Thereafter the production was gradually slowed down.
Thus the major part of the ammunition which was acquired was 
produced domestically. Thanks to the fact that the orders were 
divided up in SAN-KKV into different groups, it is possible to gain an 
impression of the way in which the totals for equipment ordered in 
Sweden were distributed amongst the main departments. Firearms 
ammunition accounted for one-third of the total, and missiles for 
almost as much. Bofors’ production alone approached 20 per cent, 
and consisted mainly of grenades of various kinds. In addition there 
were detonators and special cartridge cases from other companies.75
Thus the two big items of ammunition were firearms ammunition 
and artillery ammunition. Before the outbreak of the war the former 
had been produced mainly in the state’s own factories, above all one 
in Karlsborg. Private industry was gradually brought in for the 
manufacturing of bullets, cartridge cases and charges. Cartridge case 
production - a fairly difficult process technically - was to constitute 
the main bottleneck. In 1940 it was not possible to reach the target 
which had been worked out by the military “requirement committee” 
during its period in operation from July to October 1940 (MBl), viz.
73 Imports of ammunition 1939-1945. In millions of kronor.
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Imports 12 58 39 29 28 23 3
Including 
small arms 0.5 11 20 12 2 0.2 0.1
Source: SOS Handel
74 Underlag för statsrådsrapporter 1940-1943. KKV H F:II. KrA.
75 The distribution relates to the total quantities up to and including February 1942. 
Underlag till statsrådsrapporter 1940-1943. KKV H F:II. KrA.
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stocks for “six normal war months” over and above the equipment 
requirement.78 Insufficient machines had been acquired, and the bulk 
of the machine park was very much out of date.77 Further machines 
could be bought from Germany, but at the beginning of 1940 a delivery 
period of six months was specified.78 In the main it would be 
necessary to resort to domestic production, but even this took time. In 
fact, through strenuous efforts the renewals were accomplished with 
comparative speed. The machines were acquired via the authorities 
and were farmed out to suitable industries. At the beginning of the 
year 1941 the country’s firearms ammunition production capacity was 
fairly good, as the compilation in table 11 shows. The most important 
private industries included there are Svenska Tändsticksbolaget, with 
factories in Jönköping, Lidköping and in Tidaholm, Norrahammars 
Bruk, Svenska Metallverken in Västerås and Norma Projektilfabrik. 
The state-owned production was carried out at the ammunition fac­
tory in Karlsborg (Amf. K.).
With the increased machine capacity it was possible in the course of 
1941 to reach the target for the inventory of firearms ammunition. The 
remaining requirements related above all to 8 mm armour-piercing 
ammunition for light machine guns and 9 mm parabellum ammunition, 
the demand for which increased as the armed forces were supplied 
with sub-machine-guns on a large scale. In other respects the rate of 
production could be reduced. Training ammunition which had been 
fired would still have to be replaced, just as production was 
maintained in order to train personnel and put machines in good trim. 
A certain production was also maintained on purely social grounds; at 
the turn of the year 1941/42 about 3,300 workers were directly
78 Protokoll inom nämnden 4/8 1940. KKV H. KrA.
VPM angående am-kommitténs utredning rörande am-anskaffning 17/10 1940. KKV 
H F:I Oreg. handl. PM 1940-1943. KrA.
This was based on the fact that industry needed about 6 months to achieve a full 
war supply capacity. SAN ang. underdånigt utlåtande över betänkande, avgivet av 
1941 års försvarsutredning. 18/2 1942. IK KA El: 13 dnr h 39. RA.
77 PM. Anteckningar från sammanträde hos ÖB den 8/7 (1940); KKV H F.T Protokoll 
och rapporter. Div. år. KrA.
78 PM rörande erforderlig maskinanskaffning för utökning i krig av tillverknings­
kapaciteten för handvapens- och kulspruteammunition. 5/3 1940. KKV H F:I Oreg. 
handlingar, protokoll och rapporter utan dnr. KrA.
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Table 11. The small arms ammunition production capacity in February 1941.
Machine units Total capacity per
Bullets cases charges millions of
old new total old new total old new total bullets cases charges
Calibre
6.5 mm
Private 10 8 18 10 8 18 11 5 16 11.0 11.8 13.8
Amf K 2 _ 2 2 - 2 1 - 1 1.3 1.3 1.6
Total 12 8 20 12 8 20 12 5 17 12.3 12.1 15.4
Calibre
8 mm
Private 4 6 10 4 8 12 2 4 6 6.0 7.3 7.8
AmfK 2 2 4 2 - 2 1 2 3 2.6 1.3 3.6
Total 6 8 14 6 8 14 3 6 9 8.6 8.6 11.4
Calibre
9 mm m/07 
Private 2 2 2 2 1 1 1.2 1.2 1.4
AmfK 2 - 2 2 - 2 1 1 2 1.2 1.2 1.4
Total 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 2 3 2.4 2.4 2.8
C alibre
9 mm m/39 
Private 6 6 _ 6 6 3 3 3 2.4 3.6 4.2
Source: PM angående maskiner för tillverkning av handvapenammunition. KKV HFI Oreg. handl. PM 
1940-1943. KrA.
employed in the manufacturing of ammunition, consisting of 1,360 in 
state-owned industry and 1,940 in private industry.79
Now that the stocks began to be replenished all was not well. They 
were still only prepared for a war of short duration, while industry 
lacked the capacity to replace consumption as it occurred in the
79 Rapport till chefen för försvarsdepartementet nr 12. Am-läget 31/12 1941. IK H KA 
EI:16. RA.
SAN:s planer för tillverkning 1942 och 1943 i anledning av 1941 års försvarsutredning. 
7/4 1942. IK H KA EI:17. RA.
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course of a war, and thus a shortage of ammunition would arise after 
a certain period. The expansion of the ammunition industry to a war 
capacity meant large new investments in buildings and machinery. 
So-called shadow factories for firearms ammunition were established, 
SAN-KKV renting suitable premises and setting up their machines 
there. The private companies undertook to provide a certain produc­
tion when required.80
The production of artillery ammunition, i.e. ammunition with a 
calibre larger than 20 mm, is a fairly complicated process with 
several stages. No special equipment is required for the turning of 
shell bodies, and so a very large number of engineering works could 
be called on early on for such production. According to a rough esti­
mate in July 1940 90 per cent of the country’s lathes were being used 
for the production of artillery ammunition.81As soon as there was a 
breathing-space special comparatively simple lathes were manufac­
tured at Bolinder-Munktell and were set up in large numbers in 
suitable places, chosen primarily for the short distances involved in 
transporting materials.82 Cartridge cases were manufactured by 
Svenska Stålpressnings AB in Olofström, Norma Projektilfabrik, 
Guldsmedshytte AB and many other companies. Private industry was 
also brought in to a great extent for fuses and other mechanical com­
ponents, e.g. Lux, Svenska Metallverken, Finspångs metallverk, 
Optimus and Primus. At Bofors there was an extensive production 
of a large number of types of artillery ammunition, all stages of pro­
duction taking place there except the manufacturing of cartridges. 
Thus shells were also adapted; apart from this, the adaptation of 
shells, like the laboratory work on fuses, was carried out by the state’s 
own engineering works. Bofors also provided the patterns which were 
distributed by the Government authorities to the private manufac­
turers of artillery ammunition who had been called in.83
80PM angående de för skuggfabrikema tillämpade kontraktsformerna. KKV H F:I 
Oreg. handl. PM 1940-1943. KrA.
81 PM. Anteckningar från sammanträde hos ÖB den 8/7 (1940). KKV H F:I Protokoll 
och rapporter. Div. år KrA.
A series of reports of travels in southern and western Sweden in April 1940 gives a 
vivid picture of the dispersal of the production. IK KR B:1 PM 1940 nr 714. RA.
82 Appelqvist oral information.
83 SAN's planer för tillverkning 1942 och 1943 i anledning av 1941 års försvarsutredning. 
7/4 1942. IK H KA EI:17. RA.
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The total production of artillery ammunition was about twice as 
large in terms of value as the production of ammunition for firearms. 
In stepping up production during the first year of the war difficulties 
were encountered because of the fact that there were not enough of 
the necessary measuring tools and surveying instruments. SAN 
arranged for the acquisition of the necessary equipment by placing 
orders, mainly with Svenska Kullagerfabriken. The industries had to 
buy the measuring tools and the surveying instruments remained the 
property of the state.84
The inventory which the requirement committee of 1940 considered 
essential was achieved more rapidly than was the case with firearms 
ammunition. The target was the equipment which was required plus a 
reserve for six normal months of war, but the calculations were also 
based to a certain extent on the number of aircraft and the number of 
barrels.85
During the first quarter of 1942 the total labour force engaged in the 
production of artillery ammunition amounted to 10,370 people, 
about 8,000 of whom worked in private industry. However, during 
the course of the year the labour force was cut down by more than 
one-third.88
With regard to artillery ammunition it was also necessary for there 
to be a planning of the production which would supply fighting forces. 
When the organization of the armed forces was set up in 1942 new 
figures were worked out for the ammunition requirements, and as 
regards artillery ammunition these figures were much higher than 
those put forward by the requirement committee in 1940. Extensive 
investigations were carried out within SAN-KKV to determine what 
the planning of industrial war production of this magnitude would
84 Protokoll inom nämnden 7/4, 17/4. 16/5 1940. KKV H. KrA.
Between September 1940 and April 1942 purchases worth 575,000 kronor were made 
from SKF, purchases worth 100.000 kronor were made from C. E. Johansson in 
Eskilstuna and purchases worth 40,000 kronor from Elektroskandia. Förteckning över 
SAN:s inköp av mätverktyg. KKV H F:I Div. oreg. handl. 1940-1942. KrA.
85 Rapport till chefen för försvardepartementet nr 12. Am-läget 31/12 1941. IK H KA 
EI:16. RA.
86 SAN:s planer för tillverkning 1942 och 1943 i anledning av 1941 års försvarsutredning. 
7/4 1942. IK H KA El: 17. RA.
Skrivelse till Konungen angående åtgärder för utökning av den för ammunitions- 
tillverkning avsedda kapaciteten 24/4 1942. IK KA EI:17 dnr h 223. RA.
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The throttling and drawing of cartridge cases at the ammunition factory in Marieberg 
in June 1940 (Fst pressdetalj).
mean, and in a series of proposals in 1942 and 1943 money was 
requested to increase the capacity. A total of almost 120 million 
kronor was involved. The biggest items were machines and tools for 
various kinds of mechanical production. In addition there was the 
erection of new buildings for the production of ammunition and of 
establishments for the manufacture of explosives. Before 1942 the 
Government investments for these purposes had been modest - about 
14 million kronor up to the middle of 1940 and thereafter money from 
the so-called 13 million grant.87 Although the proposed sums were not 
granted in their entirety the total for the period as a whole involved 
very large investments. About 91 million kronor (out of a grant of 113 
million kronor) was used through SAN-KKV to increase the industrial 
capacity. Of this sum about 42 million kronor was used for the 
acquisition of machinery. 24 million kronor for the acquisition of raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods.88 The importance of the
87 Försvarsdepartementet till KKV 15/10 1943. IK KA EI:22 dnr h 657. RA.
88 Ber. v. KKV:s berättelse CFI. MHA.
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investments for the Swedish engineering industry lay in the fact that 
the equipment supplied, e.g. the machine tools, came mainly from 
Swedish manufacturers. To a great extent the investments could also 
be used in civilian production. However, this did not apply to highly 
specialized equipment for firearms ammunition or establishments for 
the manufacture of particular explosives. On the other hand a large 
number of machines were acquired which could easily be used for the 
production of goods other than military equipment. For example, a 
large part of the production of artillery ammunition consists in the 
turning of granades or components of fuses. The automatic lathes and 
the turret lathes were not limited in their use to the manufacturing of 
ammunition. The same applied to the steelworking machines for the 
ball jacket materials et cetera. It was part of the planning to facilitate 
civilian use of the investments. The production units were placed in 
direct contact with other industries and the terms of the contracts 
allowed for utilization by renting or taking over buildings and 
equipment.89 The form of contract recommended by the King in 
Council as far as buildings were concerned meant that in the industries 
in question premises were set up which were not only suitable for the 
production of ammunition would have cost, while the company 
company for its production. The Government only contributed funds 
equivalent to what the buildings which were necessary for the 
production of ammunition would have cost, while the campany 
invested the rest. During the period of the contract, 15-25 years, the 
company undertook when called upon to manufacture ammunition 
with the aid of the machines owned by the state. If the company itself 
was able to make use of the premises it did not have to pay rent, and 
after the period of the contract had expired the premises went to the 
company. SAN-KKV considered that this form of contract was less 
favourable for the customer buying ammunition, but it was expressly 
dictated by the fact that the investments were not to be wasted in case 
a military production was not called for.90
Up to and including 1943 a total of 38 agreements were made with
89 Skrivelse till Konungen angående åtgärder för utökning av den för ammunitions- 
tillverkning avsedda kapaciteten 24/4 1942. IK KA EI:17 dnr h 223. RA.
90PM angående de för skuggfabrikerna tillämpade kontraktsformerna. KKV H F:I 
Oreg. handl. PM 1940-1943. KrA.
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regard to so-called shadow factories, apart from deposit agreements 
relating to machines.91
To summarise the position, it can be established that the production 
of ammunition was an important feature of the rearmament, above all 
towards the end of 1940 and during 1941. Private industry’s 
production on behalf of the nation began towards the end of January 
1940. Partly as a result of the deliveries to Finland, Sweden was then 
poorly supplied with ammunition. Industry’s expansion to full 
capacity was delayed by the shortage of machinery and tools but 
towards the end of 1941 demands were on the whole met, if they 
are defined as the equipment required plus a reserve of six war 
months.
During the second half of the war the orders for ammunition were 
much smaller, but on the other hand there was a large increase in the 
puchases of equipment for industrial production for the war. Apart 
from the direct effect which this had on the machine tool manufac­
turers and other mechanical industries, it meant that the Government 
was responsible for extensive investment which were partly of benefit 
to civilian industry. Thus, apart from Bofors, the ammunition produc­
tion - in spite of the fact that the orders involved large sums - was not 
to bring about any new private investments of a significant size.
2. Tanks
At the outbreak of the war the Swedish tank force was still weak and 
comparatively undeveloped.92 This was due both to a lingering doubt 
about the usefulness of the force, and the shortage of the economic 
resources for acquisitions. In fact the Defence Act of 1936 did provide 
for the setting up of certain tank units, and after a long-drawn-out 
process of acquisition it was possible to muster 64 modern tanks in the 
summer of 1939. 48 of these were bought in Czechoslovakia. They 
were known as AH-IV-S or m/37, they weighed 4.5 tons and were 
equipped with submachine armaments. The tanks were imported in 
parts and then assembled, and they were supplied with armour plate
91 Ber. v. KKV:s ber. CFI. MHA.
92 An account of the acquisition of tanks up to the autumn of 1942 is to be found in 
Stade, A., Stridsvagnsvapnet under 1936 års försvarsordning, passim.
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from Avesta Jernverk and engines from Volvo at Jungnerverken in 
Oskarshamn. The other 16 tanks (L-60-S or m/38) had been 
manufactured by Landsverk in Landskrona. They weighed 8.5 tons 
and were equipped with a 37 mm Bofors gun and an engine from 
Scania Vabis. In the main the design of the m/38 was Swedish, but 
certain parts were German and the armour plate was imported from 
Austria.
When war broke out and reports were received from the Polish 
campaign, the Swedish tank force revealed itself in all its frailty. 
Rapid reinforcements were plainly necessary, but how were these 
to be obtained? First of all work was carried out along the old lines: 
by making use of Landsverk, whose experience of production was 
now extremely valuable but whose manufacturing capacity was very 
limited, and by importing from abroad. Thus in December 1939 a 
further 20 tanks were ordered from Landsverk. At the same time 
action was taken on several fronts to acquire tanks rapidly from 
abroad.
lSiPliisllIllll!!
9.5 ton m/41 tanks on exercises on Gärdet in Stockholm in September 1943. (Fst press- 
detalj).
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As already described, the negotiations proceeded farthest in 
Czechoslovakia, where a contract to purchase 90 tanks of the TNH 
type was signed with C e s k o m o ra v s k a- Kolben-D an é k (CKD) in 
Prague, the firm from which previous purchases had been made. 
When it became clear in the summer of 1940 that the Germans were 
not going to allow this transaction to go through, negotiations began 
instead for the grant of a licence for the tanks which had been re­
quested.93
In the autumn of 1940 the tank acquisition situation was very 
precarious. In one and a half years no tanks had been supplied to 
the defence. There were no possibilities of imports and the domestic 
capacity was limited. The organization which was already in opera­
tion asked for almost 400 more tanks, and in addition these were to 
be better equipped and armoured than the old ones. It was plain that 
the domestic capacity would have to be increased, and new com­
panies which concentrated on engine production, vehicle produc­
tion and work on heavy plate called in.94
To begin with an order for a further 100 tanks (m/40) was placed 
with Tandsverk in October 1940. Delivery of the 20 tanks which had 
previously been ordered had not yet begun, and the newly ordered 
tanks were not ready until the beginning of 1942. Money for the 100 
tanks, 20 million kronor, was raised by using the grant for the Czecho­
slovakian tanks.95 In December 1940 a licence was obtained for 
the Czechoslovakian TNH tank. Three companies were asked to 
submit tenders for the production before 21/5 1941: Jungner, Scania 
Vabis and Volvo. After IK had expressed its views Scania Vabis 
received an order for 116 TNH-Sv (m/41) tanks weighing 9.5 tons. 
The final contract was signed on 6-7 October 1941. The purchase 
price totalled 18,061,200 kronor. KATD undertook to supply wea­
pons, gun mountings, electrical equipment, radio apparatus and tools
93 See p. 44.
Fst till UD 15/7 1940. Fst H Mtrlavd. BI:2. KrA.
94 Chefen för armén till Konungen 21/8 1940. Fst Mtrlavd. BI:2. KrA. In the letter it 
is assumed that two battalions are to be set up. which would call for about 470 tanks, 
taking into account the six months replacement requirement. There were 84 tanks 
available, including the 20 which were under construction at Landsverk in the autumn 
of 1940.
95 A survey of the acquisition up to the turn of the year 1941/42 is to be found in PM 
beträffande stridsvagnar och pansarbilar 12/3 1942. IK KR B:2 dnr h 32. RA.
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for the tanks. The total cost came to about 25 million kronor. It was 
proposed that the deliveries should take place in 1942.9,5
At the same time as the orders for the 9.5 ton tanks were placed, 
there was discussion of the problems relating to the larger 22 ton 
m/42 tanks, of which KATD wanted 160 as soon as possible. This 
model, the "LagoA had been developed by Landsverk, and since 
this firm had begun to be ready with its series of a hundred m/40 
tanks towards the end of 1941, it was natural for the major part of 
the order to be placed there.97 On 3 November 1941 a contract for 
100 “Lago” tanks was concluded. The delivery period agreed on was 
October 1942-April 1943. The remaining 60 tanks were ordered 
from Volvo. The engines came from Scania Vabis save for 5 tanks 
which got engines from Volvo. Volvo’s production was based on 
licences acquired by KATD from Landsverk.9S
At the beginning of 1942 military circles had concentrated their 
attention on the “organization of 1943” as drawn up by the Com­
mittee for National Defence in 1941. This involved a continuing 
expansion of the tank force. Thus 9.5 ton as well as 22 ton tanks 
would be built.99 After taking stock of the resources, in March 1942 
IK suggested that Scania Vabis and Jungnerverken should be invited 
to tender for the lighter tanks, while Landsverk and Volvo should 
initially continue to manufacture 22 ton tanks.100 After the tenders 
had been considered in April and preliminary orders placed in May, 
final contracts were signed in June 1942 which provided as follows:
96 Protokoll fört vid öppnandet av anbud å tillverkningen av strv TNH-Sv.
Kontrakt mellan KATD och Scania Vabis;
In an edict issued by the King in Council on 21/11 1941 KATD was authorised to 
pay 25 million kronor to complete the payment in advance. IK KA EI:9 dnr h 275. RA.
97 Sammanfattning av diskussionen å IK 16/11 1941, mellan dir. Leire, IK och civiling. 
Forslund, Tygdep.;
Div. korrespondens ang. “Lago“ mellan IK. KATD, Volvo. Landsverk i oktober och 
november 1941. IK KA EI:9 dnr h 493. RA.
98 Div. korrespondens och kontrakt angående strv m/42.
IKKA ELlOdnrh 10. RA.
99 Anteckningar, förda vid sammanträde på IK 19/9 1941. IK Kr B:I dnr 6. RA;
KATD till IK 4/3 1942. IK KA ELlO dnr h 10. RA.
i°o pm beträffande stridsvagnar och pansarbilar 12/3 1942.
IK KR B:2 dnr h 32. RA.
IK till KATD 14/3 1941 ang. stridsvagnar. IK KA EL. 10 dnr h 10. RA.
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80 22 ton m/42 tanks to be manufactured by Landsverk 
42 22 ton m/42 tanks to be manufactured by Volvo 
80 9.5 ton m/40 tanks to be manufactured by Landsverk101 
122 9.5 ton m/40 tanks to be manufactured by Scania Vabis
The delivery times were fixed so that the final deliveries were to be 
made before the end of 1943.102
However, the acquisition of tanks as a whole was characterized 
by big delays in the implementation of the production plans. The 
previous orders had already been delayed for various reasons. The 
main reason seems to have been the fact that the deliveries of armour 
plate from Avesta lagged behind. Because of a lack of works capacity 
the working of the plate could not be carried out rapidly enough. In 
the summer of 1942 there was talk of delays of up to six months on 
the terms of delivery in the contracts. Attempts were made in various 
ways to increase the capacity; there was even discussion of having 
the plate worked in Denmark. Other parts of the tanks - e.g. gear­
boxes and drop forged crankshafts - were subject to delays. At this 
point in time Bofors was inconveniently behind schedule, and so the 
gun production programme was held up.103
Tank production has a distinctive character structure. The manu­
facturing firms mentioned above to a very great extent received 
complete components from sub-contractors. For example the most 
important manufacturers of components for Landsverk’s “Lago” 
tanks were as follows:104
Armour plate from Avesta Jemverk
Driving gears and gearboxes from Hedemora verkstäder
Engines from Scania Vabis
Runners and crankshafts from Jonsereds fabriker
101 The 80 m/40 tanks were to be produced at Karlstads mekaniska verkstad but with 
Landsverk in charge of the production.
102 Anbud, div. korrespondens och kontrakt. IK KA El: 17 dnr 191. RA.
103During 1942 IK’s war industry department carried out an extensive investiga­
tion of the reasons for the difficulties in producing tanks and the possibilities of over­
coming them. IK KR B:2 dnr h 53, 68, 85. 87, 100, 106;
Protokoll från sammanträde i IK 24/7 1942 angående leveranser av stridsvagnar. 
IK KR B: 1 dnr 52b. RA.
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The tank production was based on a network of sub-contractors. Parts awaiting 
assembly at Landsverk. Driving gears, gearboxes, petrol tanks and electric wire can 
be distinguished. June 1941. (Fst pressdetalj).
Turrets from Eriksbergs mekaniska verkstad
Optical and electrical equipment and weapons from other manufac­
turers via KATD
Volvo and Scania Vabis had similar networks of sub-contractors 
attached to them. Thus all the available capacity in the country for 
engine and vehicle production was being used. The rational coor­
dination and spreading of the load over the country, while at the 
same time taking other important war production, e.g. of vehicles 
and of engines for aircraft and ships, into consideration was an im­
mense task. This was one of the major tasks for IK. When at several 
points one banged one’s head on the ceiling which was the upper 
limit of the country’s total production capacity, there was nothing else 
one could do. The shortages in equipping the defence with tanks - 
either in terms of the organization’s requirements or a general esti­
mate of the defence potential which was desirable for the country -
Ill
were considerable. Throughout the whole of the critical year of 1940 
strenuous but vain efforts were made to make good these shortages. 
Not until 1942 did the army begin to receive m/39 and m/40 tanks from 
Landsverk. In March 1942 120 tanks of these models were delivered 
and the number of tanks was increased to 184.105 Thus two and a 
half years had then passed since the outbreak of the war. During the 
winter of 1942/43 the measures which had been taken to increase 
capacity proved really fruitful and m/41 and m/42 tanks began to be 
delivered to the armed forces from various quarters at a more rapid 
rate.106
3. Ships
At the end of the 1930s there was a considerable difference between 
the basic position with regard to shipping equipment and the position
104 Landsverk till KATD 28/10 1941. IK KA EI:9 dnr h 493.
105 Materiellaget 20/9 1942. Fst kvmavd. Ö.h.e.ä. PM och planer F XLl FCA; Stade,
p. 86.
106A summary of the orders for tanks which were placed during the war period and 
which have been mentioned above:
Number Model Weight in 
tons
Date of order
order
Manufacturer
20 m/39 9.5 Dec. 39 Landsverk
100 m/40 9.5 Oct. 40 Landsverk
116 m/41 9.5 June 41 Scania Vabis
100 m/42 22 Nov. 41 Landsverk
60 m/42 22 Nov. 41 Volvo
80 m/42 22 June 42 Landsverk
42 m/42 22 June 42 Volvo
80 m/40 9.5 June 42 Landsverk (KMV)
122 m/41 9.5 June 42 Scania Vabis
720
The total value of the orders placed with the manufacturers listed above came to 
about 170 million kronor (the lighter tanks cost between 155.000 and 170,000 kronor 
and the heavier ones between 320,000 and 365,000 kronor). In addition to this there 
were weapons and certain other equipment, and so the total cost was somewhat over 
200 million kronor.
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as far as tanks and aircraft were concerned. Within the country there 
was an old tradition of shipbuilding and a significant production 
capacity. The navy had experience of shipbuilding and at Karlskrona 
naval shipyard they were able to do fairly extensive work - and also 
to carry out comparatively large new shipbuilding. As a result of 
previous military orders serveral of the civilian shipyards were 
familiar with the production of warships, and those which lacked 
this experience were able to adjust without too much difficulty; there 
are no decisive points of difference between civil and military ship­
building. During the period of rearmament it did not become neces­
sary to create any new shipyard capacity.
In the middle of the 1930s the Swedish navy’s complement of 
ships was worn and outmoded - most of the vessels originated from 
the period before the First World War, and some of them were badly 
maintained. In comparison with aircraft or tanks, for example, the 
age factor made less difference, since the technological development 
had been slower. Comparatively speaking the Defence Act of 1936 
meant a small reinforcement of the navy. However, during the years 
1938-1939 several ships were built, thus scrapping the previous 
agreement. Behind what was an improvement in the situation from 
the point of view of the naval administration there lay a certain change 
in the view which was taken of the importance of the navy. It is 
thought that the new Minister ofDefence, P.-E. Sköld, who replaced 
Janne Nilsson in December 1938, played a major role in this pro­
cess.107 Before the outbreak of the war one destroyer was delivered 
from Eriksbergs mekaniska verkstad and two U-boats from Kockums 
mekaniska verkstad. Of the larger minesweepers (of the “Arholma” 
type) two were delivered from Karlskrona naval shipyard. Thus 
drawings and other basic data were available for all these models, 
and new orders could be placed immediately.108
However, the need for new ships increased sharply when the war 
broke out, and attempts were made to find ways to reinforce the 
navy rapidly. In many cases extensive design work had to be carried 
out before orders could be executed, and this would involve an awk-
107 Holmquist, A., Flottans beredskap 1938-1940, pp. 75 f.
108 The information about the acquisition of ships is taken from Redogörelse beträffande 
marinens materiella utveckling 1/7 1937/30/6 1945. Ber. v. CF IV MFIA.
The building of smaller naval vessels was able to expand rapidly after the outbreak of 
war. In the picture the destroyer Gävle is crammed in on Gotaverkens' slipways with 
the minesweepers Vinga and Ven in July 1940 (Götaverken).
m
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ward delay. One way of accelerating the process of acquisition was 
to import warships. During the first phase of the war when the Swed­
ish armed forces wanted to puchase many kinds of military equip­
ment from abroad, suitable naval vessels were also sought. It was the 
task of the delegation to the U.S.A. (see p. 32) to see how the land 
lay as far as motor torpedo-boats and armoured cruisers were con­
cerned. However, the American negotiations were abortive. Instead, 
an approach was made to Italy where the navy bought 4 destroyers in
8 - The Creation ...
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1940 ("Puke”, "Psilander” and the somewhat smaller “Romulus” 
and “Remus”), and also 4 motor torpedo-boats. These ships cost a 
total of just over 31 million kronor.11*1 Two motor torpedo-boats had 
previously been imported from England. These 6 motor torpedo- 
boats formed the basis of the torpedo-boat fleet which was built up in 
Sweden during the years 1940-1943 (on the acquisition of ships see 
p. 23).
The imports of naval vessels were limited. In terms of time the 
imports took place during the first year of the world war. In terms of 
value they accounted at most for 10 per cent of the total cost of the 
ships acquired in 1939—1945. The balance, around 450 million kronor, 
was spent on domestic acquisitions.
Another way of cutting down the time it took to acquire warships 
was to buy and rebuild civil ships for military use. This method was 
followed with various kinds of special ships, the most important of 
which were the mother ship “Patricia”, the hospital ship “Prins 
Carl” and the communications ship “Marieholm”. In the main private 
shipyards were used for the reconstruction, as well as for the rebuild­
ing and improvement of older naval vessels.
Most of the ships were acquired through new shipbuilding in Swed­
ish shipyards. As far as destroyers were concerned (see diagram) 
the two Gothenburg shipyards Eriksbergs mekaniska verkstad (EMV) 
andGötaverken (GV) accounted for the majority. Before the war they 
had already gained experience of this type of ship, and, with their 
total of nine ships, they became specialized to a certain extent. One 
destroyer was also built at Karlskrona örlogsvarv (ÖVK). However, 
the shipyard was saddled with a large number of tasks, and once the 
destroyer had been delivered in 1940 after a lengthy period of con­
struction - the keel had been laid as long ago as 1936 - the yard was 
not called on to build any further destroyers. A smaller destroyer 
(“Munin”) of the so-called coastal destroyer type was delivered 
from Öresundsvarvet (ÖV) in Landskrona.
U-boats were built mainly at Kockums mekaniska verkstad (KMV), 
which specialized in this type of ship. In addition 4 U-boats were 
built at Karskrona örlogsvarv.
Amongst the various types of ship the minesweeper was a com-
109 Ericson, pp. 138 f.
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destroyers ÖV
GV GV
GV GV GV
ÖVK EMV EMV EMV EMV
1939 1941 1943 1945
ÖVK
Newly built ÖVK OVK
U-boats KMV OVK KMV
KMV KMV KMV
KMV KMV KMV KMV
KMV KMV KMV KMV KMV KMV
1939 1941 1943 1945
parative newcomer. Orders were placed for a further 12 of the larger 
type of minesweeper which had been delivered from Karlskrona 
naval shipyard shortly before the outbreak of war; these orders 
were distributed amongst a large number of private shipyards, which 
included a few smaller yards - Oskarshamns varv, Lindholmens 
varv and Finnboda varv - apart from those mentioned above. The 
deliveries already took place in the years 1940-1941. A total of 24 
smaller minesweepers of the fishing boat kind were built by several 
small yards during the years 1940-1942.
Another type of smaller naval vessel which made something of a 
breakthrough during the Second World War was the motor torpedo- 
boat. 15 of these were built in the years 1941-1943 under the super­
vision of the naval administration’s engineering department. The 
hulls were constructed at Kockums mekaniska verkstad, while the 
engines were partly imported and partly manufactured at Atlas Diesel 
under an Italian licence.
Of the other large naval vessels which were built, mention should 
certainly be made of the minelaying cruiser “Älvsnabben”, which 
was delivered from Eriksbergs mekaniska verkstad in 1943.
Two larger destroyers were under construction at the end of the 
war. The contracts for these had been made respectively with 
Kockums verkstad in July 1943 and Karskrona naval shipyard in 
December of the same year. As a result the ‘regular’ manufacturers 
of destroyers were made available for the construction of the two 
cruisers “Tre Kronor” and “Göta Lejon” the keels of which were
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U 1 is launched at Kockums in Malmö in 1941. It was the first of 
a series of small so-called coastal U-boats (Fst pressdetalj).
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laid at Gotaverken and Eriksbergs mekaniska verkstad respectively 
in September 1943, and which were launched but were far from ready 
for delivery when peace came.
The summary review of the distribution of orders for the building 
of new ships has shown that the private shipyards carried out the 
lion’s share of the work. Ofthe larger ships, the navy’s own shipyard 
in Karlskrona delivered one destroyer and 4 U-boats, while the other 
shipyards accounted for the rest, amounting to more than 90 per cent 
of the total sum in terms of value. The navy’s own capacity was 
increased mainly in relation to certain central functions, such as con­
struction, purchasing and coordination. A special new building centre 
was set up in Gothenburg to maintain close contact with the large 
shipyards there.
If an assessment is to be made of the role played by the shipyard 
industry in relation to orders for warships it must be made quite dear 
that the shipyard’s share of the total sum involved in an order for a
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warship was only about 30 per cent. Other branches of the engineer­
ing industry, including arms manufacturers, accounted for 50 per 
cent, while the balance of about 20 per cent went to completely 
different industries, including the wood industry.110
Thus, of about 450 million kronor allocated to the acquisition of 
ships within Sweden during the years 1939-1945, 135 million kronor 
went to the shipbuilding industry, while 225 million kronor went to 
engine manufacturers, the electrical industry, gun manufacturers and 
many others. Here there were areas in which there was competi­
tion from other sectors of the rearmament programme. It was within 
these sectors rather than within the actual shipbuilding industry that 
the overcrowding occurred. As a result the navy’s demands had to 
take second place when competing with other vital needs.* 111 Such a 
situation will be described in greater detail below, but in other cases 
too, e.g. with regard to engines for the motor torpedo-boats, there 
can be found similar tendencies in the priorities determined by IK.112
A striking feature of the naval rearmament was the concentration 
on smaller vessels. The explanation may well lie in the changes in 
naval strategic thinking, where there was a clear trend away from 
large armoured ships with heavy artillery towards lighter units with 
greater mobility. A debate between naval men of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
schools continued throughout the whole of the 1930s.113 The plans 
for the building of light cruisers (and hence a cancellation of the plans 
for large armoured vessels) constituted a retreat from the tenets of the 
old school, although “Tie Kronor” and “Göta Lejon”, with almost 
8,000 tons, were to become the largest naval vessels which had been 
built in Sweden. However, the reasons for the fact that no ships larger 
than the 1,200 ton destroyers of the city class had been completed 
before the end of the war were not only strategical ones.
In December 1940 Parliament granted money for the commence­
ment of work on two cruisers. By then the preparations had been 
under way for some time, in the form of planning and drawing work
ll0IKKAprot. 25/9 1942 bit. 3. RA.
111 “In the majority of situations the navy had to struggle against a fierce head wind of 
lack of sympathy, shortage of money, competition with industry, ignorance and 
isolation". Ericson, p. 156.
112 As to the drop forging capacity cf. p. 92.
113 Ericson, pp. 120-125.
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at Cantieri Riuniti dell’ Adriatico in Trieste. This work was completed 
during 1941 and the naval administration was able to place certain 
orders, e.g. for turrets, electrical installations and optical and nautical 
equipment. The design and drawing work was taken over by Gota- 
verken in accordance with a special agreement with the naval adminis­
tration.114
However, now that the time for the actual start of the shipbuilding 
was drawing near, difficulties arose. IK raised objections to the plans. 
In the autumn of 1941 there was a very tense situation in several 
sectors as regards the work of rearmament. For example, both engine 
and gun production wrestled with great difficulties. The two cruisers 
would mean increasing the burden on the engineering industry by 
between 5 and 7 per cent.115 The supply of design personnel was 
very small. IK took the view that in this situation it was better to use 
the limited resources on smaller vessels, primarily destroyers, which 
could be completed in a significantly shorter time than the cruisers.116 
IK raised even stronger objections when it came to the question of 
raw materials. The consumption of copper, chromium and nickel 
would be great and would impose a serious strain on the limited 
resources. However, the really critical factor was the requirement 
of molybdenum for the production of armour plate (see pp. 70-71). 
The orders which the naval administration had placed for armour for 
cruisers were stopped after intervention by IK. Armour plating was 
also needed for other purposes, e.g. for shells and bombs. However, 
the most urgent need related to armoured vehicles for the army. In 
September 1941 it was estimated that about 3,650 tons would be 
required for this purpose during the coming five-year period. It was 
estimated that about 2,600 tons of armour plate would be required 
for the cruisers.117 In IK's view these requirements could not be met 
at the same time, by virture both of the molybdenum consumption 
and the production capacity of the steel works. They therefore wanted 
to postpone the decision about the building of the cruisers until the 
navy's entire requirements of materials had been clarified and a 
review of the consequences of the new Defence Act had been re-
114 Erfarenheterbetraffande fartygsmaterielen. Ber. v. CF IV. MHA.
115IK till KMF 3/2 1943. IK KA prot. bil. pag. 65. RA.
116IK prot. 31/5 1940 bil. 4 pag. 230IK KA prot. RA.
117 Anteckningarförda vid sammanträde i IK 10/9 1941. IK KR B:2. RA.
JTn October 1943 the hull of the 
cruiser “Tie Kronor" began to 
take shape. Just over two years later 
it was time to put the main arma­
ments into position: 15 cm guns in 
elevating triple gun mountings, 
manufactured by Bofors (Gota- 
verken).
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ceived, which could not be expected to occur until the middle of 1942. 
With this the matter came to a head, and a regular struggle for power 
began between IK and the naval administration which wanted to press 
on with the building of the cruisers at any price.118 Both the Defence 
Minister and the Supreme Commander were forced to make their 
positions clear, with the result that the cruiser plans were shelved for 
the time being.119
It was not until 4 September 1942 that the naval administration 
received the consent of the King in Council to the conclusion of 
agreements for the construction of two cruisers at a maximum cost 
of 74 million kronor each. On 5 February 1943 agreements were 
made between the naval administration and the two Gothenburg 
shipyards, and work began towards the end of the year. The contract 
price was 24 million kronor for each cruiser.
When the building of the cruisers was really under way, the period 
of the most intensive rearmament had already passed. The rate of 
shipbuilding had been reduced; the annual expenditure had been 
halved from more than 100 million kronor in the years 1940-1942. 
There was now scope for the wider, more long-term objectives which 
it had not previously been possible to accommodate within the large 
rearmament pattern.
4. Aircraft
The expansion of the air force after the passing of the Defence Act 
of 1936 took place with the aim of establishing five wings with a total
118 “Samtal med amiral Tamm 9/12 1941.“ IK KA PM 19 IK KR B:l. RA.
A statement from the head of the naval administration Admiral G. Bjurner at a 
meeting about the building of the cruisers at IK on 2/1 1942 provides an example of 
a discussion which bears a natural resemblance to that which took place 30 years 
before about the question of the armoured ships: "It is basically a question of priorities. 
I would like to emphasise that it is not the Industry Commission nor the Minister who 
decides the priorities. An edict from the King in Council is needed. The matter must 
be dealt with without fail. As to the building of the cruisers there are no obstacles in 
the way of the ships which are currently under construction. It is true that it is not 
possible to stop up the rate which would be desirable, this is not possible but it 
ought to be possible . . . for it to be possible!!!” IK KR B:2. RA.
119 PM för sammanträde den 26/11 1941 angående större marina byggen. Prot. fört vid 
sammanträde på IK 26/11 1941. IK KR 15/41, 16/41. RA.
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of 257 aircraft in 1942/43, and it was estimated that this would cost a 
total of about 70 million kronor,120 Both the Government and the air 
force desired the creation in Sweden of a qualified aircraft industry 
which could in the long term secure the supply of equipment, since 
the building-up of an air force had now become one of the most im­
portant aims of the Defence Act. The end of the 1930s brought about 
a complicated game with many turns, in which several of the country’s 
leading industrial groups were involved. In 1939, as a result of an 
agreement about capacity expansion, an aircraft manufacturing 
company, Svenska Aeroplanaktiebolaget (SAAB), acquired a posi­
tion approaching a monopoly within the country. The company 
embraced within itself the production capacity in Trollhättan which 
was created by the Wennergren-Bofors group, as well as plants in 
Linköping which had come from AB Svenska Jämvägsverkstäderna 
- a company which had close connections with Stockholms En­
skilda Bank. There was an equivalent concentration as regards air­
craft engines. NOHAB’s Flygmotor AB in Trollhättan, a subsidiary 
of Nydqvist & Holm AB (NOHAB) was clearly dominant. In 1941 
the company changed its name to Svenska Flygmotor AB (SFA) 
when Volvo bought the majority shareholding. A minority holding 
(three-eighths of the share capital) was retained by NOHAB, which 
was in turn a subsidiary of Bofors (cf. p. 131). SAAB and NOHAB’s 
Flygmotor-SFA were to dominate Swedish aircraft production com­
pletely during the years to come.
When war broke out none of the aircraft which had been ordered in 
accordance with the Defence Act of 1936 had yet been delivered. 
Slowly, between 1934 and 1938, 45 light bombers (B 4 Hawkers) were 
completed under licence. The production under licence of B3s 
(Junkers) and B5s (Northrops) was under way but deliveries did not 
begin until well into the year 1940. This constituted a delay in relation 
to the plans which had been drawn up, but before the war had broken 
out it was possible to overlook it, since it was fairly easy to make it 
up by purchasing from abroad a greater proportion of the new fleet of 
aircraft than had previously been thought possible. With the com­
paratively generous funds which had been allocated to the air force,
120 For this chapter generally the references are to Norberg. Söderberg, Kindberg and 
Flygmotor 1955:4, passim.
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between the autumn of 1937 and the autumn of 1939 a total of 106 
planes were purchased, consisting of German bombers and torpedo 
carriers and English fighters. In addition a number of German recon­
naissance planes were acquired. Including older planes as well, the 
air force was able to muster about 195 aircraft when war was ap­
proaching.
As described above, there was an alarming decline in opportunities 
to import aircraft during the autumn of 1939 and the first six months of 
1940. The situation in 1940 was similar to the tank situation which 
has already been described; while the need for equipment increased 
to such a degree that the air force administration and the Government 
ordered acquisitions without regard to the adaptation of the aircraft 
within the organization, the possibilities of importing were stifled and 
the domestic production capacity proved completely inadequate. The 
imports from Italy which were described above (p. 51) constituted an 
emergency solution which involved a compulsory choice of aircraft 
which were not altogether desirable either as regards type or quality. 
During 1940 it became quite clear that a reinforcement of the domestic 
aircraft industry was probably the most important factor in the 
whole of the Swedish rearmament.121
It is against this background that the establishment of the so-called 
framework agreement in the autumn of 1940 should be viewed. Dis­
satisfaction with the performance of the aircraft industry led IK and 
the Government to the conclusion that the aircraft industry must be 
strongly reinforced with Government participation. In practice the 
framework agreement gave the companies involved a complete 
monopoly over domestic supplies to the air force for the next five 
years, and formed the basis for a vigorous expansion. According to 
IK the main motive for the agreements between KFF and SAAB and 
NOHAB’s Flygmotor respectively, and between NOHAB’s Flyg­
motor and its sub-contractors was that they constituted the most 
economical way of preserving the country's aircraft manufacturing
121 Cf. the view expressed in Söderberg, p. 279.
In his proposal of 8/8 1940 the Supreme Commander recommended an extension 
of the air force by 5 wings over and above the 9 which were already under con- 
stmction. For this 1,555 aircraft would be required over a five-year period, and it 
was thought they could be manufactured within the country. VPM 8/8 1940. Fst 
Kvmavd. F XI. FCA.
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resources.122 There was a particular shortage of draughtsmen and 
designers, and splitting the resources amongst several parties would 
involve wastage. The framework agreement structure meant that 
prices were not fixed, but that instead regulations were laid down 
for writeoffs, profits et cetera so that prices could be determined 
when the manufacturing was complete. The companies were exempt 
from the war tax on excess profits. The profit was to amount to 10 
per cent of “the works cost price” which meant that changes in the 
cost of materials and wages were taken into account.
SAAB undertook to deliver aircraft of its own design in accordance 
with the following schedule: 260 of type 17 before 1 April 1943, 88 of 
type 18 between 1/1 1943 and 1/7 1944, and a number of SK planes 
in addition. According to this plan the total number of aircraft up to 
the middle of 1946 would be about 1,100. New buildings and new 
equipment worth about 5 million kronor were to be written off before 
the end of 1946. For existing assets, valued at 12.76 million kronor 
in November 1940, the following yearly rate of depreciation was 
fixed:
Airfield buildings 15 %
Buildings 5 %
Equipment 10 %
Shelters, roads 10%
Machines 10 %
Tools and workshop inventories 20 % 
Office inventories 50 %
Cars and tractors 33 %
NOHAB’s Flygmotor’s undertaking involved deliveries of about 
1,360 engines, mainly Twin Wasp and Double Wasp, before the end 
of 1946. The structure of the agreements was the same as for SAAB. 
It was estimated that new investments - mainly machines - would cost 
2.1 million kronor and would be written off before the end of 1946. 
The existing capital assets were valued at 3.5 million kronor and 
would be written off at the same rates as applied to SAAB. The co-
122PM angående utvidgning av den inhemska flygmaterieltillverkningen 27/11 1940. 
IK KA EI:6 dnr h 735. RA.
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suppliers, Volvo-Pentaverken and Bolinder-Munktell, were each to 
account for 25 per cent of the value of NOHAB’s Flygmotor’s deli­
veries. Volvo’s new investments were estimated at 1.6 million kronor 
and Bolinder-Munktell’s at 1.8 million ,123
It soon became apparent that the plans which had been drawn up 
towards the end of 1940 could not be adhered to. The delays were to 
a certain extent connected with personnel difficulties with regard to 
design work, but the most serious problems were still to be found on 
the engine side. The expansion of the engine manufacturing capacity- 
required many extra machine tools. Many of the machine were im­
possible to obtain in Sweden, and imports were uncertain and time- 
consuming. In other cases machine tools had to be newly manu­
factured within the country, often by industries without experience of 
the models in question. The limited drop forge capacity - in spite 
of the fact that deliveries to the air force were given priority - also 
held up engine production as well as actual aircraft manufacturing.124 
In the autumn of 1941 IK assumed firmer control of the aircraft 
production. During conferences at SAAB in Linköping there was 
discussion of the reasons for the delays, and there was harsh criti­
cism from the air force administration. SAAB presented a new and 
much less optimistic plan than the one that had been put forward a 
year earlier. The promises of deliveries which the company had 
given in connection with the framework agreements had obviously 
been unrealistic. Now someone from IK was given the task of super­
vising the progress of the production, allocating the distribution of 
labour according to priorities, keeping an eye on sub-contractors, et 
cetera.125
According to the defence resolution of 1942, 16 or perhaps 17 wings 
were to be set up. In this connection SAAB was asked if it could 
undertake to supply the planes which would number about 1,250 
during the five-year period 1/7 1942 to 1/7 1947. SAAB said it thought
123 Ramavtal med bilagor. The framework agreements were approved by Parliament 
19/12 1940. IK KA EI:6 dnr h 735. RA.
124 KFF till Bofors. KFF till OB 19/2 1942. IK KA El: 16 dnr h 136. RA.
125 Anteckningarförda vid konferens hos SAAB i Linköping 17/9 1941. IK KR 8/41; 
Konferens hos SAAB i Linköping 13-14/11. IK KR 13/41;
IK:s uppgift i samband med leverans från SAAB. PM 12/9 1941. IK KR 7/41. RA.
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An STW C3 is assembled at Svenska Flygmotoraktiebolaget. About 430 of these 14 
cylinder radial engines were manufactured in 1943-1945 and were installed in the B/S 
17 and J 22 planes amongst others (Volvo Flygmotor).
it would be able to do this.126 Problems still remained on the engine 
side, for when deliveries of the My XXIV - an English engine various 
versions of which had for a long time been standard in aircraft manu­
factured in Sweden - were completed, the aim was to be able in 
June 1942 to begin to produce the American Twin Wasp (STW C3) 
in series. 470 of these engines were required. After that they would 
concentrate on the Daimler-Benz engine for which a licence had been 
obtained in August 1941. In February 1942 the aim was to begin this 
production in January 1944 and from then onwards to produce 1,230 
before 1/7 1947. After 1/7 1947 the capacity was to be 40 engines a 
month. SvenskaFlygmotor (SFA), Volvo and Bolinder-Munktell said 
they thought they could achieve this aim. A new framework agree-
126 KFF till SAAB 28/1 1942, SAAB till KFF 4/2 1942. IK KA El:13 dnr h 39. Prot. 
KFF 19/2 1942. IKKA El: 16 dnr h 133. RA.
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ment within these guidelines was also made with SFA. The long 
period of time between the obtaining of the licence and the start of 
the DB production was needed for the manufacturing of tools, 
machines and the basic materials for the production. IK estimated 
that 0.5 million working hours - or 250 workers for ten months - were 
required for the production of tools and 1 million working hours for 
the production of machines.127
Thus in relation to the plans of November 1940 there was a delay of 
2-3 months for the My and TW engines. In fact there was an even 
greater delay in the production of the DB engine which was not able 
to start until 1944. Finally, the problems went back to the difficulties 
of importing from the U.S.A. in 1940. According to an agreement the 
Twin Wasp and the much more powerful Double Wasp were to be 
manufactured under licence. When contact with the U.S.A. was 
broken off in the summer of 1940 existing Twin Wasp engines in 
Sweden were copied and production was able to begin without a 
licence but subject to certain delays.128 In Sweden it proved impos­
sible to get hold of a Double Wasp engine, and the air force adminis­
tration had to cast around for an alternative engine with a develop­
ment potential approaching 2,000 h.p. which was required for SAAB’s 
project 18 and for new fighter plane designs.129 After long-drawn-out 
negotiations from December 1940 onwards, a licence for the German 
Daimler-Benz 605 engine was obtained in August 1941. Great diffi­
culties arose in getting the production of this engine started. No 
aircraft delivered before the end of the war were equipped with the 
DB engine, which was first installed in the B version of SAAB’s 18 
series and in the J 21.
127PM beträffande maskinkapacitet för tillverkning av DB-605 (SFA). IK KA El: 16 
dnr h 105 ;
Div. materiel ang. DB-motorn. IK KA El: 16 dnr h 133, 136, 149, RA.
Chefen för flygvapnet till chefen för försvarsstaben 3/11 1942. Fst Kvmavd. F XII: 1. 
FCA.
128 Thus the copying was carried out without any data in the shape of drawings, material 
specifications, tolerance tables et cetera, and this was a complex task which was in fact 
performed with great success. After the end of the war the American manufacturers. 
Pratt & Whitney, were offered compensation for the licence and royalties under the 
agreement which had been worked out when the negotiations were broken off in 
1940. The offer was declined. Söderberg, pp. 332-333. Flygmotor 1955:4, p. 21.
129 Söderberg, pp. 297 f.
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SAAB 18 Bs under construction in Linköping. The engines are DB 60.5s which differ 
greatly from those previously manufactured in Sweden. Inter alia they had hanging 
cylinder blocks with 12 cylinders forming a V and a fuel injection pump (Övl. Kind- 
berg, Flygstaben).
SAAB's contribution to the building up of the air force during the 
period from the commencement of the framework agreement in 1940 
up to the middle of 1944 consisted mainly of 102 B5s and 322 B/S 17s 
manufactured under licence.
At about the same time as SAAB’s B 18 As began to be supplied 
to the formations - in the summer of 1944 - another aircraft of Swedish 
manufacture was also to be found there. This was the J 22 fighter 
which had begun to be designed within the air force administration at 
the start of 1941. It was manufactured outside the framework agree­
ment and, with its limited engine power (Twin Wasp engines), it was 
an “emergency project" intended to fill an acute need but with no 
development potential. The design involved a steel framework and 
supporting wooden panels, an old-fashioned method of construction
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which had been outmoded by the aluminium structures. The produc­
tion was based entirely on ready-made parts which were assembled 
by KFF in rented premises. Thanks to the construction of steel and 
wood it was possible to avoid the imposition of a burden on SAAB’s 
sub-contractors. In spite of its almost improvised origins the J 22 
was regarded as being a very good plane of its time, and one which 
played an important role in bridging the gap between the imported 
fighter planes and SAAB’s J 21s which came into service long after 
the end of the war. A total of 198 J 22s were delivered, 180 of these 
before May 1945. After that the air force administration's activities 
as an aircraft builder ceased.
Summarising the acquisition of aircraft during the war, it can be 
established that it was not until 1944 that a satisfactory situation 
was achieved. Then it proved possible to deliver both fighters and 
bombers which had been designed and produced in Sweden. The 
aircraft industry’s capacity was then such that it could supply a fight­
ing force, which imports were unable to do. During the last six months 
of the war the bulk of the total of just over 600 aircraft which had been 
manufactured in Sweden were delivered. The balance of about 400 
planes were imported, above all during the first years of the war.131’ 
Thus the period up to 1944 was a period of expansion for the Swedish 
aircraft industry during which, with Government support, it devel­
oped new types of aircraft and made large investments the fruits of 
which ripened mainly after the period described here. Even under 
normal conditions it would have taken a considerable time to develop
13° During the period 1939-1945 the following aircraft were manufactured in Sweden:
number type period of delivery
16 B 3 (Junkers) Aug. 1940-Oct. 1940
102 B 5 (Northrop) April 1940-April 1943
322 B/S 17 (SAAB) Dec. 1941-1944
198 J 22 (KFF) Aug. 1944-1947
240 B/S/T 18 (SAAB) May 1944-1948
Information from Norberg, p. 220, Kindberg, passim. Norberg’s information about 
the period of delivery for SAAB’s type 17 (Oct. 1944-Aug. 1947) is plainly misinter­
preted. Cf. Söderberg, p. 280 and Kindberg, pp. 114-116. There are also other small 
differences between the authors with regard to dates of delivery.
Assembly work on the J 22 in the premises rented by the air force administration in 
Ulvsunda, Stockholm in 1944 (Övl Kindberg, Flygstaben).
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a viable aircraft industry. During the years 1940-1944 many problems 
arose, connected with the World War and the blockade, which con­
trived to make aircraft production perhaps the most problematic 
sector of the whole rearmament.
5. Small arms and gunnery equipment
There were two motives for acquiring small arms during the rearma­
ment period.131 First of all there was a sharp increase in the war units, 
which resulted in a demand for traditional weapons such as rifles. In 
addition 64,000 rifles were transferred to the National Home Guard 
and a similiar number to Finland, which created further gaps. The 
production of this kind of standard equipment was based on existing
131The figures given on p. 000 indicate the size of the most important items. The 
figures are minimum figures since they do not include the period September 1939— 
February 1940 and only relate to the army.
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designs and these could easily be supplied by Swedish companies. 
Secondly, however, there were requests for more modern automatic 
weapons: automatic rifles, sub-machine-guns and light machine-guns. 
The shortage of these was keenly felt and the domestic models which 
were available were unsatisfactory. Imports were desirable, but were 
not altogether easy to obtain, since the international demand was also 
great. As far as sub-machine-guns were concerned, during the years 
1939-1940 German as well as Finnish and American models were 
imported (see chapter II). Gradually a domestic production was 
started, and before the war was over it was possible to supply the 
armed forces with a total of about 60,000. 3,000 Czechoslovakian 
sub-machine-guns (7.92 mm) were purchased in 1940. After that this 
type of weapon was also produced in Sweden. The development of 
the automatic rifle was under way in many places towards the end of 
the 1930s. In 1941 a commission was set up in Sweden to choose 
between the alternatives which were available. The result was the 
m/42 automatic rifle, a total of 23,000 of which were produced and 
supplied to the units from 1943 onwards. The very large number of 
light machine-guns which were acquired (including 9,000 machine- 
guns for the army) were also produced in Sweden.
The purchases from several different foreign sources resulted in a 
troublesome confusion as regards models of weapons and ammuni­
tion. It was not until later that the situation was stabilized by virtue of 
the fact that domestically produced series began to predominate.132
In terms of volume the importation of small arms constituted a small 
part of the total acquisition and was limited to the initial stages of the 
war. Swedish industry accounted for the bulk of the small arms. In 
terms of value the annual production of small arms and light machine- 
guns during the years 1940-1943 amounted to about 50 million kronor. 
Carl Gustafs stads gevärsfaktori, the state's own industry, bore the 
main responsibility for design and coordination but only accounted 
for about a quarter of the actual production. Husqvarna Vapenfabrik,
132 See p. 20.
Hedqvist. B., En orientering om arméns tekniska upprustning. Fälttygmästarens 
handlingar F II. KrA;
Översikt överläget beträffande viss krigsmateriel. 31/12 1940. Fst Kvmavd.
PM och planer 1939-1944. F XI: 1. FCA;
Ber. v. KATD:s redogörelse. CF 1. MHA.
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Telefon AB L. M. Ericsson, Industri AB Svenska Automatvapen and 
G. Arehns mek. verkstad - on a sharply declining scale - bore the 
responsibility for the bulk of the remaining three-quarters. In addition 
a large number of sub-contractors were involved.133
The production of small arms attracted no great attention from the 
authorities which planned the equipment rearmament. Nor did the 
lighter gunnery equipment cause any serious difficulties. There had 
been previous experience of such designs and production. The charac­
ter of this type of production is such that it presents no great diffi­
culties in the adaptation of civilian industry for the production of 
military equipment. A light engineering industry, producing tele­
phones or office machines for example, is well suited to the produc­
tion of parts for light weapons.
Heavier weapons were also purchased for the defence on a large 
scale. There is a description on p. 20 above of how the army acquired 
more than 3,000 guns of various kinds in 1940-1945: mortars, anti-tank 
guns, field artillery and anti-aircraft guns. During the same period 
the navy ordered about 600 guns, mainly anti-aircraft artillery but 
also heavier naval artillery and coast artillery (see p. 21-22).
Guns had been produced for a long time in Sweden. In spite of an 
uncertain basis of domestic orders, AB Bofors had managed to main­
tain a considerable military production capacity during the period 
between the wars. During the most difficult years, in which there was 
a tendency towards a limitation of armaments both internationally 
and in Sweden, valuable support was received from the Kruppverken 
in Essen with whom a close technological and financial collabora­
tion had been established. As a result significant export markets were 
opened. Through the nominee company Boforsintressenter Krupp 
had a dominant proprietorial influence in Bofors. This became an em­
barrassment in the 1930s but it was not until 1935 that the German 
interests could be persuaded to sell their shares. By that time Bofors’ 
lean years had passed. New establishments in Tidaholm and Troll­
hättan (NOHAB and the subsidiary NOHAB’s Flygmotor AB) were 
purchased and heavy investments were made in mechanical equip­
ment. There was a very powerful expansion up to the outbreak of
133Redogorelse för läget inom byrå 3, Handvapen och kulsprutor 19/2 1940, 23/10 
1941. 4/11 1942. IK KA EI9 dnr H 309, 466, El: 16 dnr h 106, EI:37 dnr h 110. RA.
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15 cm turret guns for naval artillery were also produced at Bofors (Bofors).
war: in 1935 military equipment worth 23 million kronor was pro­
duced, and in 1939 equipment worth 78 million kronor. Almost 90 per 
cent of this production was sold on the export markets. The trump 
card in the range was the newly designed 40 mm automatic gun which 
caused something of a sensation on the weapon market in the 1930s, 
but there was a very wide selection: anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns 
of various calibres, field artillery, heavy coast and naval guns.134
Bofors’ resources at the outbreak of war were placed at the disposal 
of the Swedish armed forces. With the support of the general disposi­
tion legislation Swedish orders were given priority. Equipment con­
tracted for by foreign customers but not yet delivered was requisi-
134 Steckzén, pp. 323-565, 692-733.
For the Kruppverken the collaboration with Bofors meant that as far as weapons 
were concerned the work of development in the field of technology was also able to 
continue during the years when the prohibition on the manufacturing of weapons in 
the Treaty of Versailles was respected. Manchester, W., The Arms of Krupp 1587- 
1968, pp. 392-394.
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tioned as it was completed. The following guns were requisitioned 
during the years 1939~ 1940:135
number type original customer
181 40 mm automatic gun Holland, England, Argentina
52 7.5 cm field gun Argentina, Siam
20 7.5 cm anti-aircraft gun China, Siam, Iran
32 10.5 cm field howitzer Siam. Holland
8 15.2 cm gun for coast artillery Holland
In addition a considerable number of guns were purchased abroad 
in order to achieve a rapid increase in artillery equipment. These guns 
came almost exclusively from Germany. The most important pur­
chases were of 142 10.5 cm howitzers, 110 of which were in fact or­
dered later on during the war (see p. 45). During 1940 60 40 mm auto­
matic guns were purchased as well as 102 20 mm guns, while a total of 
210 3.7 cm anti-tank guns were acquired during the same year. The 
heavy 21 cm coast guns from Skodaverken were delivered in 1944. 
Apart from Germany gunnery equipment was only acquired from 
Finland (219 12 cm mortars in the years 1942-1944) and Switzerland 
(450 20 mm anti-tank guns and 300 20 mm anti-aircraft guns).136
The overwhelming majority of the imports of gunnery equipment 
took place during the period up to and including 1941. During this 
period the reinforcements were based mainly on requisitions from 
Bofors and imports. This was followed by a period in which Bofors 
alone accounted for by far the greatest part of the contribution. This 
made the company’s position as the sine qua non of the rearmament 
quite apparent. For all the branches of the services and a large 
variety of products the defence was dependent on its production 
capacity (cf. above as regards ammunition production and heavy 
forging). Total deliveries to the Swedish Government amounted to 
the following:137
us viktigare beställningar av artilleri materiel för marinen 1/7 1939-30/6 1945. Ber. v. 
KMF CF III. Vid Aktiebolaget Bofors för tygavdelningen beslagtagen materiel. Ber. 
v. KATD. CF. I. MHA.
136 See p. 000.
137 Steckzén, p. 711.
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1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
millions of kronor 115 109 145 111 113 71
In 1942 the company, including its subsidiaries, had about 11,300 
employees, which meant an increase of 3,300 since 1938.138 During 
those years Bofors worked close to the limit of its capacity, reaching 
a peak in 1940.
6. Summary
The important examples of the acquisition of equipment which have 
been discussed here show that the years 1940-1941 meant above all an 
intensive production of the lighter and simpler equipment for which a 
production capacity was available. The ammunition production and 
the weapon production are representative. Alongside this attempts 
were made to buy foreign equipment to fill the gaps. In the long term 
the problematic shortages proved to relate to tanks and aircraft 
with their fittings, above all engines. On the whole it was impossible 
to import such equipment and experience of production within the 
country was very limited. Efforts were concentrated on these areas. 
Private domestic companies which were suited to this type of produc­
tion were supported in every possible way. However, it was not until 
the most acute threat of war had already been removed that it proved 
possible to deliver modern tanks at a steady rate, and by the time that 
domestically designed aircraft which were technologically satis­
factory emerged from SAAB’s assembly halls the war was practically 
over.
If a comparison is made between Sweden’s war industry before and 
after the war the difference is striking: before the war it was possible 
to produce within Sweden traditional small arms, guns and warships 
of a good international standard. After the war the obvious lost 
ground in relation to automatic weapons, tanks and aircraft had been 
made up.
13s Steckzén, p. 727.
IV
THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY BLOCKADED AND MOBILIZED
A. The role of the military orders in terms of quantities
The plans which were made had for a long time taken into account 
the fact that in the event of war or a situation of similar gravity Swe­
den would have to rely on her domestic private engineering industry 
to a high degree. It was not practically possible to make sure of 
supplies by stockpiling, and it was unrealistic to count on uninter­
rupted imports in such a situation. The Swedish engineering industry, 
which was on a high level as far as quality was concerned and was 
richly diversified, constituted a great potential armament industry 
which had to be adapted to the production of military equipment. 
The availability within the country of technical expertise in the form 
of an established war industry was of special value for such an 
adjustment. During the 1930s the only specialized industry of any 
significance in this sector was Bofors, and on the whole the Govern­
ment viewed the expansion of this company with satisfaction. There 
were discussions about a Government takeover of the company at 
the beginning of the decade, but this idea was rejected by the military 
equipment commission of 1932. Bofors concentrated to a marked 
extent on exporting. This gave the company a large volume of produc­
tion and hence opportunities for technological development work 
which led it to a position of international preeminence above all 
in the sphere of artillery gun design. It was maintained that a state- 
owned company would not be able to count on large exports, and 
the company's value as far as defence potential was concerned 
would be drastically reduced. Quite simply Bofors was too valuable to 
tamper with. Nor were plans for a state monopoly, which had on 
occasions been mooted as far as the aircraft industry was concerned, 
put into effect. The military equipment commission's report resulted
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solely in increased Governmental control through the setting up ,of the 
military equipment inspectorate in 1935.1
The more imminent appeared the risk that Sweden would be drawn 
into an armed conflict, the less inclined the Government probably was 
to transfer the responsibility for military equipment to Government 
establishments. In any event radical interventions in that direction 
would mean problems of adjustment which from the point of view of 
both time and cost would constitute an inferior alternative to relying 
on an already existing capacity. As the previous chapter showed 
Government operations during the war period were limited to manu­
facturing within traditional areas: ammunition, firearms and to a 
certain extent warships - apart from repairs and design work. An 
interesting phenomenon, and what may also be regarded as something 
of an exception to the rule, was KFFs production of fighter planes 
(see p. 127). It was regarded as profitable to build aircraft independ­
ently of SAAB under Government supervision. However, the opera­
tion can hardly be regarded as a major departure from the main 
principle of distribution between Government and private military 
equipment production. First of all, the actual production was carried 
on entirely by private companies; the role of the air force administra­
tion was limited to design and assembly.2 Secondly, it was clear 
throughout that it was a question of a project of a temporary nature, 
motivated by the shortage of aircraft, before the aircraft industry 
had reached full capacity. There were never any plans for a continua­
tion of G overnment aircraft production, and this is underlined by the 
fact that the J 22 was a blind alley technologically, with no develop­
ment potential.
If one includes the production of the J 22, the Government’s new 
production in terms of value can be assessed at around 10 per cent
1 The main features of the military equipment commission's report are covered by 
Government Bill no. 87 of 1935, pp. 1-36. The debate in the UpperHouse took place 
at the beginning of the month of April. Fk prot. 22:2 d, 25:11 d; Ak prot. 24:4 d, 
26:20 d.
2The maximum number of workers at KFF’s assembly factory was 467. KKV till 
chefen för försvarsdepartementet 31/1 1945. IK KA EI:37 dnr h 110. RA.
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Diagram 7. The value of production and the number of workers in the engineering 
industry.
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Source: SOS Industri.
of the total value of the war period.3 The balance of about 3,300 
million kronor went on private industry.
Diagram 7 shows how the Swedish engineering industry developed 
during the years 1938-1946 in terms of production value and the 
number of workers. State-owned industry is not included in these 
figures.4 The production is expressed in terms of current prices, as is 
the case throughout this account. If the changes in the value of money 
are taken into consideration the picture alters somewhat, since prices
3 The estimate is based on figures for the value of the new production in relation to 
small arms and ships and figures for the numerical distribution of workers in Govern­
ment and private industry in the manufacturing of small arms ammunition and missiles. 
The rough figures are: small arms: 50 million kronor, ships: 50 million kronor and 
ammunition: 150 million kronor. Cf. pp. 00-00. 000, 000.
4The engineering industry means group 1 of the Official Statistics, ore mining and 
metal industry, with the exception of mines, ore concentration plants, iron and steel 
works and metal works.
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shot up during the period 1939-1941. Expressed in index figures 
(1938 = 100) the production, in fixed prices, was as follows:5
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
100 111 97 101 111 122 130 109 157
The development within the engineering industry will be the subject 
of more detailed comment later. First the military orders’ share of the 
total production for the war period will be established. One basic 
factor for this is the grants for mechanical military equipment which 
were calculated in chapter 1 (see p. 17).
After deductions for imported equipment and state-owned 
companies a balance of about 3,300 million kronor remains. A simple 
comparison with the total production of the engineering industry 
over the same period shows that the armed forces bought 23 per cent 
of the total production.6 When it is a question of distributing the 
production intended for the armed forces over the whole period it is 
not possible to use the allocation of grants as a basis, for these give 
no direct information as to when the production took place. However, 
sources are available for such a distribution over the period in ques­
tion in the form of a number of studies which were carried out through 
IK during the period 1939-1945. Through a census which was carried 
out twice a year the work done by the companies in a certain month 
was established, and records were therefore kept of the distribution 
of the work between military orders, export orders and other orders.
5 The conversion has been based on the wholesale price index of the Board of Com­
merce for machinery and means of transport ( 1935 = 100):
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
113 114 131 140 147 150 150 151 155
Source: Statistisk årsbok 1939-1945.
6 The total value of the production 1/9 1939-30/5 1945 can be estimated at 14,656 million 
kronor.
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Diagram 8. Production in the Swedish engineering industry in terms of destination 
of sales.
AprJan AugAprOct MarOci MarSept Aug
939 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 4 4 44 1945
Source: IK: UT. PL. RA.
Domestic civilian 
and for stocks
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The proportion of working hours devoted to the various types of 
production is shown in diagram 8.7 * * * * * * * 15According to this, from April
7 The percentage distribution of workers in various sectors of the whole of the engineer­
ing industry is based on figures for the distribution in larger and smaller companies
respectively, with a dividing line of 100 workers. It has been possible to make the
assessment because of the fact that either the number of working hours or the number
of workers has been known for the two groups. In some cases - 1941, October 1942
and August 1945 - such figures have not been available and the distribution has had 
to be gauged approximately on the basis of known figures. Since the relationship 
was very stable - whether one uses working hours or the number of workers in the
calculation, the larger works account for about 83 per cent of the capacity during the 
period - the approximations do not result in any great uncertainty.
IK’s employment researches do not descend as far in order of size as do the Official 
Statistics, but only list companies with 20 - in 1945 25 - workers. This means that the
number of works in IK’s researches is small in comparison with the latter: at most about
15 per cent. As far as the number of workers is concerned, for the same reason IK's 
researches cover a larger proportion of the material on which the Olficial Statistics 
are based. As is shown in the table below the level of coverage increased from about
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1940 until September 1944 at least 24 per cent of the labour force 
would be engaged in military production, and during the peak period 
in 1942-1943 around 30 per cent. Here a high and remarkably even 
load becomes apparent.
If it is assumed that productivity in the working hours set aside for 
military purposes was the same as for the other hours - and there is no 
reason to assume otherwise - it becomes possible to “translate” the 
percentage proportion of working hours into production values and 
compare the result with the sum calculated on the basis of the money 
granted. The result of such a “translation” is 3,862 million kronor, 
i.e. a higher sum than that which was calculated on the basis of the 
grants.8 According to IK’s records the average load of military orders
two-thirds to more than three quarters up to 1942 and remained as high throughout 
the period.
April 1940 Aug. 1941 April 1942 Oct. 1943 Sept. 1944
1. Number of workers
according to IK 95,000 108,000 130,213 143,626 142,588
2. Number of workers
according to SOS 156,626 159,464 169,561 177,255 180,031
3. 1 as a percentage of 2 61 68 77 81 79
IK UT H 28/40, UT H 29/40, PL H 2c/42, PL H 3/42, PL H 17/44, PL H 25a/44, PL H
2c/45; Handelskommissionens arkiv III AA prot. 18/12 1946 bil. RA.
8 The estimates have been compiled in the following way:
Engineering Proportion of Production for
industry’s production working hours military purposes
in millions of devoted to military in millions of
kronor (SOS) production (IK) % kronor
1939 1/9-30/12 700 7 49
1940 3,138 25 534
1941 2,379 27 642
1942 2,756 30 827
1943 3,085 30 926
1944 3 298 25 824
1945 1/1-30/6 approx. 300 20 60
Total approx. 14,656 3,862
Note: A labour dispute completely paralysed the engineering industry from the begin­
ning of February 1945.
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is 26 per cent which is three per cent higher than the proportion 
calculated above. The difference in the results is probably due mainly 
to the fact that IK’s census did not include the whole engineering 
industry but only applied to companies with more than 20-25 workers. 
Because of this a large number of small companies with a total of 
around a quarter of the engineering workers employed in the country 
disappeared. Since the smaller companies, generally speaking, had a 
smaller share of military orders (see p. 149) one can assume that 
IK’s estimate of the share of military equipment production is some­
what too high if the whole sector of the industry is taken into ac­
count.9 An approximate but more realistic estimate of direct military 
orders’ shares of the total production value of the Swedish engineering 
industry during the period of the war appears on the next page in the 
form of diagram 9 together with the collocation of figures below it.10
How then was the military production fitted into the overall 
development of that sector of industry? During the period in question 
the engineering industry’s international approach and its great 
importance for the armed forces made it dependent to a high degree 
on political and military developments beyond the borders of Sweden. 
Political developments abroad had already had an effect from 1938 
onwards. The general decline in business which could be seen in the 
international economy was counteracted in the case of the engineering 
works by the tendency to rearm in Europe. In addition there was in 
Sweden a continuing high rate of investment both in industry and in
9 Before the five-year plan for 1942-1947 an estimate was compiled within IK of the 
burden in terms of value which the military orders would impose on the engineering 
industry during 1941. The information was supplied by the administrations and SAN 
and included all workshops. The result was 650 million kronor, distributed as follows: 
the army ; 300, the navy: 75, the airforce: 75, joint ammunition: 200. IK KR h 2/42. RA. 
When 10 per cent is deducted for Government production this figure becomes 585 
million kronor, which on the whole is in the same proportion to the estimate of 642 
million kronor according to IK’s percentage rate for 1941 as 3,300 is to 3,862.
Thus this spot check confirms the estimate based on the equipment grants and 
indicates a military share of 23 per cent for the period as a whole.
1(1 The production values have been obtained by a proportional reduction of the yearly
, ■ , , . TI„ , 3,862-3,300production values obtained from IK s percentage rates by —_ 0 -— = 0.143,862
Cf. note 8 above.
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Diagram 9. The production of the engineering industry 1/9 1939-30/5 1945 and 
the proportion of military orders.
millions of kronor
3 500-,
30000
2 500 J
2 000J
1 500J
! OOOJ
500J
42 43 44 1945
1/9-31/12
Total production
Military orders
Source: SOS Industri, IK: UT, PL. RA.
building operations.11 From the beginning the year 1939 was charac­
terized by the threat of war. The increase in the demand for arma­
ments was most apparent as regards weapons and ships.
11 The account of the economic development of the engineering industry is based on 
Meddelanden från konjunkturinstitutet A:2, pp. 44-47; A:3, p. 44; A:4 pp. 4-6, 14-15; 
A:5, pp. 12-13; A:6,p. 15;A:7, pp. 19, 34-35; A:8, pp. 12-14; A:9, pp. 9-14; A:ll, pp. 
5, 74-76; A:12,pp. 76-76.
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Production of the 
engineering industry 
in millions of
kronor (SOS)
Military 
orders in
millions
of kronor
Percentage 
proportion of 
military 
orders
1939 (1/9-) 700 42 6
1940 2,138 459 22
1941 2,379 552 23
1942 2,756 711 26
1943 3,085 796 26
1944 3,298 709 22
1945 (-30/5) 300 52 17
The whole period 14,656 3,321 23
When the war broke out in September 1939 the engineering industry 
in Sweden came under the influence of two main forces which would 
be decisive for the development of the sector for several years to 
come: on the one hand the direct consequences of a blockade and a 
war which affected the prospects of exports and the possibilities of 
being supported by production resources, and on the other hand the 
demands for a rearmament of the Swedish armed forces. However, 
the direct consequences of the new situation took some time to occur. 
Exports declined somewhat during the autumn of 1939, but the decline 
was compensated for by the increase in Government orders for 
military equipment. The unprecedentedly large building programme 
for 1939 still acted as a major stimulus for demand.
It is possible to say with a certain justification that the Swedish 
economy during the first months of the war was still a peace economy. 
As the autumn and winter wore on ever greater demands were made 
for production results. Exports were stepped up, especially after the 
outbreak of the Finnish Winter War. The increased demands from 
several quarters resulted in an increase in the production of the 
engineering industry to absolute maximum figures and in the capacity 
of machinery and manpower being used to the utmost.
The situation was to alter in several respects during the course 
of 1940. The Finnish War came to an end, domestic building opera­
tions were on the decline, and Sweden’s trading connections to the 
west were cut off by the German occupation of Denmark and Norway
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in April. The importance of external developments is reflected in the 
export figures from the first months of 1940.12
The value of the exports in 1940 as a percentage of 1936-1938.
Machinery, means of transport, instruments et cetera
January 217
February 125
March 115
April 82
May 62
The exports which took place after April 1940 went almost exclusively 
southwards. In spite of the fact that Government orders for military 
equipment now began to mount up, the engineering industry expe­
rienced a slowing down in demand in the summer of 1940. This was 
to a certain extent connected with the fact that orders for military 
equipment were short-term and related to lighter equipment such as 
ammunition. The acute demands were met with comparative rapidity, 
and new orders were not placed at a corresponding rate. The situation 
stabilized in the autumn of 1940 and there was once more an increase 
in production. This is connected to some extent with the fact that the 
production of certain items which was stimulated by the war situation 
gathered momentum. For example producer-gas units were manu­
factured at a remarkably rapid rate from the month of September on­
wards. One tenth of the working hours of the engineering industry 
were used for the production and adaptation of these. The electrifica­
tion of the rural areas and the production of carbide lamps were other 
fields in which operations were stepped up for reasons of prepared­
ness.
In the meantime longer term rearmament was planned. The produc­
tion of aircraft, tanks and vehicles amongst other things began to be 
organized. As far as making room in the engineering industry for the 
extensive production of military equipment was concerned, the 
situation in 1941 was quite different from the situation in the first 
year of the war. During the winter of 1939/40 in particular Govern-
12 Meddelanden från konjunkturinstitutet A:6, p. 59.
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ment orders had come into conflict with the companies' other under­
takings, but developments during 1940 resulted in the emergence of a 
reserve capacity which the engineering works were glad to use up in 
producing goods for domestic military requirements. The increase in 
the total production from 1941 was not generally speaking limited by 
any capacity ceiling but rather by the supply of raw materials and 
fuel and also - from the spring of 1942 - a certain shortage of labour.13 
The Government’s allocation according to priorities - with military 
requirements well in mind - determined the size of the production 
in the strictly controlled economy which had developed by this time.
From the autumn of 1941 onwards the development had entered a 
phase of stability. Up to and including the year 1943 the relations 
between production for a civilian domestic market, an export market 
and Government orders for military equipment were comparatively 
stable (see diagram 8). The Government orders now related above all 
to heavier equipment and claimed about a quarter of the capacity of 
the engineering works. The export production which had accounted 
for at least one-third of the total before the war now comprised 
about one-eighth. The World War also determined the concentration 
of the rest of the production to a not insignificant extent; this applied 
for example to investments in machinery and buildings for the produc­
tion of military equipment or replacement production of various 
kinds.
This “wartime boom period" resulted in an increase in the volume 
of production of the engineering industry during the period 1941-1943. 
From the spring of 1944 conditions had reverted to those of the 
pre-war period inasmuch as the demand once more determined the 
size of the production. The military orders declined as the equipment 
confirmed in the rearmament plan was completed and the emergency 
demands abated. At the same time developments on the battlefields,
13 During the years 1941-1943 the employment level was around 90 per cent of the 
capacity for the larger works and between 75 and 80 per cent for the smaller. Thus 
certain parts of the production capacity - those which could not be devoted to military 
purposes - were not used at all. Often the companies in question were simply not 
given the allocation of raw materials and power. In 1944 too the larger companies' use 
of their capacity declined towards 80 per cent. By this point in time the total demand 
had been reduced. IKPL h 2c/42, 17/44, 25 a/44, PM angående sysselsättning 12/6 1946. 
RA.
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primarily within “Festung Europa”, disturbed the export situation. 
On the domestic market developments were uncertain in the face of 
what the peace which was now in sight would bring about. A certain 
increase in the building of houses was the only upswing factor. Not 
until there was the threat of a conflict on the labour market did a 
recovery in production occur in the autumn of 1944.
The total strike within the engineering industry during the months 
February-July 1945 makes it more difficult to interpret developments 
during the final stages of the war. The factors which created the 
demand situation in 1944 were still in fact operative in 1945: declining 
military orders, export problems, a cautious domestic market. During 
the strike production requirements were dammed up and manifested 
themselves in high production figures for the second half of the year 
1945 and the beginning of the year 1946. The continuing development 
during the latter year in fact showed that the post-war picture had 
not yet become clear and that the expansion of the post-war period 
with its large increase in exports had not yet begun in earnest.
Summarising the development for the whole engineering industry, 
it can be established that during the period of the war Government
Table 12. Work on military orders within parts of the engineering industry. 
As a percentage of the total work.
Sept. 1940 April 1942 Oct. 1943 Sept. 1944
Machine industry, heavy 37 49 48 30
Machine industry, light 35 31 27 26
Car and engine factories 23 74 71 70
Shipyards 21 19 13 7
Elec, machines and appl. 34 18 21 17
Accumulators and cables - - 26 15
Foundries 24 20 16 11
Sheet-metal industry, heavy 29 25 19 16
Sheet-metal industry, light 34 34 35 32
Tool, nut and bolt industry 18 30 24 21
Instrument factories 40 39 39 46
Accessory factories 4 52 32 26
Metal goods factories 39 53 38 29
Source: IK UT H 28; PL H 1/42, 2c/42, 25a/44. RA.
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Diagram 10. The development of the production of certain branches of the engineering 
industry.
millions of kronor
Engineering works and foundries
Machine and motor factories
'Shipyards and shipbuilding
.Car and coachwork factories 
including trucks and vehicles
Source: SOS Industri. 
Note: Logarithmic scale.
orders did not merely replace the vanished exports but also allowed 
that sector of industry to expand. Thanks to its strategic importance 
the engineering industry was favoured by being given the production 
resources which it needed for its expansion. Problems of adjustment 
only arose in 1940 and 1944. but they were not very profound and 
they entailed no serious consequences for the industry as a whole.
The picture of the quantitative role of the military orders for the 
engineering industry will be amplified somewhat in two respects: the 
distribution between the parts of this sector of industry and the 
distribution between companies of various sizes.
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A comparison between different parts of the engineering industry 
shows that the military orders were unevenly distributed.
During the summer and autumn of 1940 the machine industry - 
which was the dominant one and employed about one-third of the 
workers from the engineering works - experienced a certain general 
decline and the military orders were very unevenly distributed. 
Because the rearmament was stepped up, from the autumn of 1941 
and for about two years thereafter the heavy machine industry’s 
share of the orders for military equipment increased by getting on for 
half, while there was a slow decline in the figures for the light machine 
industry. During this period this part of the engineering industry 
worked close to the limit of its capacity.
The car and motor industry's development resembled that of the 
heavy machine industry but was even more dramatic. This branch of 
the industry which employed about 5 per cent of the workers in the 
engineering industry as a whole was hard hit at the outbreak of the 
war. The civilian market practically disappeared and it was not 
possible to change over rapidly to other production. The manu­
facturing of producer-gas units provided short-lived relief. However, 
when the picture of the equipment requirements of the Swedish 
armed forces had become clear and the adjustment had taken place 
within the companies it was precisely the car and motor industry 
which concentrated most heavily on the production of military 
equipment. As a result of this the total production was also in­
creased. Towards the end of 1944 two-thirds of the capacity was 
still used for military orders. These were mainly responsible for the 
increase in production which took place within the car and motor 
industry after 1941 (see diagram 10).
There was no similar development within the shipbuilding industry. 
The work in hand on military orders was comparatively small and 
already showed a tendency to decline from 1942 onwards. New civil 
shipbuilding and repair work provided the main employment for the 
expanding shipbuilding industry (see diagram 10).
Of the other branches of the engineering industry the electrical and 
the sheet-metal industries were the largest. Both were characterized 
by the fact that they reached their maximum shares of military 
equipment production early on, and these did not in fact exceed the 
share of the engineering industry as a whole to any appreciable 
degree.
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During the whole period under investigation engineering works 
with more than 100 workers had a greater share of military orders 
than companies with between 20 (1945 25) and 100 workers. As is 
shown in diagram 11 the percentage figures for works with more than 
100 workers from January 1941 to March 1944 range from 28 to 34 
while the figures for the latter companies range from 15 to 19. The 
difference is accentuated somewhat during the period under investiga­
tion; the smaller workshops reach their maximum percentage figure, 
19 per cent, in August 1941 and only attain it again in March 1943, 
while the larger engineering works increase their percentages to new 
maximum figures in April 1942 and March 1943.
Diagram 11. The share of military orders at the larger and smaller engineering works 
respectively.
arger
- smaller
!939 4o
Source: IK: UT, PL. RA.
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Diagram 12. The accumulated share of the total working hours spent on military 
production within the engineering industry. The ten biggest manufacturers.
. October 1946
September
1940
23^56789 10 number of companies
Source: IK: (. ( , PL. RA.
An indication of a shift towards the larger engineering works is 
also given by the fact that in September 1940 the larger works (95) 
accounted for just over half of the military production and in April 
1942 the larger works (224) accounted for over 90 per cent of that 
production.14
For some points in time it is possible to study the work of the 
engineering companies in detail. Thus diagram 12 shows how large a 
share of the total production of military equipment was accounted 
for by the ten leading companies in September 1940 and April 1942. 
From this it is possible to distinguish a clear tendency towards in­
creased concentration: ten works account for getting on for twice 
as large a share in 1942 as in 1940. Clear evidence of continuing 
concentration after the conclusion of peace is to be found in the fact 
that in October 1946 three companies accounted for half of the produc-
14IK UT h 28; PL h 2 c/42. RA.
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tion of military equipment.15 In 1940 three companies accounted for 
16 per cent, and in 1942 for 22 per cent.
The explanation for the apparent concentration is mainly to be 
found in the change in character of the acquisition of military equip­
ment: at the beginning of the war it was a question of looking after 
all the available capacity in order to make grenades and manufacture 
light equipment of all kinds. Gradually the emphasis shifted to heavier 
objects such as tanks and aircraft, and there was a concentration 
around certain larger companies. Diagram 12 certainly gives an 
exaggerated picture of the absolute level of concentration, since a 
large number of sub-contractors were attached to the bigger com­
panies, but the trend towards concentration is nevertheless unmis­
takable .
The companies which crystallized into the large suppliers of 
equipment to the armed forces in the middle of the period under 
investigation differed greatly from each other. Bofors continued to 
play its central role as a specialized military equipment company 
both before and after the war. Husqvarna Vapenfabrik was the 
largest of the other weapon manufacturers, but only just over one- 
third of it was concentrated on military production. SAAB developed 
into a large new company for the production of military equipment 
and in 1943 surpassed Bofors in the number of working hours devoted 
to defence supplies. A number of companies were attached to SAAB 
which were to an equally great extent engendered by the rearmament, 
above all Svenska Flygmotor. In the long term the establishment of 
this group which concentrated on aircraft manufacturing was the most 
important result of the rearmament of the Second World War as far as 
industry was concerned. In consequence the Swedish war industry 
had expanded greatly by the time the war was over.
Another important group of suppliers were the car and motor 
manufacturers, with Scania Vabis and Volvo as the most important 
companies. This sector of industry concentrated to a very great extent 
on the production of military equipment in the years 1941-1944 but 
in this case the phenomenon was more ephemeral: in an abnormal 
situation - after certain problems of adjustment - the Government
15 IK UT h 28; PL h 1/42; PM 12/6 1946; Handelskommissionen III AA. Prot. 18/12 
1946. bil. RA.
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orders replaced the vanished civil market. Thanks to their production 
structure the car industry and the motor industry were never to 
become as dependent on Government orders as the manufacturing 
group connected with aircraft production.
A further important group of workshops were the shipyards, 
amongst which Eriksberg and Kockum were the armed forces' largest 
suppliers. Neither these companies nor - even less - that sector of 
industry as a whole concentrated to an extreme degree on Govern­
ment production. During the whole of the period under investigation 
there was a strong civil demand for repairs and the building of new 
ships both within Sweden and abroad. Extensive work was carried 
out, not least on behalf of the Germans. In the long term the ship­
building industry was not affected by the period of rearmament as 
far as its approach to production was concerned.
In concluding the discussion of the quantitative importance of the 
military orders it should be observed that the engineering industry was 
far more dependent in practice on Government orders than is shown
Diagram 13. Profits, dividends and funding in relation to companies’ own capital.
profit after tax
■' dividends 
'funding
I9Ô7 3Ô 43 44 1945
Source: Vinster, utdelningar, produktion och investeringar inom industrien 1937-1947, 
p. 48.
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by the figures produced here. In many cases production for the armed 
forces demanded major readjustments with new investments in the 
form of buildings, machinery and tools which made demands on the 
resources of the domestic engineering industry. If the scope of the 
question is widened to include the inquiry as to how much of the engi­
neering industry's production was connected with the country’s gene­
ral emergency situation which resulted from the war, further important 
factors emerge. The most important of these was probably con­
nected with the actual or apprehended shortage of imported fuels: 
it fell to the engineering industry to acquire the materials for a 
stepping-up of electrification, and also to produce all the carbide 
lamps, bicycles, producer-gas units and the numerous installations 
which were required when wood was to replace coal for heating and 
industrial power. If in addition the picture is taken to include the 
altered conditions of competition both within and outside Sweden 
resulting from the western blockade, hardly any company escaped the 
influence of the exceptional conditions during the period in question.
B. Trading results
The first part of this chapter has concentrated on outside conditions 
for the development of the engineering industry, in which production 
for military purposes played an essential role. The question which the 
text which follows will attempt to answer is whether the expansion 
of the engineering industry in volume of production was parallelled 
by an increase in financial results or whether the difficulties as far as 
production resources were concerned or the extra taxes necessitated 
by the war imposed such a strain on the companies that business 
profitability deteriorated.
The most readily available gauge of the profitability of a sector of 
industry is the yield received from capital invested in the companies. 
The dividend paid to the shareholders then becomes the yardstick to 
be used. However, company managements might for various reasons 
take differing views as to how much of the profit ought to be paid 
out as dividends. In general terms it can be said that the trend of 
the development during the 1930s was towards the payment out of an 
ever decreasing share of the profit, while an increasing share was
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Diagram i4. The allocation of profits before tax.
°//o
taxes
dividends
funding
937 36
Source: Vinster, utdelningar, produktion och investeringar inom industrien 1937-1947, 
p. 48.
retained within the company, e.g. in the form of funds of various 
kinds.16 In this case it would appear necessary, when estimating the 
development of profitability, also to take into consideration that part 
of the profit which is retained within the company.
Certain basic material for a discussion of the relations between 
own capital and profit, dividend and funding is given in diagram 13. 
It is based on a representative sample of 39 of the larger companies 
within the metal industry.17
16Index. SvenskaHandelsbankens tidskrift juni 1942, p. 15.
17 The diagram is based on information provided by Industriens utredningsinstitut: 
Vinster, utdelningar, produktion och investeringar inom industrien 1937-1947, p. 48. 
The survey comprised 39 companies within the metal industry whose own capital was 
as follows (in millions of kronor):
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
356 366 370 379 399 418 439 443 470
The reorganization of the tax collecting system in 1945 makes it very difficult to 
estimate the tax for that year.
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As a result of the outbreak of the war in 1939 the profit fell, but 
there was a speedy recovery and a certain nominal increase took place 
during the period up to 1944. Thus in relation to the companies’ 
increasing own capital the profit amounted to about 7-8 per cent. 
After a lower level of dividends was paid temporarily in 1939 and 
1940, this allowed for a remarkably stable dividend policy with the 
4.5 per cent of the pre-war years as a target. Nor did the development 
preclude a funding on the same level as before the war.18
There is a natural explanation for the stability of dividends from 
1942 onwards: an Act of 5 February 1943 imposed a limitation on 
dividends with effect from the dividend for 1942. The companies were 
not allowed to increase the dividend in relation to their own capital 
above the level for the period 1938-1940.19
One question which is of particular interest during the years under 
consideration is the effect of taxes on the profitability of the com­
panies. During the war years an increased burden of taxation was
18 Supplementary information can be obtained from Svenska Handelsbankens tid­
skrift Index (juni 1943, p. 13, juni 1944, p. 17, maj 1945, p. 17), which carried out a 
survey of 24-26 companies on the same basis. The following table shows the results:
Own capital 
in millions of
kronor
Net profit
%
Dividend
%
Funding
%
Note
1939 - 10.5 6.5 4.0 26 companies
1940 - 8.4 6.3 2.1 26 companies
1941 695.4 9.26 6.49 3.0 24 companies
1942 745.9 8.85 6.10 3.1 25 companies
1943 759.7 8.82 6.23 3.0 25 companies
1944 760.7 8.12 6.22 2.4 26 companies
Note: For 1939 and 1940 there are no absolute figures available. The percentage 
figures are rough estimates from a diagram in the Index.
One defect in the information is the inclusion of Grangesbergsbolaget which explains 
the poorer result for 1944 (in that year the company’s profit fell by 20 million kronor 
as a result of developments in the war in Europe).
Otherwise the survey confirms the conclusions drawn in the text: stable dividends 
and funding after a certain weakness at the outbreak of the war.
19 Cf. Affärsvärlden 8/4 1943. SFS 1943.
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imposed on industry. The Government tax was the heavy item; during 
the years 1939-1944 it accounted for more than 70 per cent of the total 
tax collected while the municipal tax amounted to 25-30 per cent and a 
percentage went towards the special war profits tax.20 The increase 
in the burden of taxation is clearly shown in diagram 14 which is based 
on the same sample of companies as diagram 13. It is a remarkable 
fact that in spite of the sharp increase in the provisions for taxes the 
engineering works were able to maintain dividends and funding on a 
fairly stable level in comparison with the pre-war period. The explana­
tion obviously lies in the fact that profits were higher. In relation to 
the companies' own capital they developed as follows:21
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
% 11 10 10 13 14 13 15 16
However, to arrive at a true estimate of the possibilities of profitable 
business for the engineering works it is not enough to take into 
consideration the book profit and allowances for tax payments. To 
these should be added write-offs, on machinery and stock for 
example, and surplus dispositions of other kinds such as transfers 
to pension funds, et cetera. With the inclusion of “invisible” profit 
dispositions of this kind it would be possible to calculate a “gross 
profit” which would reflect more adequately the economic situation 
of that sector of industry.
20 Vinster, utdelningar, produktion och investeringar inom industrien 1937-1947. IUl 
1947,p. 48.
21 In absolute figures the profit (in millions of kronor) was:
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
39 38 38 49 55 54 64 69
The companies’ own capital is shown in note 17 above.
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A priori one might expect that the engineering works - to the extent 
which the profit development allowed - made substantial provisions 
of the kinds mentioned above during the period 1939-1945. First of 
all the companies had been faced with an increased tax demand which 
was connected with the war situation and could therefore be regarded 
as temporary. Thus there were grounds, at least for the time being, 
for retaining untaxed profits within the companies. Certainly an inner 
consolidation of this kind also seemed desirable in the light of experi­
ences from the First World War. Then the profits, in many cases 
splendid, of the war years had been eaten up rapidly by war profits 
taxation and a post-war depression. As regards the engineering 
industry part of the investments during the war years were directly 
concentrated on the production of military equipment. It would be 
natural if there was a desire to write off such investments more 
rapidly than usual since they in fact ran the risk of becoming more 
or less worthless when the war came to an end. The war also brought 
with it other investments, in shelters for example, for which special 
write-offs could be justified.
Finally, the period after 1938 was very liberal as far as allowing the 
writing down of the value of different items was concerned. The 
legislation of 1928 provided that “income from trading should be 
calculated on a bookkeeping basis". The bookkeeping of stocks was 
to correspond with “good business practice" which was soon to mean 
that on the whole they could be written down to an unlimited extent. 
Thereafter a change in the law gave the right from 1938 onwards to 
write off machinery and inventories just as freely. A further step in 
the development took place when the Supreme Administrative Court 
in a judgment about an income tax assessment for the year 1943 held 
that goods contracted for should be placed in the same category as 
goods delivered as far as write-offs were concerned. Thus this made it 
possible for a company to order raw materials and even before they 
had arrived - which could take a long time because of the wide­
spread shortage of goods during the war years - use them for write­
offs. During the last year of the war the view was widely held that 
because of this the development had gone too far and that the free 
write-offs should be limited. It had been the intention of the legislature 
that the power to write-off should act as a buffer against fluctuations 
in the economic situation and not that it should be used for tax eva-
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sion, which, in the opinion of many people, was what was now 
happening.22
In the very nature of things it is difficult to establish the existence of 
and quantify “invisible” funding. However, some contemporary 
investigations can indicate the main features of the development.
In 1944 the National Price Control Board compiled an estimate 
of the “gross profits”, i.e. taking invisible provisions into considera­
tion, of 261 companies representing all sectors of industry. This 
estimate can appropriately be placed side by side with calculations 
of profits compiled by the Industrial Institute for Economic and 
Social Research and relating to 133 companies.23
No far-reaching conclusions can be drawn from the comparison 
between the lines in diagram 15 since the samples of companies are 
different. But it should be borne in mind that both samples have 
started with the larger companies and worked downwards, and that 
the 133 companies in the smaller sample should therefore be taken to 
be included in and constitute the bulk of the larger sample. The profit 
capacity and the tendency towards “invisible” fundings have proved 
to be greater amongst the larger companies.24 Using the same sample 
of companies to calculate the gross profit as for the calculation of the 
profit before tax there is a sound basis for the assumption that the 
tendency towards an increase in the gross profit had been reinforced. 
In its present form the diagram shows that potential tendencies 
towards hidden profit dispositions during the pre-war years which
22 Annell, G., PM rörande nedskrivning av varulager i beskattningshänseende; Kungl. 
Maj-.ts prop, nr 377 1945. Reply to the submission of the account by, inter alia, the 
County Administrations, the Audit Court and the Government taxation comittee of 
1944. Observations about the trend towards ever increasing write-offs and appropria­
tions before the final calculation of the profit are to be found in a large number of 
balance-sheet commentaries in Affärsvärlden. See for example 15/5 1941, pp. 400-401. 
26/3 1942, p. 230, 2/7 1942, p. 253, 9/9 1943, p. 666, 1/6 1944, p. 458;
Västhagen, N.,De fria avskrivningarna, passim;
The final accounts of the larger limited companies for 1940 with special reference to 
the disposition of the profits (in: Meddelanden frän konjunkturinstitutet ser. A: 8 bil. 1); 
Meddelanden frän konjunkturinstitutet A: 11, pp. 72-74.
23 Vinster, utdelningar vid större industriföretag 1934-1943 IUI 1944, p. 11.
24 See for example Government taxation committee of 1944: 1. Betänkande med för­
slag till förfarande vid avveckling av krigskonjunkturbeskattningen (SOU 1944:62), 
pp. 48, 51.
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Diagram 15. Gross profits and profits before tax of the larger industrial companies.
939=100
jross profit 
'261 companies)
profit before- tax 
(133 companies)
Source: Vinster och utdelningar vid större industriföretag, p. 11.
were favourable as regards the economic situation were accentuated 
during the war. In 1945 certain investigations were carried out into the 
writing-down of stocks and goods contracted for, in connection with 
a proposal for a change in the law designed to curtail the right to free 
write-offs. The books for the year 1943 showed that the practice 
varied in this connection, but that there were often very large writing- 
downs. In one case six companies whose stocks consisted mainly of 
iron and steel products had written them down by between 55 and 87 
per cent. Expressed in “pre-war prices” the stocks, worth 186 million 
kronor, had been written down by 129 million kronor, which meant 
that about 300 million kronor, according to the current value of 
money, was available as a reserve. In addition goods contracted for 
had been written down by 25 million kronor.25
25 Annell, passim.
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In 1944 the general taxation committee for that year published a 
report which contained certain criticisms of the relationship between 
stock values shown and stock values at pre-war prices. In this con­
nection it was emphasised that the larger companies above all, 
especially those within the iron and metal industry, had built up large 
hidden stock reserves. In 1942 the stocks within this sector of in­
dustry, - which were particularly large in engineering works and 
shipyards - were valued at 618 million kronor in pre-war prices, and 
were shown at 438 million kronor. With a price increase estimated 
at 50 per cent this meant that the stocks were written down to less 
than half of their market value and that as a result a reserve of at least 
450 million kronor had been created. The major part of the writing- 
down had taken place in relation to goods contracted for.26
Write-offs and other dispositions designed to retain profits within 
companies apparently took place on a large scale. These invisible 
fundings reinforce the picture already obtained of a positive develop­
ment of profitability in the engineering industry during the period 
1940-1944.
The war years also saw vigorous investment activity within the 
engineering works. A comparison between the situation at the end of 
the war and the situation at the beginning of the war shows that the 
production capacity increased by about 25 per cent. This meant that 
the country’s capacity to be self-sufficient had increased by 50-60 
million kronor, or 15-20 per cent of the imports of engineering 
products of the pre-war period. Within certain groups of goods in 
particular, such as machine tools, electrical appliances, tractors and 
other agricultural machinery, instruments and office machines there 
was a considerable increase in production resources.
The reasons for the extensive investments were to be found in the 
demand for military production and also for ersatz production when 
the imports were disrupted. During the first year of the war there 
were high figures for investments above all in machinery, but after 
that there was something of a slowing-down. By virtue of the fact that 
the more long-term production of military equipment and the ersatz
26 The survey includes companies with a sales production value equivalent to about 
half of what is listed in the official statistics. 1944 års allmänna skatte kommitté. 1. 
(SOU 1944:62), pp. 48-52.
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production began to speed up from the second half of 1941 onwards 
the investments increased again, more rapidly now, with a greater 
proportion of buildings and other more permanent objects. The 
increase in the investment figures continued in the years 1942 and 
1943 which show the highest figures for the period (see diagram 
16).28
Although the particular needs of the war years lay behind some of 
the capital investments the development did not mean that this part of 
industry was ill prepared for the coming of peace. The bulk of the 
investments consisted of buildings, machinery and appliances which 
could also be used after adjustment for the civil market.29 The 
stepped-up production of the years 1939-1943 had involved no wear 
and tear as far as capital was concerned. Instead, industry had
28Utredning angående ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering. 1. (SOU 1944:7), pp. 81, 
107-108.
The four sectors of industry accounted for 95 and 93 per cent of the engineering 
industry’s total investments in 1942 and 1943 respectively.
29 In 1943 the percentage distribution of investments was as shown in the following 
table (according to Utredningar angående ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering 1. (SOU 
1944:7), pp. 81, 107-108):
Industrial
buildings
Other
production
establish­
ments
Machinery,
appliances
Housing Shelters Total invest­
ment
% in million
of
kronor
Engineering 
industry total 38 8 45 5 3 99 164
including 
Iron and steel 
manufacturing 34 4 48 12 1 99 13
Engineering
works 38 8 48 3 4 101 93
Shipyards 47 15 32 3 4 101 18
Electro-tech­
nological
industry 35 5 46 11 3 100 24
11 - The Creation .
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Diagram 16. Yearly investments within the engineering industry.
[Till Ii CPS
L.....] iron and steel manufacturing
i. . .1. 1 Shipyards
[_J Edectric technology industry
Krul Engineering works
of Krono. .
42 43 1944
Source: Utredningar angående ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering 1, pp. 107-108.
strengthened its position through new investments.30 It is part of the 
picture that the extensive investments had been canned out in the main 
with the companies ' own capital. The companies only had to issue new 
shares to an insignificant extent and were seldom restricted to 
borrowing from banks or through bond issues.31 The engineering 
industry emerged from the war years well equipped for a peace- 
orientated production.
C. The price-fixing of military orders
An assessment of the role of the Government orders in the engineering 
industry’s production volume was made in the first part of this 
chapter. On the other hand the question of the profitability of these
30Meddelanden från Konjunkturinstitutet A:ll, pp. 82-84; A: 12. pp. 34-39, 58-59; 
Dahmén, E., Den industriella investeringsverksamhetens utveckling (in: Meddelanden 
från Konjunkturinstitutet B:3, pp. 120-130).
31 During the period 1939-1944 heavy industry including engineering works financed 
about 70 per cent of their investments through write-offs and profit reservations. 
Dahmén, E., Finansieringen av industrins investeringar 1939-1944 (in: Inkomster och 
investeringar inom industrien 1939-1944. IUI 1945); see also Meddelanden från 
Konjunkturinstitutet A:ll, p. 65.
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very orders - as distinct from other orders - and thus their impor­
tance for the profit development of that sector of industry has not 
been discussed. Even with access to complete internal accounting 
material it would be very difficult to answer this question in respect of 
an engineering works which was engaged at the same time in produc­
tion for the military and the civil market. Such an aim would be 
inconsistent with the object of this account, which is to keep the 
whole of the Swedish engineering industry in focus. To the extent to 
which it is possible to draw conclusions about the value of the pro duc­
tion of military equipment for the industry they must be indirect and 
based on more general considerations.
The most important factor for estimating the value of the military 
orders is the price-fixing of military equipment. When a Swedish war 
administration began to take shape at the end of 1939, the question 
naturally arose as to the establishment of some form of organization 
for the review of the prices of supplies to the armed forces, it was 
difficult to conceive of a free price-fixing for several reasons. A sharp 
increase in prices would obviously occur since the military cus­
tomers would be forced to place orders in competition with domestic 
civilian production and export demands. In the Swedish engineering 
industry the pressure of demand was very strong during the autumn 
and winter of 1939-1940. During previous years it had been possible to 
make military purchases under different conditions in which the 
companies’ need for supplementary production in recessions and off­
season was often exploited.32 The acquisition of military equipment 
which took place under the auspices of certain provisions of the law, 
such as the general law of dispositions or the law of requisitioning, 
would in addition, according to the provisions of the law, be priced 
either by the National Valuation Board or through step by step 
negotiations between the parties. The latter applied to the so-called 
“war supply contracts” which the military administrations had made
32 The head of PR 22/2-21/10 1940, R. Rausing, in an article entitled Några synpunkter 
vid prissättning av krigsleveranser (EkonomiskTidskrift 1941), pp. 18-28. described his 
experience of the problems of price-fixing. Summaries of PR’s operations have been 
compiled by the Board: Prisbyråns verksamhet och resultat (author not disclosed), 
PM 4/9 1941 (H. Throne-Hoist, head of PR from 22/10 1940 to 30/9 1942) and PM 
oktober 1945 (E. Larsson, head of PR from 1/10 1942 to 15/10 1945). IK PR BIEl 
(öppna, arkivet). RA.
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Ruben Rausing worked out the basic fea­
tures of the price policy as head of the 
Price Board of the National Industry Com­
mission in 1940 and as a member of the 
Commission in 1941-1943 (Pressens Bild).
with certain companies and which imposed on the companies the 
obligation to supply specified products when called upon to do so.33 
On 17 January 1940 the Price Board of the National Industry 
Commission (PR) was set up to assist with this price-fixing.
To a limited extent the Board’s tasks were to be the very ones 
mentioned above. The system of war supply contracts was abandoned 
soon after the outbreak of war and instead the purchasing armed
33The Government’s acquisition of military equipment was partly controlled by the 
Requisition Act of 31 March 1938 (SFS 1938/87) paragraph 11 of which provided that 
compensation was to be paid on the basis of a valuation made by a National Valua­
tion Board consisting of five people, of which the chairman and two members were 
appointed by the King in Council, and two members were chosen by the chairman 
from candidates proposed by the Board of Commerce and the National Board of 
Agriculture. Paragraph 31 of the Requisition Act (SFS 1938/304) imposed a duty to 
supply the necessary documents and information.
According to the Disposition Act of 22 June 1939 (SFS 1939/293) which was brought 
into force by ordinance on 6 September 1939 (SFS 1939/624), reasonable compensation 
was to be paid after investigation by the National Valuation Board. This Act was to be 
applied to a very small extent (only against Bofors in the autumn of 1939).
The regulations for war resulting from war supply contracts were set out in a pro­
clamation by the King in Council of 2 December 1938 "med vissa bestämmelser om 
krigsleveranser m.m.” (SFS 663/1938). A separate Act of 14 October 1939 (SFS 
726/1939) imposed an obligation to give information about the cost of such war supplies.
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forces administration signed supply contracts in which the prices had 
been fixed or in which a so-called price clause was included which 
provided that the price in the contract was a maximum price and 
that the actual price would be fixed through negotiations after a 
report from PR. In the event of a disagreement the question would 
be referred to an arbitrating body with a representative of each of the 
parties and a third from the Board of Commerce.34 With the new 
forms of contract PR’s tasks were on the whole the same as before but 
there was a difference, viz. that there was no longer any foundation in 
the form of legal provisions for PR's power to examine the accounts 
of the companies and the basis of their calculations, and this was to 
bring about certain difficulties.35
PR’s main task was to work out principles for price-fixing and to get 
them accepted by the representatives of industry. No guidelines 
existed for this work. At a conference on 16 April 1940 certain, 
“principles of price-fixing” were presented, which had been worked 
out within PR, These provided amongst other things that compensa­
tion for the replacement value of raw materials and other costs of 
materials was allowed to be included in the cost estimate. Furthermore 
compensation for all variable costs was allowed to be included, 
as was compensation for the fixed costs directly attributable to the 
production in question. No consideration was given to the imbalance 
which resulted when a part of the workshop could not be used because 
another part was being used for industrial production for the war. 
Write-offs were calculated on the basis of a reasonable replacement 
value and “in accordance with the normal practice” of the industry 
and the establishments in question in each case. The depreciation 
figures were lower for old establishments but investments which had 
been made exclusively for the production of military equipment were 
allowed to be written off completely within the delivery period. Inter­
est and profit were both to be allowed in sums corresponding to a 
reasonable return of interest on all working capital in the parts of the 
companies affected by the deliveries. Sales and administration costs
34 War supply contracts during the war years were mainly signed by SAN-KKV but 
purchases also took place outside these. PM beträffande krigsleveranskontrakt. IK 
KR 30/42. RA.
35 PM 25/4 1947. IK PR B 11:1 (öppna arkivet). RA.
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were allowed to be included in the cost estimate to the extent to which 
they were attributable to the Government orders. Certain other items 
were not allowed to be included, such as the writing down of unsale 
able stock, interest on accounts receivable, collection expenses and 
bad debts. Special interest was paid in cases where companies went 
over from working in one shift to working in several shifts, when in 
fact certain kinds of costs, such as interest, write-offs and other fixed 
costs, could not be presumed to increase proportionately with the 
production, it was suggested that the procedure should be for compa­
nies to prepare estimates of costs in accordance with the guidelines 
above. Where appropriate a “normal estimate” and a “multiple shift 
estimate” should both be prepared. These should be certified and 
signed by a person responsible within the company. FR reserved the 
right to examine the basis on which a company calculated its costs, 
i ' • thorized auditor or its own staff.38
As ”ci! be seen the principles of price-fixing were expressed in very 
s and ira I 1 j j ■> • vague
phrases. St was for example difficult to calculate the replacement 
value of raw materials, not least because many raw materials were 
impossible to obtain on account of tire blockade. As a rule estimates 
in such cases had to be based on prices of 1939. It was also difficult to 
conditions for writing-off and profit margins, 
having regard to the great variety of conditions prevailing within 
ir i \ eft open for individual negoti n.
However, the representatives of industry were not prepared to 
subscribe unconditionally to the principles formulated by PB.. There 
t it ■ he arena. The procedure
for t la i of price • msidered unnecessary as far as
■ i d a i for the industry were
. I >->h the Government was the customer. Oi 1
regard to purely military equipment was it possible to consider such 
a usti I v mai 1 that tl
36 Grursder for prissättningen av industriens krigsleveranser
I* 1 -.i X av tillverkningskostnader för krigsleveranser vid
övergång från enskifts- till flerskiftsarbete. 
rid 2. PM angående beräkning av försäljnings- och administrationskostnader vid 
krigsleveranser.
IKPR B 11:1 (öppna arkivet;. RA.
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estimates should be made more flexible according to circumstances 
than had been suggested by PR, However, the two most important 
areas of dispute were the question of compensation far an imbalance 
and the difficulty that the price was not alw * t
1 - £ an, which industry found unsatisfactory. PR’s motive for not 
agreeing that the cost of idle parts of a factory should not be a burden 
on the production in other parts was that this would weaken the 
incentive to work off imbalances and that the Government orders 
would de facto acquire the character of a subsidy. The difficulties in 
determining the precise reason why a department stood idle were 
apparently great; export difficulties and the shortage of materials 
might also be behind it. As regards the start of the production PR 
referred to the fact that the rearmament was taking place in great 
haste and that it was not always pot the
price had been agreed on. It was also frequently a case of producing 
articles without previous experience which made it very difficult to 
work out realistic prices. PR declared that it had the greatest interest 
itself in prices being fixed as soon as possible; it was totally opposed 
to production on a running account.37
The fiercest resistance carne from the Swedish Association of 
Engine Makers which, after a long-drawn-c it disf only agreed 
orally towards the end of 1941 to recommend negotiation with PR to 
its members.38 The Federation of Swedish Industry’s publication 
“Standard Principles for the Calculation of Prime Costs” appears to 
have been of great importance for the many cost estimates during the 
war years.39 it was a practical handbook for a company’s calculation 
at production values; it was reprinted in 1940 and numerous refer­
ences to it are to be found in discussions of prices. A modus vivendi 
was fairly soon achieved between the parties. It seems that in general 
there was fairly smooth cooperation and no-one chose to press any 
question of price-fixing as far as resort to the arbitration procedure.
How then was PR’s work carried out in practice? The customers
37PM 4/9 !94!. (H. Throne-Hoist) IR PR B 11:1 (öppna arkivet). RA: Rausing, 
passim.
33Brevvaxling mellan PR och Sveriges Maskinindustriförening 17/4 1940-16/9 1941. 
IK PR B II: i (öppna arkivet). RA.
39 Enhetliga principer för självkostnadsberäkningar jämte normer rörande enhetlig ter-
stnadsberäkning.
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KATD, KMF, FCFF and SAN-KKV, made agreements with manu­
facturers, and in principle PR was to assist in this as price examiner. 
This was not always the case. Bearing in mind the thousands of 
agreements which were made, this was an impossibility for purely 
practical reasons. Therefore as a rule only the more extensive con­
tracts were submitted for examination. The lower limit for the con­
tract price varied between 10,000 and 50,000 kronor for the various 
administrations. In the main SAN-KKV handled its purchasing with­
out the assistance of PR. Only in exceptional cases, and then only 
where there was no competition between the manufacturers, was 
PR. brought in.40
As far as possible the customers tried to create competition be­
tween the manufacturers through a procedure of tenders. In conse­
quence PR's staff examined the quotations on the basis of the provi­
sions in the purchasing legislation as to the number and selection 
of suppliers, et cetera. In certain cases the prices quoted were exam­
ined but normally an estimate was accepted and delivery agreements 
were made.
However, on many occasions the situation was such that the 
tendering procedure could not be operated. For example, a cartel or 
monopoly situation on the manufacturing side was not unusual. In 
such cases agreements were made with a price clause. PR then ex­
amined the prices on the basis of the preliminary calculations and 
negotiated direct with the supplier over the price, and the purchasing 
administrations were then given the result. As regards companies 
which received repeated orders or perhaps orders which were very 
similar in character, such as L. M. Ericsson, ASEA and SKF, 
separate general agreements, extending over several years, were 
reached as to the basis for price calculations, The main examples of 
special agreements with companies in a monopoly situation are the 
orders of aircraft, from SAAB, of engines from NOHAB's Flygmotor- 
SFA, and of heavier weapons from Bofors. Long-term agreements 
often contained provisions for adjustments in relation to changes in 
costs, such as alterations in the price of raw materials or changes in 
wages as a result of collective wage agreements (cf. p. 123).
40 During 1940 one of S,XN ’s tasks was to assist the administrations in their purchases 
but this task was completely transferred to PR.
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In the case of large deliveries where there were substantial short 
deliveries the staff of PR also had the task of acting as price examiners 
in relation to the latter.41
During the period 1940-1945 PR functioned as a price supervisor in 
relation to the engineering industry’s supplies to the Government. 
Thus even after the introduction of the price freeze in 1942 the 
National Price Control Board delegated the power to allow the 
controlled prices to be exceeded.42
It is extremely difficult to assess the economic effect of PR’s 
operations. In its reports the Board indicates several cases in which 
it proved possible to achieve reductions in preliminary prices or in 
renewed supply contracts. As regards the original situation such a 
development is natural; there were no standard norms for price­
fixing, the customers had large economic resources and competed 
amongst themselves for attention from an industry which was working 
at full steam. It was reasonable that the prices should tend to be high. 
During the first hectic months of the war there was great uncertainty 
as to how the labour and raw material situation would develop, and 
the companies therefore probably allowed for a considerable margin 
of risk compensation in their calculations. When the orders were 
placed gradually and on a small scale the first estimates were made 
on the basis of a small volume and prices became very favourable 
when the volume increased sharply.43 PR’s cost hunters, who first 
began in earnest when the economic trend had slowed down in the 
summer of 1940, found rich and easily captured prey to begin with.44 
The continuing operation probably also had a good effect in that
41PM beträffande kontroll av prissättning av leveranser till försvaret 16/11 1943; 
PM beträffande prisbyråns verksamhet. Oktober 1945 (E. Larsson). IK PR B 11:1 
(öppna arkivet). RA. There appears to have been no standard practice as to when the 
administrations were to use PR. In many cases this simply did not happen. It may be 
inferred that the collaboration between the military bodies and the “controlling” 
civil authorities did not always take place without friction. K. Appelquist, for example, 
also gives evidence of this (orally); he was employed within SAN-KKV'.
42 Cirkulärskrivelse från PKN 5/9 1943. IKPR B 11:1 (öppna arkivet). RA.
43 PM från sammanträde rörande orientering över prisbyråns arbetsprogram lördagen 
den 9 mars 1940 kl. 12 f.m. IK KRiBl (PM 1940). RA.
44 The first thorough survey of the cost of engineering works products was carried out in 
the summer of 1940 in connection with the price-fixing at Motala verkstad. Prisbyråns 
verksamhet och resultat, p. 7. IK PR B II: 1 (öppna arkivet). RA.
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norms for price fixing were now available and companies paid atten­
tion to the existence of PR in their cost calculations, In fact the Board 
was conscious of its in many respects weak position in negotiations 
with the companies. The basis for price-fixing maintained by PR did 
not derive from any legislative provisions and the companies had to 
be persuaded to accept it voluntarily. Nor did PR have any legislative 
backing for being able to study the basis for the companies' price 
estimates when the war supply contracts had been abandoned, which 
had already occurred at the beginning of 1940, When, as happened on 
occasions, an industry refused to hand over its documents PR could 
only make an appeal to it to do so. The surviving papers of the 
Board testify fairly often to the difficulty it experienced in getting hold 
of basic documents for price discussions. In the “testament” which 
PR drew up just before its abolition it says that it would be desirable 
in future for legal provisions to be enacted which would give the 
authorities support against the companies if a similar situation was to 
recur.45
In many cases the manufacturers' position in negotiations was 
favourable because of the fact that time was short. If the customers 
had indeed received grants for the military equipment in question 
they exerted strong pressure for speed in the procedure of preparing 
the contract. If the industry then firmly contended that the price 
should be fixed before production began it was difficult for PR to 
delay the whole matter with extensive and protracted price negotia­
tions. PR maintained, for example, that the cost of building the large 
cruisers could perhaps have been kept down if it had had the alterna­
tive of not having the ships built or of postponing their construction 
for a considerable period of time, which in practice was out of the 
question once the grant had actually been made.46
Finally it may be said that PR had great problems in finding staff 
sufficiently well qualified to cope with the purely bookkeeping side 
of examining the cost estimates and also knowledgeable enough to 
reach decisions on technical questions relating to the consumption of 
labour and materials and many other matters. In the main the manage­
ment of the Board chose staff who had links with industry and avoided
45 PM angående prisbyrån 25/4 1947, IK PR B II:t (ööpna arkivet). RA.
46 PM oktober 1945. p. 5. IK PR B II: 1 (öppna arkivet). RA.
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msid • it this had contributed 
to she fact that the clashes with industry were not more serious than 
might otherwise have been the eased7
It has already been observed that it is difficult to make any 
assessment, based on incontrovertible fact, of the profitability of the 
y equipment as compared with other production 
or which can be regarded as fair. However, many factors tend to 
indicate that the engineering industry did not at least have lower
i » f mil it; juif merit than on its 
other production, and that the former was therefore at least as 
important for the result as it was in terms of pure volume.
47 PlVl oktober !945, pp. 4-6. IK PR B 11:1 (öppna arkivet). RA.
YTHE GOVERNMENT, TRADE AND INDUSTRY
During the period 1939-1945 the Government was interventionist 
to a high degree, exercising strict control over the private sector of 
industry and commerce.1 In contrast to what had happened when 
the First World War broke out, an extensive war administration was 
swiftly set up. In principle the whole of the build-up took place during 
the autumn of 1939. The preparations which had been made through 
the National Board of Economic Defence had been geared above all to 
measures to be taken in the event of the country being drawn into 
war, but they were still of great value on account of the fact that 
important fields of the economy were mapped out.2 The central war 
bodies were attached to different departments but important questions 
- of foodstuffs, fuel, raw materials, industry, trade and price control - 
were to be dealt with by a newly created department: the Ministry 
of Supply. The local war administration was developed along com­
pletely different lines from that of the previous war. Wartime provi­
sional government on a county level and local government on a 
municipal level effectively covered the whole country. Thanks to the 
so-called Municipal Emergency Powers Act the local authorities could 
be instructed to take control as the central bodies considered neces­
sary. Yet another feature of the war administration of the Second 
World War was the consultative councils which added very weighty 
support to the management of the central bodies.
The industry commission was responsible for control in the indus­
trial field save in relation to foodstuffs and fodder. The principal
1 Björnberg, A., Andra världskriget svenska krisförvaltning, passim (1946); Odhe. T., 
Folkförsörjningen under krisen, pp. 48-112.
2 Månsson, p. 223,Gjöres, p. 67.
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tasks were the planning and coordination of production in accordance 
with the requirements of the armed forces and other important 
sectors and the distribution within industry of raw materials and 
other means of production. Thanks to extensive legislation IK had at 
its disposal the power to take controlling measures: the law of 
disposition, import and export restrictions, the price control law, 
et cetera (see p. 164). With its extensive organization it was also 
possible to put its intentions into effect to a high degree.
The short-term effect of the extensive control as far as industry was 
concerned was a severe restriction on its freedom to acquire the 
means of production by itself and to choose the orientation of produc­
tion and sales. The actual consequences of this varied sharply from 
company to company. The engineering industry as a whole was not 
hampered in its development, either with regard to production or 
economic results, a fact which is obviously connected with its role 
in relation to rearmament and ersatz production (see chapter IV). 
Within the sectors in which the Government acted as a big customer 
it also saw to it that there were products to be sold.
Thus the influence of the state on industry during the war years 
was very great indeed, mainly on account of the influence of the 
emergency bodies on the country’s economy in various respects, 
but also by virtue of the fact that the Government authorities acted 
to an unusually high degree as buyers on the private market.3 If one 
considers what actually took place and disregards the purely formal 
relationship between the state and industry and commerce, it will in 
fact appear more important to point out the converse: during the 
years in question the influence of industry and commerce on the 
Government was unusually great.
In their instructions the emergency bodies - with their extraor­
dinary powers of control over the economy - had been told to coop­
erate closely with the organizations of industry and commerce. 
They were even willing to assist in the organization of private trade 
associations which would arrange for the actual implementation of 
the measures of control. Older trade associations often acquired a
3In "Styre i kristid. Studier i krisförvalningens organisation och struktur" (stencil 
1971 ) L. Friberg has discussed certain general features of the wartime administration, 
mainly based on studies of the control of agricultural products, energy and transport.
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position of almost corporate character, such as Jemkontoret (tec- 
ironmasters ’ Association) which was an officially sanctioned part of 
the emergency administration under the control of IK. In other cases 
the bodies had a general semi-official position, i.e. they carried out 
official administrative functions without having clear official au­
thority. The Swedish Association for the Importation of Iron 
Products was a body of this kind: a newly created framework orga 
nization which comprised eight old and four newly established import 
associations.4
In this way a large part of the work of practical control was given 
to trade and industry’s own bodies. The emergency bodies them­
selves also used labour obtained from the private sector. This applied 
to a high degree to IK with its great need for knowledge of the 
industrial field. It has already been described (p. 170) how the price­
fixing of supplies to the military administrations could only be done in 
the main by personnel from trade and industry. Only in this sector 
were there available the qualified personnel who were required. It was 
not possible to extract from the apparatus of the Civil Service all the 
staff needed by the emergency bodies. When the wartime administra­
tion was at its largest, in the autumn of 1943, about 9 per cent of its 
personnel had previously been engaged in local or Government 
administration while almost two-thirds had been obtained from what 
may be called the private sector in its widest sense. The remainder 
consisted mainly of women without previous experience. The central 
wartime bodies with about 2,000 employees had recruited about 14 
per cent of their personnel from the Civil Service while about two- 
thirds came from the private sector, above all from industry and 
commerce.5
4 Friberg, pp. 244-247.
Björnberg (1946), passim.
5 Krisorganens personal. A statistical survey carried out by the Government labour 
market commission (in: Utredningar angående ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering VI. SOU 
1944:36), pp. 31-33.
People who “in the event of the winding-up of the wartime body in question were 
able to return to another post or other work or did not intend to try and find new em­
ployment’’ were not included in the survey. A total of 4,449 out ot 5,037 office 
staffwere included in the survey. 1,703 of the 2,031 people in the central bodies were 
included (pp. 10-11). Cf. Friberg, pp. 170 f.
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The governing bodies were also completely dominated by the 
representatives of private industry and commerce. Thus IK was run 
by a leading group of heads of companies, the departments were 
normally headed by managers or senior personnel from industrial 
trade associations and companies, and other senior staff came from 
private industry. Finally, the council of IK was dominated by people 
with practical experience of various trades. The council was not to 
become of any great significance as an institution but its members - 
temporarily and individually - often helped out when special questions 
arose which required investigation.6
The close collaboration between private industry and commerce 
and the Government authorities during the war years can obviously be 
interpreted as a natural result of outward circumstances: the pressures 
of the war and the blockade drove all parties together and compelled 
collaboration regardless of differences in basic social attitudes. It is 
all the more important to point out that clear precedents for this 
existed in the Government's former attitude towards collaboration 
with private industry and trade. The policy of the Social Democrats 
during the 1930s included several features of organized collaboration 
with different groups. The earliest related to agricultural organiza­
tions. These developed - partly with the help of the Government - 
at the beginning of the decade and they gained a position which in 
certain respects resembled that of the trade unions. The collaboration 
with the agricultural organizations was connected with the political 
cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party 
during the 1930s. After the congress of 1932 the reform policy seemed 
to have triumphed amongst the Social Democrats and a pragmatic 
view of the relations with industry and commerce was dominant. 
This became clearly apparent after 1936 when the Government was 
more firmly in the saddle. In the year 1938 a dialogue began between 
the Finance Minister Ernst Wigforss and representatives of private 
industry and commerce. It was the Finance Minister who opened the 
door and suggested that they ought to cooperate instead of fighting 
each other. Before the outbreak of war interrupted the exchange of 
views, in which the leading industrialists participated, it had led to
6Huss, E.. Statens industrikommission (in: Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 1942, pp. 400- 
411). Cf. pp. 58-68.
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concrete negotiations for joint stocktakings in several sectors of 
industry. TheGovernment authorities had shown their willingness to 
support industry in 1938 by setting up trade equalization accounts, 
by changing over from a progressive to a proportional company tax 
and by raising the maximum figure for export credit guarantees from 
35 to 60 million kronor in 1939.7 The improvements in the depre­
ciation conditions of limited companies described above (p. 157) also 
formed part of the picture. The strong support given by the Govern­
ment to a domestic aircraft industry is a concrete example of a Social 
Democratic desire to strengthen Swedish industry in the face of the 
difficulties which were expected.8
Signs of a recession began to manifest themselves in the U.S.A. 
towards the end of 1937. The Government’s economic policy from 
1938 onwards probably ought to be regarded primarily as an attempt 
to guard against an international depression of the sort that had hit the 
world eight years earlier. There was no lack of signs that an arma­
ments boom would be able to counteract the depressive tendencies 
but they could hardly have offered any secure basis for long-term 
planning. In addition the fact that a possible war might mean stagna­
tion within the Swedish economy had to be taken into consideration. 
When the war came the climate was well-prepared for increased 
cooperation between Government and trade and industry. The 
hatchet had been buried and was not to be dug up again until after 
the war.9
Contemporary observers were agreed on the fact that the forms of 
collaboration during the war years were a new feature of modern 
Swedish administration. Both parties were aware of the necessity for
7Montgomery, A., Svensk ekonomisk historia 1919-1939, p. 335. Söderpalm, S. A.. 
Arbetare och bönder. Krisuppgörelsen och socialdemokraternas väg till makten, 
passim. Lewin, L., Planhushällningsdebatten, pp. 112-175. In an essay (Industrin 
och samlingsregeringen. Scandia 1973:1, pp. 99-113) S. A. Söderpalm has pointed out 
how industry tried, independently of party political attachments, to acquire influence 
over the Government during the 1930s and when the coalition Government was set up in 
1939.
8 Norberg, p. 124 et passim.
9 Wigforss. E., Minnen III, pp. 110-118; in his account Lewin places heavy brackets 
round the war years. When one looks at the development of the politics rather than of 
the debate the war years seem less isolated from the periods before and after them 
(pp. 175, 263).
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this collaboration but viewed in retrospect it seems to have taken 
place largely on trade and industry’s terms, above all as a result of the 
personal “infiltration” into the war administration. Whenthepressure 
eased and there was no immediate threat of war or recessions, it 
turned out that each side had reached different conclusions from the 
events of the years 1939-1945.10
The development, especially as regards the organization of the 
acquisition of military equipment, has already been described (pp. 
58-68). The claims of the representatives of trade and industry to be 
allowed to play a more active part in planning had been given expres­
sion earlier, but they grew stronger with the acceleration of the 
rearmament. From the spring of 1939 up to 1943 the influence of 
industry and commerce increased gradually but continuously. In 
March 1939 representatives of industry voiced criticism of the way in 
which the acquisition of military equipment was organized. They 
wanted better coordination and they wanted the National Commission 
of Economic Defence (RKE) to be given greater resources and power. 
The decentralized system which gave great independence to the 
military authorities should be reconsidered. Up to the outbreak of 
war the representatives of industry acquired an increasing influence 
over planning and acquisition, above all through an industrial 
committee which was set up within RKE in May. Because of the 
fact that the Government after the outbreak of war did not choose 
to adopt the proposal for a wartime organization which had been 
worked out within RKE, industry and commerce were to be com­
pletely dominant.* 11 RKE’s industry department became a war 
industry department within the newly established IK. The head of 
RKE's industry department, Colonel S. Thorén, was replaced by 
R. Blomqvist, a director. In the spring of 1940 special bodies were 
hived off to deal with important acquisition questions: the acquisition 
of ammunition and production at the Government’s own factories and 
other establishments. SAN and FVN were set up on the initiative 
of IK; they exercised a dominant civil influence and were to be in
10 Huss (1942), passim; Heckscher, G., Staten och organisationerna, pp. 231-262.
Cf. the views expressed in:
Domö, F., Svenskt näringliv under krig och kriser.
Björnberg, A., Svensk krishushållning. Lewin, pp. 263-347.
11 Månsson, pp. 38^18; 168-183; 194-197.
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the front line of the struggle for power between the new wartime 
administration and the military establishment. The establishment of 
KKV and FFV in July 1943 represents the natural peak of the expan­
sion of the power of the industrial experts.
The development was connected with the technological and indus­
trial character of modern warfare. Industry was placed at the centre 
of this warfare and its problems had to be solved by its own men 
since the representatives of military administrations lacked the 
required experience and knowledge. Just before the establishment of 
KKV the representatives of industry drew parallels with the purely 
military organization: industry was the fourth branch of the services - 
in the long run the decisive branch in a war. Its management must 
possess a staff which had the strength and knowledge to carry on the 
work of the administration in peace as well as in wartime. Not only 
the planning of industrial investment but also the entire acquisition of 
equipment should be brought together under the staff of KKV. In 
contrast to the National Commission for Economic Defence the 
Board would in consequence be able to hold its own against industry 
and other parties. The chief of staff - the Director General - should 
of course be recruited from the ranks of the industrialists. No-one in 
industry laid a claim to take command of units of troops and likewise 
the military representatives should not make claims to govern 
industry.12
In the field of acquisition of military equipment two influences 
combined to make private dominance very great indeed. At 
bottom there was the long-term trend towards greater cooperation 
between Government and industry and commerce, which had a 
political background but which was strengthened throughout the 
whole of the national economy by the war. In addition there was a 
military tendency, which was both technological and tactical, towards 
industrial warfare and closer contact between the branches of the 
services which made it natural for there to be a centralized organiza­
tion for the acquisition of equipment, dominated by industry.
The same tendency can be found in other countries during the 
Second World War. In the U.S.A., for example, there had been since 
the First World War a tradition of central cooperation between
12 Gummeson, P. E., Krigsmaterielverket och industrien, pp. 334-340.
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trade and industry and the military administration. During the period 
between the wars this collaboration was the subject of criticism; it was 
said that the interest of private profit ought to be detached from the 
acquisition of military equipment. Such proposals were rejected and 
when the U.S.A. entered the Second World War the acquisition was 
dealt with by the Office of Production Management which was 
dominated by a large number of representatives of trade and industry 
(886 in January 1942). These administrators were lent by their com­
panies. but they retained their company salaries and were therefore 
not civil servants. The system was motivated by the fact that it was 
impossible to ask them to accept a lower salary and an interruption 
in their careers in transferring temporarily to the Government service. 
The Office of Production Management came in for strong criticism. 
In the eyes of many people undue favour was given to the large 
companies, and this was thought to be connected with the system 
of borrowing employees. Conflicts with the military authorities were 
also common and the organization was regarded as being generally 
ineffective.
In January 1942 the acquisition organization was changed. A War 
Production Board was set up with increased powers. A “strong" 
representative of the economic life of the country, D. Nelson, was 
appointed to head the Board. However, he did not consider that he 
had enough time to change the basic features of the existing organiza­
tion. It was a question of winning the war and this was made possible 
by maintaining good contacts with industry: the “borrowed” em­
ployees were allowed to remain. It would be too risky to replace them 
with bureaucrats who had no experience of work in industry. Nor 
could they afford a conflict with the military: they were allowed to 
retain their right to sign all contracts with the manufacturers. The war 
industry achieved outstanding production results but because of the 
organization it also made large profits during the Second World War 
as it had done during the First.13
12 Gummeson, P. E., Krigsmaterialverket och industrien, pp. 334-340.
13 The information about the U.S.A. has been obtained from:
The Military-Industrial Complex (ed. Pursell, C. W. Jr.), particularly the following 
contributions:
Koistinen, P. A. C. The industrial-military complex in historical perspective. The
180
The experiences of the First World War obviously also played an 
important role when Germany rearmed again under Nazi leader­
ship.14 In order to coordinate the orders of war equipment placed by 
the military authorities and supervise production, during the 1930s 
an organization headed by General G. Thomas was set up under 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt 
(Wi Rü Amt). Because of an imprecise demarcation of powers and 
overlapping jurisdictions Wi Rü Amt fought with other bodies for the 
planning of the economy. The main competitor for power was 
Vieijahresplan, an organization headed by H. Goering, and also the 
Reichswirtschaftsministerium under W. Funk, which was generally 
speaking outmanoeuvered on military questions.15
In the winter of 1939-1940 difficulties had already arisen in relation 
to the supply of military equipment, especially ammunition. Wi Rü 
Amt did not manage to carry out its duties satisfactorily and it was
Interwar Years.
Baruch, B.. American industry in the War;
Report on Government Manufacture of Munitions. (Nye Committee);
Investigation of the National Defence Program (Truman Committee);
Catton. B., Warlords of Washington;
Economic concentration and World War II (Smaller War Plants Corporation).
14 The German war planning organisation immediately before the First World War was 
based on the assumption that the war would be a short one. When instead the situation 
on the Western Front developed into long-drawn-out trench warfare which made 
enormous demands for a continuous flow of military supplies the country was com­
pelled, reluctantly and only after a military leadership crisis, to make a total readjust­
ment to a war economy. On 1 November 1916 a special new body was set up, Kriegs­
amt, which - under the war ministry but with wide powers of its own - would handle 
questions relating to recruitment for military service and the labour force supply 
within industry (compulsory work was introduced for men between 17 and 60 years 
of age); raw materials, weapons and ammunition. In spite of the fact that this body 
was under the control of a civil authority it had strong connections with the top 
military leaders (especially General Ludendorff) who together with the leading indu­
strialists had worked out the fundamental guidelines for the total war effort. During 
the first year the head was General W. Groener. who had two section heads under 
him. one civil and one military. The Waffen- und Munitions-Beschaffungsamt was 
under the control of the latter.
Armeson, R. B., Total Warface and Compulsory Labor. A Study of the Military- 
Industrial Complex in Germany during World War I, passim. Groener-Geyer, D., 
General Groener. Soldatund Staatsmann, pp. 47-63.
15 Janssen, pp. 17-18.
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subjected to criticism and strong pressure both from the various 
branches of the services and from the political leaders.16 In February 
1940 Hitler introduced a civilian onto the scene through Vierjahres- 
plan: F. Todt, who had previously been responsible for the building 
of the Autobahn and the Western Wall, and who had also been 
Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und Munition since March 1940. The 
new minister was first in charge of the planning of the ammunition 
production and later of the army’s other supplies of equipment. In 
fact the navy and air force still held on to the orders and Todt never 
managed to centralize the whole of the military equipment side 
under himself, let alone the country’s whole supply policy.17
WhenTodt died in February 1942 the conflicts between the military 
and the civilian administration had intensified; at the same time the 
setbacks on the eastern front had brought the question of equipment 
to a head. Todt had worked for a transfer of further functions from 
Wi Ru Amt.18 A viable coordination of the resources of the war 
industry was first achieved by A. Speer who was appointed to succeed 
Todt soon after the latter's death. Speer outmanoeuvered G. Thomas 
and the bulk of Wi Rü Amt was rearranged to form Rüstungsamt 
within Speer’s ministry. A small and unimportant part remained 
behind within OKW. In practice Vierjahresplan and H. Goering 
and Reichswirtschaftsministerium were also made subordinate. In 
1943 Speer’s title was changed to Reichsminister für Rüstung und 
Kriegsproduktion.19
A. Speer’s ideas about organization, the basic features of which 
had already been worked out by F. Todt, clashed with earlier ideas, 
inter alia in relation to the arrangement of the manufacturing com­
panies in functional units, "shoots” for the main production (tanks, 
ammunition and so forth), surrounded by “circles” of sub-contractors. 
Industry itself controlled these units, being able to act with a fair 
degree of independence within the framework of the planning as a
16 Carroll, passim.
17 Carroll, pp. 230-231 ; Janssen, pp. 20-22.
18 . Ende des Jahres 1941 erkannte Todt selbst, dass die von ihm versuchte Steiger­
ung der Rüstung auf breiter Front unter militärischen Regie ein Fehlschlag war." 
Kehrl, H.. Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstungsindustri, pp. 276-277.
19Carroll, pp. 238-250; Wagenführ, R., Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, 
pp. 39-40.
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whole. During the years 1942-1944 a remarkable increase in the 
production of military equipment was achieved through this organiza­
tion.20
The Second World War was not followed internationally by a period 
of arms reduction as the First World War had been. Even after the 
war administrations had been abolished the close contact between 
industrial and military management was maintained in the countries in 
which no military defeat had sapped both military power and industry. 
The more complex the weapon systems became, the more intensive 
and durable must the contacts be. In this way a “military-industrial 
complex” was established. There has been discussion, especially in 
the U.S.A., of the effects which such a “complex” can have on the 
development of society in general, having regard to the fact that it is 
dependent for its existence on large orders of military equipment 
which in turn are most easily prompted by an atmosphere in which 
war and conflict threaten.
In spite of all the differences there are clear parallels between 
developments in Sweden during the Second World War and develop­
ments in the U.S.A. and Germany. A high quality and versatile 
engineering industry was mobilized, and representatives of industry 
and commerce gained great influence in a centralized acquisition 
organization. After considerable difficulties and delays the bottle­
necks were widened, and towards the end of the war Sweden’s 
industry was able to support modern forces. In the short term this 
meant large Government orders for the engineering industry and an 
economic consolidation. In the longer term it probably constituted 
a spring-board for the development of that industry during the post­
war period.
By the end of the war Sweden had an advanced military industry 
which worked closely with the armed forces and in many cases 
included the country’s leading engineering companies. This military/ 
industrial complex acquired its basic features during a period of 
intensive rearmament. In a final chapter the fortunes of the military 
equipment industry will be traced up to the beginning of the 1970s. As 
with the war years, the starting point of the discussion must be 
Sweden’s foreign political situation.
20 Wagenführ, pp. 40-42 et passim.
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THE THIRTY YEARS SINCE THE WAR
A. Foreign policy and defence policy
The flexible policy of neutrality which the Swedish Government 
pursued with undeniable success during the Second World War had 
become firmly rooted in Swedish public opinion by the end of the 
war. It was obviously the aim of foreign policy in the post-war period 
to try and keep out of possible conflicts in Europe. “Freedom from 
alliances in peacetime with a view to neutrality in wartime” became 
a generally accepted doctrine.1 However, Sweden’s membership of 
the United Nations was plainly a complication since a policy of 
sanctions within the framework of the new world organisation would 
be able to force Sweden away from the path of strict neutrality. 
The Swedes were prepared to take this risk; it was considered more 
important to be able to work actively within the United Nations 
towards the solution of conflicts.
However, the bloc formation in European politics, which 
manifested itself as early as 1947, forced the countries of Northern 
Europe to show their hand. Sweden then made proposals for a Nordic 
defence alliance between Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These 
proposals were based on the theory that the three countries would 
form a non-aligned bloc between the two formations in the east and 
west, so as to remain outside a possible military conflict. This 
presupposed a common attitude to foreign policy and a coordination 
of military resources. The Swedes counted on the other two countries 
to rearm up to the level of the Swedish forces. This could be done 
swiftly, e.g. by purchasing equipment from the U.S.A. On the other
1 Several documents illustrating the Government's basic attitudes are collected in 
Andrén, N.-Landqvist, A., Svensk utrikespolitik efter 1945 (Stockholm 1965), pp. 
91-140.
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hand the Swedes thought that the acceptance of gifts from the U.S.A. 
would create an attachment to one of the parties to the cold war, 
which would run counter to the fundamental principle of the plan. 
Denmark supported Sweden’s proposals, but in Norway opinion was 
divided. Powerful forces in Norway had drawn different conclusions 
from the Second World War as regards defence policy to those which 
had been reached in Denmark and Sweden. It was said that the main 
threat to world peace came from the Soviet Union. The best way of 
preventing another war was to make the western alliance a powerful 
deterrent. The surest defence against Norway being drawn into 
another war was a guarantee of support from the west in the event 
of an attack from the east. Participation with Sweden in a neutral 
alliance would have the effect of severing the close contacts with the 
west which had been formed during the war without replacing them 
with anything of equal value.
The idea of a Nordic defence alliance was opposed by the western 
powers, and with particular vigour by the U.S.A. which threatened 
to refuse even to sell weapons to a neutral Nordic alliance. After 
intensive negotiations in 1948, it became clear in January 1949 that 
Norway had chosen to go westwards to the North Atlantic Treaty 
which was concluded in April 1949. With that the whole idea of a 
Nordic defence alliance collapsed.2
Sweden’s position as an isolated and non-aligned country of 
Northern Europe was already established in 1949. This foreign 
policy position has continued throughout the whole of the period 
since the war. In spite of the fact that Sweden has joined cooperative 
organisations of a “western” character, such as the Council of 
Europe, she has constantly shunned military or political alliances 
with other countries. As a result Sweden’s defence policy position 
was established for a long time to come. Without political guarantees 
of security from any source and without the support of any treaty 
for her non-alignment Sweden considered it necessary to have a 
powerful defence in order to demonstrate her determination to 
safeguard her territory. In comparative terms Sweden was one of the 
world’s best armed countries in the middle of the 1940s. Naturally
2 On foreign policy see Andrén-Landqvist, passim; Erlander, T., 1949-1954 (Nacka 
1974).
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Diagram 17. Defence costs 1945-1973 in relation to total Government expenditure 
and GNP.
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Source: SOS Statistical abstract, Historical statistics.
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the funds allocated to the armed forces were reduced when peace 
was concluded in Europe, but the reduction was reversed when the 
Korean war broke out and there was great tension in the Baltic area at 
the beginning of the 1950s. Sweden's relations with the Soviet Union 
were strained at this point in time and several dramatic incidents 
occurred, including the shooting down of Swedish aircraft. As is 
shown in diagram 17, the tension in foreign politics led to an increase 
in defence allocations, not merely in absolute terms but also in 
relation to total Government expenditure and to the country’s GNP. 
Since the second half of the 1950s there has been relatively speaking 
a gradual decline in defence costs as the political situation in Europe 
has become increasingly stable.
The basic strategic concept in Swedish defence has been the 
ability to confront an invading enemy beyond or on the country's 
borders with technologically advanced equipment. As a result great 
emphasis has been placed on the role of the air force. Roughly half 
of all new acquisitions have been of air force equipment.3 As far as 
the acquisition of this equipment was concerned, the foreign political 
situation placed the Government in a position closely resembling that 
which had obtained during the Second World War: it was a question 
of supplying the armed forces with equipment which was as sophisti­
cated technologically as any which a potential foe might possess, 
but without thereby becoming dependent on supplies of equipment 
from abroad. The Swedish military/industrial complex which had 
grown up during the war years therefore continued to order, develop 
and produce military equipment. Imports of military equipment were 
to become the exception during the post-war period. About 10 per 
cent of the purchases of equipment were made abroad, while the 
balance came from Swedish industry.
The ambitious aims of Sweden’s defence resulted in the fact that 
in general terms she shouldered the same burdens as one of the 
great powers as far as research and technological development of 
munitions were concerned. As was the case in the U.S.A., England 
and France, grants for military research increased during the 1950s
3 This relates to the beginning of the 1970s. Forsvarsindustriella problem. Rapport till 
försvarsutredningen 1975-11-13 (stencil).
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and accounted for about half of all Government research grants at 
the beginning of the 1960s. The grants have gradually been reduced 
since the middle of the present decade.4 About 70 per cent of the 
grants for military research have been paid to Swedish industry for 
orders of military equipment. As a result about one-third of Swedish 
private industry’s total research contribution has been financed out of 
Government funds. In assessing the importance of Sweden’s defence 
policy for Swedish industry this fact should be borne in mind as being 
perhaps the most significant. As we shall see in due course, the 
proportion of pure production devoted to defence orders was far more 
modest. Certain technologically advanced branches of the engineering 
industry in particular, such as the electro-technology industry, have 
been favoured with large research grants which have in the main 
gone very largely to the leading heavy defence industries.
As well as in industry basic military research has also been carried 
on above all at the Swedish National Defence Research Institute 
(Försvarets Forskningsanstalt, FOA) which was directly under 
Government auspices. Towards the end of the 1950s comparatively 
advanced development work for the production of a Swedish atom 
bomb was also carried out within FOA. Having regard to the coun­
try’s strategic planning it was a completely logical step for Sweden 
to have an atomic weapon. Arguments in favour of such a develop­
ment were advanced by representatives of the armed forces and 
certain other groups, but there was also strong political opposition to 
this within the country. The party in power appointed a committee 
which shelved the question in a vague compromise report in 1959. 
In practice it proved politically impossible to produce a Swedish 
atom bomb. This policy was affirmed in 1970 when Sweden ratified 
the limitation of arms agreement. Instead the emphasis in military 
atomic research has been placed on “advanced defence research’’ 
which does not involve the introduction of the nuclear weapon into 
the Swedish defence system.5
4 The section on research is based, except where otherwise stated, on Annerstedt, 
J., Makten över forskningen. Om statlig forskningsorganisation och forskningsplanering 
i dagens Sverige (Lund 1972). pp. 28-34.
5 Andrén-Landqvist, pp. 78. 80; Annerstedt. pp. 71-72, 155.
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B. The production of military equipment
As far as foreign policy and defence policy are concerned, there 
has been no fundamental change in Sweden’s position during the 
post-war period. This is probably the main reason for the fact that the 
structure of the Swedish munitions industry appears to have changed 
so little during the period in question. If one looks ahead thirty years 
from the period of the Second World War a familiar picture emerges. 
On the whole the same privately-owned Swedish engineering works 
are producing the bulk of the defence equipment. However, before 
considering this defence industry in greater detail we shall look at the 
development of the acquisition organisation and Government pro­
duction of military equipment.
In 1943 the organization of the purchasing of military equipment 
by the armed forces had to a certain extent been assimilated by the 
Swedish War Supplies Board (see pp. 64). This body was dissolved 
in 1954 and the responsibility for acquisitions was again vested in the 
various branches of the armed forces. The pendulum swung back 
towards centralization in 1968 when the Military Administration of the 
Armed Forces (Försvarets Materielverk, FMV) was set up and was 
made responsible for all major acquisitions. FMV was given depart­
ments - army, air force, naval and quartermaster equipment divi­
sions - which were to take charge of practically all the purchases 
of equipment for the Swedish armed forces. Through this organisation 
renewed attempts were made to resolve the old conflict between the 
rational argument that all acquisitions should be the province of a 
single body and the demand that those who were to use the equipment 
should also decide what it should look like.
During the post-war period the Government’s own production of 
military equipment has been maintained within the narrow framework 
which was established during the rearmament of the Second World 
War. When the National Defence Factories were set up in 1943 they 
included factories for the production of ammunition, torpedoes and 
small arms (p. 66). There were also laundries and repair works. The 
pure service operations have been extended, and in addition develop­
ment work is being carried on in conjunction with private Swedish 
companies. In 1970 the National Defence Factories changed their 
name to the Swedish National Industries Corporation (Förenade
Table 13. FFVs departments engaged in the production 
of new mechanical military equipment. Number of 
employees as at 111 1974.
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Ammunition and gunpowder 1,066
Small arms 416
Torpedoes 340
Total 1.822
Source: SOU 1974:38 s. 37.
fabriksverken, (FFV)).6 There has only been one change in the 
production of new mechanical military equipment, viz. the sale by the 
privately owned Husqvarna Vapenfabriks AB of its small arms 
division to FFV in 1970. However, FFV continued to operate within 
its traditional spheres. By the beginning of the 1970s the factories’ 
invoicing of new production had increased to about 200 million 
kronor a year.
New production of the naval dockyards is also included in the 
Government’s share of the production of military equipment. After 
the war the yard in Karlskrona also continued to supply small vessels 
as well as carrying out repairs and maintenance.7
In the budget year 1973-74 FMV made purchases costing a total 
of 272 million kronor from FFV and the naval shipyard in Karlskrona, 
which constituted 9 per cent of all purchases.8 This was similar to 
the position during the Second World War when about 10 per cent of 
the purchases of military equipment were from state-owned manufac­
turers (p. 136). Thus during the post-war period too the private 
engineering industry in Sweden has accounted for the bulk of the 
equipment supplied to the armed forces. Familiar names from the war 
years featured amongst the biggest suppliers at the beginning of the 
1970s: SAAB, now merged with the car manufacturers Scania Vabis
6 FFV. Förenade fabriksverken (SOU 1974:38), pp. 40-50.
7 Förutsättningarna för civil varvsdrift vid Karlskrona örlogsvarv (SOU 1959:11), 
passim.
8 Försvarsindustriella problem, p. 18.
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Table 14. Payments made by the Military Administration of the Armed Forces to the 
biggest private suppliers of military equipment in 1973/74. In millions of kronor.
Company
army
Invoicing
navy airforce total
Most important military products
Saab-Scania 114 4 795 913 Aircraft, data equipment,
Volvo 79 0 229 308
instrument landing systems, 
missiles, trucks, tractors
Trucks, cars, tractors, aircraft
Bofors 140 62 19 221
engines, missiles and tanks
Guns, fire control systems for
L M Ericsson 23 7 176 206
guns, ammunition, missiles, 
anti-submarine weapons 
Telephone, radio and radar
(inc. SRA)
Total 356 73 1,219 1,648
equipment
Source: Forsvarsindustriella problem, p. 18.
to form SAAB-Scania, Volvo (above all as the owner of Flygmotor), 
Bofors and L M Ericsson with its special military division and its 
subsidiary Svenska Radioaktiebolaget (SRA).
In 1973/74 the four suppliers shown in table 14 accounted for about 
55 per cent of all purchases of equipment by the armed forces. The 
high degree of concentration is also evident from the fact that during 
the same period 15 companies supplied 74 per cent of the military 
equipment (cf. p. 150). The degree of concentration was particularly 
high in the aircraft equipment sector where 74 per cent of the pay­
ments made by FMV went to the suppliers listed in table 14, in­
cluding sub-contractors. This is partly due to the fact that one prod­
uct, aircraft, was heavily dominant and to the extensive use of sub­
contracting. However, the concentration is also a reflection of the fact 
that purchasing policy had continued in accordance with the guide­
lines of the war years. Long-term contracts have been signed with 
the same companies which have in practice retained the monopoly 
position which they gained during the war.
In terms of volume, however, the role played by orders placed by 
the armed forces with the Swedish engineering industry has declined
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since the war.9 In 1973/74 about 22,000 employees were engaged in 
the production of military equipment, which was less than half the 
number so engaged thirty years earlier. At the same time this sector of 
industry had grown. Thus of the engineering industry’s total produc­
tion just over 5 per cent was sold to the armed forces at the begin­
ning of the 1970s, which should be compared with about 25 per cent 
during the war years. Of course individual manufacturers may present 
a different picture. Certain companies have continued to concentrate 
on defence production and have become more or less dependent on 
Government orders.
Table 15. The concentration of the most important private 
companies on defence equipment. The proportion of sales 
to FMV in 1973/74. In percentages.
SAAB-Scania 15
Volvo 3
L M Ericsson 3
SRA 37
Bofors 17
Source: Försvarsindustriella problem, p. 21.
SAAB attempted in various ways to free itself from dependence on 
orders from the armed forces when the war ended. Production of a 
motor car was started and a civil passenger aircraft was developed. 
However, the rearmament at the beginning of the 1950s utilised the 
entire capacity for the manufacturing of aircraft and on the whole the 
civil aircraft sector has remained unimportant. Since the merger with 
the car company Scania Vabis the aircraft division has become 
smaller but as a result it is dependent on defence orders. For the even 
larger Volvo group of companies military equipment plays a minor 
role in quantitative terms. However, Volvo Flygmotor concentrates 
exclusively on the production of military equipment. Likewise the 
military division of the L M Ericsson Group of companies is built 
around defence orders. During the 1960s a diversification away from
Försvarsindustriella problem, p. 35.
192
military production also took place at Bofors. At the beginning of the 
1970s about 60 per cent of the production was sold to civilian cus­
tomers. At the same time almost half of the military production was 
exported, which was nevertheless a far smaller proportion than during 
the period between the wars.
In many cases the large suppliers of military equipment have 
formed joint, formally independent specialized companies, built up 
round qualified military production and service. They are compara­
tively small but they do work of great technological sophistication, 
which is characteristic of the modern production of military equip­
ment.10
The leading manufacturers of military equipment have carried 
out extensive research, they have employed large staffs of technicians 
and over the decades they have accumulated considerable experience 
of production. As a result they have become a necessary condition 
of Swedish defence policy and an integral part of it. In flexible 
cooperation between representatives of the armed forces, Govern­
ment and industry guidelines for the acquisition of equipment have 
developed in accordance with the pattern which was formed at the 
beginning of the 1940s.
C. The end of an era?
The circumstances prevailing at the time of the Second World War 
forced on the establishment of an advanced Swedish military equip­
ment industry. This was connected with a security policy and a 
defence policy the basic features of which have not undergone any 
significant changes during the first three decades of the post-war 
period. It is nevertheless possible to detect signs of gradual change 
towards the end of the era of self-sufficiency in technologically 
advanced military equipment. It is difficult to find proof of a direct 
connection between this state of affairs and any change in strategy 
or any new military and political situation. The reason is rather to be 
sought in the increased tension between technological development 
and limited economic resources.
As a result of international rearmament and the development
10 Forsvarsindustriella problem, pp. 16-49.
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of weapon technology the cost of modern military equipment has risen 
enormously. For example, the unit prices of aircraft have increased 
almost two hundredfold in terms of fixed prices.11 All countries with 
the ambition of developing modern weapons have been hit by these 
increases. The great powers and countries within the Warsaw or Nato 
pacts have to some extent been able to meet the increase in prices 
through rationalizations. The number of manufacturers has been 
reduced and there has been a concentration on a small number of 
types of equipment. For example, very few countries have con­
structed their own aircraft. Smaller countries have imported equip­
ment from the great powers whose weapon manufacturers have 
received orders for longer production series. It has been more difficult 
to take these steps in the Swedish military equipment industry. The 
concentration of production has as a rule been at its maximum and the 
series have tended rather to become shorter. As a result of the small 
market there has been an unusually steep rise in the costs of research, 
development and production. Possibilities of exporting have been 
limited. In the 1960s between a quarter and one-third of Sweden's 
production of military equipment was exported. The exports have 
mainly involved traditional equipment of a defensive nature, while 
there has been a very limited market for more advanced equipment 
such as air and missile systems. It is thought that high prices have 
been partly to blame for this situation, but Sweden's position between 
the great power blocs has also weakened her negotiating position 
in many cases. The exporting of military equipment has also been 
hedged around with strict legal limitations. Amongst other con­
siderations no exports have been allowed to countries engaged in 
acute internal or foreign conflicts or in which there appears to be a 
risk of war or unrest. These comparatively stringent regulations have 
made it more difficult for Sweden to export military equipment 
extensively to other parts of the world where there has been a great 
demand and other exporters of weapons have done business.12 Thus 
it has been impossible for the country’s military equipment industry 
to increase production series and reduce unit costs by exporting.
With diminishing grants and with the availability of foreign equip-
11 This relates to the U.S.A. Försvarsindustriella problem, pp. 10-11.
12 Svensk krigsmaterielexport (SOU 1970:63). passim.
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ment which is cheaper or better or both, it might appear more and 
more tempting to import equipment for Sweden's defence or to allow 
Sweden’s military equipment industry to cooperate with those abroad. 
But to do this would be to infringe a fundamental principle - that of 
self-sufficiency - and perhaps jeopardise confidence in neutrality. 
Another not very attractive alternative would be to reduce the 
demand for quality, i.e. to abandon the ambition to supply the 
Swedish armed forces with equipment as sophisticated in weapon 
technology as that possessed by the foremost great powers. There 
seem to be signs of growing difficulties here, most readily apparent 
within the aircraft industry.
During the post-war period the Swedish aircraft industry has 
developed a series of advanced aircraft, called Tunnan, Lansen and 
Draken. Plans for the most recent, called Viggen, began to be made at 
the end of the 1950s, and it was possible to supply them to the units 
ten years later. However, the Viggen project became so large and 
complex that Swedish industry found it difficult to carry it out. 
American expertise had already been called in at the planning stage 
of the project. As in the past, foreign designs and help from foreign 
companies were used in the engine production: in this case Pratt & 
Whitney Aircraft in the U.S.A. In addition American companies 
supplied large parts of the Viggen’s electronic system, the central 
data amongst other things coming from Honeywell. Throughout the 
whole of the post-war period there has to some extent been direct 
importation of equipment for Sweden’s defence. In addition there 
have been purchases made abroad by Swedish suppliers. Around 
1970, however, as much as about one-third of all the equipment 
acquired was imported. In the aircraft and missile sector the import 
requirements have been even greater, a fact which was heavily 
underlined by the Viggen project which has in fact been the heart of 
Sweden’s whole defence system for a long period.13
At the same time the cost of the project has threatened to exceed 
the limits set by the defence grants. A heated debate has flared up 
about the wisdom of spending the bulk of the grants on a single 
defence system. Criticism has also been made of the military/indus­
trial bodies which have in practice taken the key decisions to back
13 Forsvarsindustriella problem, pp. 52-57.
The Viggen aeroplane was equpped with radar produced by L. M. Ericsson (L. M. 
Ericsson).
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the Viggen. The broad measure of agreement about the form which 
Sweden’s defence should take has diminished, and voices have been 
raised in favour of a sturdy, cheaper defence in depth as an alternative 
to the expensive, advanced “shell defence” of the country’s borders.
In the middle of the 1970s most of the signs seem to indicate 
that the Swedish aircraft industry will not design any successor to 
the Viggen. Instead it is being advocated within the air force that 
foreign types of aircraft should be manufactured under Iicenced4This 
would constitute a return to the position before the Second World 
War.
During the Second World War there occurred a transformation 
in the Swedish defence industry and the forms of cooperation with the 
armed forces as a result of a bounding increase in the ambition to 
be prepared for defence and in the will to keep up with the techno-
14 Dödsstöten för nytt flyg från SAAB. Dagens Nyheter 9/3 1976.
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logical development of weapons. The foreign political situation and 
the existence of an industrial defence establishment have contributed 
to the fact that the structure of the war years has been maintained 
remarkably unchanged right up to the 1970s. It is not only the Viggen 
debate which indicates that this period of great unity about an 
ambitious and costly defence policy is coming to an end and that the 
foundations of an advanced and independent defence industry have 
been shaken as a result. It was only within a few years of the end 
of the First World War that the arms supplied to Sweden’s forces 
were sharply curtailed - the defence budgets of the 1920s were very 
small indeed and they did not allow for any large orders of equipment. 
The development since the Second World War has been different. 
Not until thirty years after the end of the war has the foreign political 
situation become such that it is possible to discern the close of an era 
which opened with the rearmament at the end of the 1930s.
Appendix 1. The defence cost of acquiring mechanical 
military equipment
However difficult it may be to define the engineering industry 
precisely, it is just as difficult to provide an exact definition of 
“mechanical military equipment”. Nevertheless, both terms cor­
respond to a practical reality. They are based on what the official 
industrial statistics call the metal industry. Military equipment 
produced by that type of industry is called mechanical military 
equipment. In the armed forces equipment belonging to this group 
in practice is kept separate in different services - even if under 
different names - from equipment such as quartermaster's equipment, 
medical equipment, et cetera.
Demarcations are discussed in Government Bill no. 1 of 1941. In it 
there appear by way of introduction in connection with the budget 
proposals for the Ministry of Defence the results of the inquiry into 
the Ministry’s statement, reports on matters submitted to it for 
consideration and the opinion expressed by the Minister.1 The 
national defence committee of 1941 includes in its estimates of costs a 
naturally demarcated cost group called “Engineering Products”, 
consisting of armoured cars, tanks and the like, ships, aircraft, other 
motor vehicles, weapons, ammunition, other engineering products, 
repairs and maintenance.2
In the estimates which were compiled within IK in connection with 
the national defence committee of 1941, the equipment mentioned 
above was placed under the heading “Compilation of the annual costs
* Riksdagstrycket 1941 Cl.
2 Betänkande med förslag till plan för organisationsarbetet inom försvarsväsendet. 
(SOU 1942:1), p. 29.
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of the types of equipment for the manufacturing of which the engi­
neering industry will be responsible”.* 3
It is probable that the group “mechanical military equipment” 
can be demarcated. The question then arises as to whether the sources 
allow differentiation in the grants.
The granting of funds to the defence during the period 3/9 1939— 
1/7 1944 was effected by Parliament allocating sums for respective 
budget years which were intended to cover expenditure which would 
also be normal in peace time according to the defence organization. 
Over and above this funds were made available for special emergency 
budgets which had to be used as interim budgets on account of the 
increased state of preparedness. This expenditure was adjusted 
afterwards through supplementary budgets, normally one at the end of 
December and one at the end of the budget year. The interim budget 
accounts were rendered in accordance with a wartime accounting 
system with special war headings which were statistical sub-headings 
in the interim budget grants. From April 1940 there was a complete 
change-over to war heading accountancy. To begin with the war 
headings did not completely correspond to the lay-out of the 
Government’s current budget. However, with the introduction of the 
new lay-out for the Government’s current budget from the budget 
year 1941/1942 onwards the two accounting systems corresponded. 
The war heading account was supplemented by a special account 
connected with the grant groups of the national budget. Only current 
expenditure on preparedness, which did not include equipment, was 
shown under war headings. From 1 July 1944 there was a change­
over to more peacelike conditions for the granting of funds for 
defence.
At the General Accounting Office compilations have been made of 
the total expenditure on defence throughout the whole period of the 
war, distributed according to the national budget's grant groups for 
the budget year 1941/42. Only for the budget year 1939/40 is there a 
large equipment item which is common to all the branches of the 
services.4
3 IKKR B:2 10/42. RA.
3 See Riksdagens revisorers berättelse 1945 I, pp. 71-77: Förskottsstats- och krigs-
titelredovisningen under den förstärkta försvarsberedskapen; II. pp. 84-100: Riksräken- 
skapsverkets yttrande i anledning av riksdagens revisorers uttalande: Riksdagstrycket 
1946: C17.
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A compilation of the costs of such equipment from these grant 
groups as is manufactured by the engineering industry includes the 
following items:
for the army: “ordnance equipment”, i.e. weapons and ammuni­
tion, signal and technical engineering equipment, motor vehicles and 
trailers, grants for industrial preparedness for war, experiments with 
certain ordnance equipment and non-recurring grants for the acquisi­
tion of ordnance equipment.
for the navy: “floating equipment, artillery equipment, et cetera", 
i.e. shipbuilding for the navy and the coast artillery and maintainance 
of ships, the acquisition and maintenance of motor vehicles, the 
acquisition of artillery and other technical equipment, experiments 
with certain equipment and grants to industry’s war organization.
for the air force: “flying equipment et cetera”, i.e. the acquisition 
and maintenance of aircraft, weapons and ammunition, motor vehicles 
and motor boats, fire-fighting equipment, equipment for the upkeep 
of airfields and subsidies to industry's war organization.
The cost of these types of equipment is shown in table 16.
Table 16. Collocation of grants made for certain types of defence equipment 
1939140-1944/45. In millions of kronor.
Army Navy Air Force Joint Total
1939/40 235.6 105.7 117.3 220.2 678.8
40/41 450.9 201.5 209.8 12.6 874.8
41/42 412.7 155.1 129.6 4.9 702.3
42/43 451.8 212.1 140.8 42.6 847.3
43/44 389.3 179.2 179.2 0.8 748.5
44/45 326.2 114.2 172.9 0.2 613.5
Total 2,266.5 967.8 949.6 281.3 4,465.2
Source: Riksräkenskapsverkets årsbok 1948, pp. 78-84.
After the end of the war an inquiry was carried out on the instruc­
tions of the Ministry of Defence into grants which had been made 
for the acquisition of equipment for the armed forces for the period 
1 September 1939-30 June 1945. Collodions were made of grants in
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interim budgets for non-recurring expenditure as well as in national 
budgets and supplementary budgets. In these a more precise break­
down of equipment was made. To demarcate a group of mechanical 
military equipment for the present account the following groups of 
equipment have been selected: ammunition, artillery equipment, fire 
protection equipment, salvage and diving equipment, coding equip­
ment, ships and boats, aircraft equipment, beacons, mine equipment, 
motor vehicles, reserve power units, fences and barbed wire, tele­
phone and other signalling equipment, torpedoes and ordnance equip­
ment. Table 17 is a collocation based on these groups.
The total figure in table 17 is 266 million kronor lower than the 
corresponding figure in table 16. Several factors interact to bring 
about this difference. During the budget years 1943/44 and 1944/45 
47 million kronor was allocated for the reacquisition of certain equip­
ment which had been handed over to the Danish and Norwegian 
police organizations. Since these allocations should have been 
covered by funds accruing from sales they have not been included in 
table 17. In addition, a number of irrelevant items have been excluded 
from table 17 which had been included in the collocations of the 
General Accounting Office as a result of the general wording of the 
Government grants. These include for example experiments with 
ordnance equipment, maintenance of equipment and subsidies to 
industry’s war organization. On the other hand the figures given in 
table 17 are somewhat low since funds from interim budgets for 
current expenditure (as opposed to non-recurring expenditure) have 
not been included. As was mentioned above, these were shown only- 
under war headings and without special votes of supplies. These costs 
also included purchases of equipment, even if this was not usual, 
but because of the set pattern of accounting principles it is very 
difficult to determine the extent of these. The material compiled 
by the Ministry of Defence has been used for the present account 
since it is more specific. In Ihct the figures are probably on the low 
side.
One weakness which affects both sources is the fact that they are 
based on grants which were sanctioned and not on grants which were 
used. Thus to obtain an accurate figure the debit position in respect 
of the various grants at the beginning and the end of the period would 
have to be established. It has not been thought worthwhile to do the
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Table 17. Collocation of grants made for certain types of defence equipment 1/9 1939-3016 1945. In
millions of kronor.
1939/40 40/41 41/42 42/3 43/44 44/45 Total
Ammunition 88.9 202.6 221.8 49.6 194.3 45.1 802.4
including: the army 20.0 111.2 96.9 14.3 139.9 24.2 406.5
the navy 10.8 11.5 32.5 8.3 6.6 - 69.8
the air force 15.6 33.0 24.4 15.0 15.0 15.0 118.0
joint 0.4 15.4 57.4 1.4 30.8 2.8 108.2
mines 32.6 31.1 8.3 5.3 0.2 0,7 78.2
torpedoes 9.5 0.4 2.3 5.3 1.8 2.4 21.7
Weapons 422.3 331.1 554.4 156.7 309.3 182.6 1,956.5
including: the army 344.6 241.7 536.3 140.1 295.9 161.9 1,720.5
the navy 77.7 89.4 18.2 16.6 13.4 20.7 236.1
Ships and boats 164.2 117.4 75.9 55.0 38.9 37.0 488.4
Aircraft equipment 184.9 165.8 141.5 124.1 117.3 142.6 876.2
Other equipment 13.4 5,3 11.2 9.1 33.6 2.6 75.2
Total 873.7 822.3 1,004.8 394.6 69.3.3 410.0 4,198.6
Source: Förteckningar och sammanställningar över under tiden den 1 september 1939-30 juni 1945 
beviljade anslag för materielanskaffning m.m. för krigsmakten. Ber.v. Huvudredogörelse: 
bihang 8. Vol. A:5 MHA.
enormous amount of work which would be necessary to achieve 
precision on this point when the actual system of the allocation of 
funds involves fairly wide margins of uncertainty. This account is 
based on the fact that the total funds available but not used were just 
as great at the beginning of the period as at the end of it. and thus 
involves the assumption that the grants made during the period in 
question correspond to the purchases of equipment made.
Appendix 2. Production agreements relating to iron and metal 
made by IK 1940-1945.
Type of product Type of 
agree­
ment1
Year when
agreement
made
Contracting company
Pig iron
Iron pipes; standard
g 1944 10 iron foundries
pipes g 1943 AB Åkers styckebruk
g 1944 Gjuteri AB Normalrör
g 1944 AB Eksjö Mek. verkstad
forged pressure pipes g 1944 9 workshop companies
g 1944 Husqvarna Vapenfabriks AB
Nickel g 1943, 1944 Bolidens Gruv AB
Tungsten (ore) g 1942, 1943
g 1944, 1945 AB Yxsjö Gruvor
Molybdenum (ore) g 1942 Säters molybdenbolag
g 1942 Källfallsgruvans molybdenbolag
g 1942 Uddgruvans molybdenbolag
Copper ore S 1941, 1943
1945
Bolidens Gruv AB (agreement for 
contract work on certain mining 
deposits owned by the Crown)
Copper g 1940, 1943 Bolidens Gruv AB
g 1941 Riddarhytte AB
g 1944 AB Ferrolegeringar
g 1944, 1945 AB Svenska Metallverken
Zinc g 1944 Trollhättans ElektrothermiskaAB
g 1944 AB Glückmans Metallaffâr
g 1944 Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB
Zinc and lead g 1941 AB Zinkgruvor
Lead g 1941, 1943 
1945 Bolidens Gruv AB
g 1942 Avesta Jernverks AB
g 1942 AB Zinkgruvor
Lead and silver g 1943 Svenska Ackumulator
AB Jungner
Aluminium S 1941 AB Svenska Aluminiumkompaniet
1 Note: g = guarantee contracts (sales and price guarantee) 
s = subsidy agreements
Source: Kristidspolitik och kristidshushållning i Sverige under och efter andra världs­
kriget (SOU 1952:49) pp. 456-458.
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